## HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND ITS IMPACT ON MATERNAL HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION IN LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES

## DHS ANALYIICAL STUDIES 45



SEPTEMBER 2014
This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Wenjuan Wang, Gheda Temsah, and Lindsay Mallick.

# DHS Analytical Studies No. 45 

# Health Insurance Coverage and Its Impact on Maternal Health Care Utilization in Low- and Middle-Income Countries 

Wenjuan Wang
Gheda Temsah
Lindsay Mallick

ICF International
Rockville, Maryland, USA

September 2014

Corresponding author: Wenjuan Wang, International Health and Development, ICF International, 530 Gaither Road, Suite 500, Rockville, Maryland, USA; phone: 301-572-0398; fax: 301-572-0950; email: wenjuan.wang@icfi.com

Acknowledgment: The authors would like to thank Ha Nguyen for her review and invaluable comments.

Editor: Bryant Robey
Document Production: Yuan Cheng

This study was carried out with support provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through The DHS Program (\#AID-OAA-C-13-00095). The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

The DHS Program assists countries worldwide in the collection and use of data to monitor and evaluate population, health, and nutrition programs. For additional information about the DHS Program contact: DHS Program, ICF International, 530 Gaither Road, Suite 500, Rockville, MD 20850, USA; phone: 301-407-6500, fax: 301-407-6501, email: reports@dhsprogram.com, Internet: www.dhsprogram.com.

Recommended citation:
Wang, Wenjuan, Gheda Temsah, and Lindsay Mallick. 2014. Health Insurance Coverage and Its Impact on Maternal Health Care Utilization in Low- and Middle-Income Countries. DHS Analytical Studies No. 45. Rockville, Maryland, USA: ICF International.

## Contents

Tables ..... v
Figures ..... vi
Preface ..... vii
Abstract ..... ix
Executive Summary ..... xi

1. Introduction ..... 1
1.1. Major Health Insurance Schemes in LMICs ..... 1
1.2. Impact of Health Insurance .....  2
2. Data and Methods ..... 5
2.1. Data Used in the Analysis ..... 5
2.2. Definitions of Variables ..... 5
2.3. Statistical Methods ..... 7
3. Results ..... 11
3.1. Health Insurance Coverage, Types, and Differentials. ..... 11
3.2. Propensity Score Estimation and the Quality of Matching ..... 17
3.3. Effects of Health Insurance Using Propensity Score Matching (PSM) ..... 21
4. Discussion and Conclusion ..... 25
References ..... 29
Appendix ..... 35

## Tables

Table 1. Percentage of women and men covered by specific types of health insurance in selected countries ..... 13
Table 2. Percentage of women with health insurance coverage, according to background characteristics ..... 15
Table 3. Percentage of men with health insurance coverage, according to background characteristics. ..... 16
Table 4. Propensity score matching performance: results of the mean and median absolute bias, pseudo- $R^{2}$ and Likelihood ratio (LR) tests ..... 19
Table 5. Number of cases off the common support in propensity score matching ..... 21
Table 6. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of health insurance on utilization of selected maternal health services ..... 22
Appendix Table A. Characteristics of health insurance schemes in eight study countries ..... 35
Appendix Table B. Estimates of the (logit) propensity score models, Albania ..... 38
Appendix Table C. Estimates of the (logit) propensity score models, Burundi ..... 39
Appendix Table D. Estimates of the (logit) propensity score models, Cambodia ..... 40
Appendix Table E. Estimates of the (logit) propensity score models, Gabon ..... 41
Appendix Table F. Estimates of the (logit) propensity score models, Ghana ..... 42
Appendix Table G. Estimates of the (logit) propensity score models, Indonesia ..... 43
Appendix Table H. Estimates of the (logit) propensity score models, Namibia ..... 44
Appendix Table I. Estimates of the (logit) propensity score models, Rwanda ..... 45
Appendix Table J. Mean biases of covariates before and after matching, Albania ..... 46
Appendix Table K. Mean biases of covariates before and after matching, Burundi ..... 48
Appendix Table L. Mean biases of covariates before and after matching, Cambodia ..... 50
Appendix Table M. Mean biases of covariates before and after matching, Gabon ..... 52
Appendix Table N. Mean biases of covariates before and after matching, Ghana ..... 55
Appendix Table O. Mean biases of covariates before and after matching, Indonesia ..... 58
Appendix Table P. Mean biases of covariates before and after matching, Namibia ..... 61
Appendix Table Q. Mean biases of covariates before and after matching, Rwanda ..... 64

## Figures

Figure 1. Percentage of women and men covered by health insurance in Africa
Figure 2. Percentage of women and men covered by health insurance in Asia........................................ 12

## Preface

The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) Program is one of the principal sources of international data on fertility, family planning, maternal and child health, nutrition, mortality, environmental health, HIV/AIDS, malaria, and provision of health services.

One of the objectives of The DHS Program is to analyze DHS data and provide findings that will be useful to policymakers and program managers in low- and middle-income countries. DHS Analytical Studies serve this objective by providing in-depth research on a wide range of topics, typically including several countries and applying multivariate statistical tools and models. These reports are also intended to illustrate research methods and applications of DHS data that may build the capacity of other researchers.

The topics in the DHS Analytical Studies series are selected by The DHS Program in consultation with the U.S. Agency for International Development.

It is hoped that the DHS Analytical Studies will be useful to researchers, policymakers, and survey specialists, particularly those engaged in work in low- and middle-income countries.

Sunita Kishor

Director, The DHS Program


#### Abstract

This study examined levels of health insurance coverage in 30 low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), using nationally representative data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). In eight countries with health insurance coverage exceeding 10 percent, we used propensity score matching and estimated the impact of health insurance status on the use of antenatal care and facility-based delivery care.

Health insurance coverage rates were less than 5 percent in most countries. In a few countries (Rwanda, Gabon, Ghana, and Indonesia), more than one-third of interviewed women and men reported coverage of health insurance, with the highest rate found in Rwanda. Educational attainment was associated with a higher likelihood of enrolling in health insurance. Pro-wealthy disparities in health insurance coverage existed in the majority of countries. In Cambodia and Gabon, however, poor women were more likely than the rich to be covered by health insurance, suggesting that in these countries policies focusing on providing insurance for the poor have been effective.

Our analysis found significant positive effects of health insurance coverage on at least one measure of maternal health care use in seven of the eight countries evaluated. Indonesia stands out for the most systematic effect of health insurance across all measures, followed by Cambodia, Rwanda, and Ghana. The positive impact of health insurance appeared more consistent on the use of facility-based delivery than use of antenatal care. The analysis provides clear evidence that health insurance has contributed to the increased use of maternal health care services.


Keywords: health insurance, maternal healthcare, impact evaluation, low- and middle-income countries

## Executive Summary

With health insurance on the rise in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), a growing body of research literature documents the impact of health insurance on access and use of general health care. However, there is limited empirical evidence on whether health insurance coverage has contributed to the improved use of maternal health services. Using nationally representative data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), this report assessed levels of health insurance coverage in 30 LMICs and examined the impact of health insurance status on use of maternal health care use in eight countries spanning sub-Saharan Africa (Burundi, Gabon, Ghana, Namibia, and Rwanda), West Asia (Albania), and South and Southeast Asia (Cambodia and Indonesia).

## Methods

Data on all interviewed women age 15-49 and men age 15-59 were used to describe levels of health insurance coverage for all 30 countries based on the most recent DHS survey. For evaluating the effects of health insurance on use of maternal health services, we focused on women who reported a live birth in the five years preceding the survey in eight countries where the health insurance coverage rate exceeded 10 percent.

Use of maternal health services was measured by four indicators: making at least one antenatal care visit; making four or more antenatal care visits; initiating antenatal care within the first trimester; and giving birth in a health facility. The main independent variable of interest was a dichotomous measure of health insurance coverage. We evaluated the impact of health insurance on antenatal care and facility-based delivery care using propensity score matching to determine the differences in care seeking behavior that can be attributable to health insurance.

## Results

Levels and differentials of health insurance coverage. Most study countries had fairly low levels of coverage-below 5 percent. In a few countries (Rwanda, Gabon, Ghana, and Indonesia), more than onethird of interviewed women and men reported coverage of health insurance, with the highest rate found in Rwanda, at 71 percent for women and 67 percent for men. In all 30 countries the gender gap in health insurance coverage favored men, with the exceptions of Cambodia, Gabon, Ghana, and Rwanda. The gender gap was small in magnitude given low coverage rates among both women and men.

In most countries educational attainment was associated with a greater likelihood of participating in health insurance even after adjusting for other covariates. Our results also indicated that the education of the head of the household matters, in addition to the individual's level of education. Household wealth status was another important determinant of participating in health insurance. Disparities in health insurance coverage that favor the rich were evident in five countries. In Cambodia and Gabon, however, poor women were more likely to be covered by health insurance than the rich, suggesting that policies targeting the poor have been effective.

Effects of health insurance on use of maternal health care. After propensity score matching, health insurance status was significantly associated with an increased likelihood of making at least one antenatal care visit in Indonesia and Rwanda. Among women who reported at least one antenatal visit, the raw differences between insured and uninsured women in the prevalence of four or more antenatal care visits ranged from 4 to 21 percentage points and were statistically significant in all countries. However, after matching on covariates that could potentially introduce bias, the positive effect of health insurance coverage only remained in Ghana and Indonesia. Health insurance coverage contributed to an increase of 8
percentage points in access to four or more antenatal care visits in Ghana and an increase of 3 percentage points in Indonesia.

Concerning the timing of the first antenatal care visit, in the adjusted effect health insurance coverage was found to increase the use of antenatal care within the first trimester of pregnancy in Namibia, Burundi, and Indonesia by 15,8 , and 2 percentage points, respectively.

In all study countries at least one-half of women delivered their most recent birth in a healthcare facility. After matching, the effect of health insurance on delivery in a healthcare facility was positive and statistically significant in four of the eight countries-Cambodia, Ghana, Indonesia, and Rwanda. In these countries, health insurance coverage contributed to an increase of 5-11 percentage points in the receipt of facility-based delivery care. In Gabon, however, health insurance status had a significant negative effect on the use of facility-based delivery care.

In summary, our impact evaluation found statistically significant positive effects of health insurance coverage on at least one measure of maternal health care use in seven of the eight countries evaluated. Indonesia stands out for the most systematic effect of health insurance across all measures, followed by Cambodia, Rwanda, and Ghana. The positive impact of health insurance appeared more consistent on the use of facility-based delivery than on antenatal care services.

## Conclusions

Health insurance programs in LMICs are still in the early stages. Despite countries' efforts in targeting the poor by reducing or removing premiums of health insurance, disparities that favor the more affluent are evident in most countries studied. Health insurance schemes in Cambodia and Gabon are effective in increasing coverage among the poor. Overall, there is clear evidence that health insurance has contributed to the increased use of maternal health care.

## 1. Introduction

With health insurance on the rise in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), a growing body of literature documents the impact of health insurance on access and use of health care, financial protection, and health status in these countries (Chen et al. 2003; Dixon et al. 2014; Dong 2012; El-Shazly et al. 2000; Escobar et al. 2010; Hong et al. 2011; Jütting 2005; Kozhimannil et al. 2009; Mensah et al. 2010; Smith and Sulzbach 2008; Wang et al. 2009). While a number of rigorous studies have evaluated the impact of health insurance on the use of general health care (i.e., outpatient and inpatient care) (Giedion et al. 2013), there is limited empirical evidence of its impact on the use of maternal health care. In the context of global maternal and child health priorities, as echoed by the 1987 Safe Motherhood Initiative, 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, 1995 Fourth World Conference for Women, and the Millennium Development Goals (AbouZahr 2003), there is an increased need to evaluate whether health insurance has contributed to improved levels of use of maternal health care services.

Using nationally representative data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), this report assesses levels of health insurance coverage in 30 LMICs and examines the impact of health insurance status on use of maternal health care in eight countries spanning sub-Saharan Africa (Burundi, Gabon, Ghana, Namibia, and Rwanda), West Asia (Albania), and South and Southeast Asia (Cambodia and Indonesia). We evaluate the impact of health insurance on antenatal care and facility-based delivery care using propensity score matching to determine the differences in care seeking behavior that can be attributable to health insurance. The results of this report provide up-to-date information on levels of health insurance coverage in LMICs. The findings help to expand understanding of the effect of health insurance on the use of maternal health services in a range of areas poorly covered in the existing literature.

### 1.1. Major Health Insurance Schemes in LMICs

The types of health insurance available can greatly influence the use of health care, the financial burden related to health care, and individual health status (Cheng and Chiang 1998). Financial mechanisms impact patterns of delivery and use of maternal care services (Ensor and Ronoh 2005). Various aspects of an insurance scheme, such as its cost, benefits, location of services provided, and to whom the services are targeted affect enrollment (Escobar et al. 2010; Robyn et al. 2013). It is important to consider these variations when examining the effect of health insurance on a particular population. Two types of insurance schemes are commonly implemented in LMICs-namely, Social Health Insurance (SHI) and CommunityBased Health Insurance (CBHI)—and individual variances within these programs exist as well. These schemes differ on enrollment requirements, funding, size of the risk pool, and associated fees, including entry fees, out-of-pocket fees, and reimbursement mechanisms.

### 1.1.1. Social health insurance

In countries with SHI, insurance coverage is typically mandated, particularly for those who are employed in the public sector, and is funded by employer/employee contributions along with government funding, usually through taxation. It is managed and regulated by the government, either at the national or district levels, and usually requires employer/employee contributions among the working population (Acharya et al. 2013; Wagstaff 2010). While universal health care may be a goal of SHI programs, these programs run the risk of financial mismanagement or underfunding and underrepresentation of the poor, due to targeting wealthier individuals who can afford to join the programs (Hsiao and Shaw 2007). SHI has become popular in several Asian and African countries including the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Ghana, and Gabon (Hsiao and Shaw 2007; Humphreys 2013; Spaan et al. 2012; Sparrow et al. 2010).

### 1.1.2 Community-based health insurance

In contrast to SHI, CBHI is managed at the community level by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or providers (Hsiao and Shaw 2007), with subsidies provided by the government or an NGO (Acharya et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2009). Although CBHI programs can vary greatly within and across countries, they tend to target those who are not covered by formal schemes and who are at risk for impoverishment from catastrophic healthcare costs (Hsiao and Shaw 2007). Enrollment is typically voluntary (Aggarwal 2010), which in turn affects the characteristics of the risk pool through adverse selection, whereby the less healthy may be overrepresented in the risk pool (Hsiao and Shaw 2007). These consequences, as well as lack of financial sustainability (Robyn et al. 2013), are inherent to CBHI programs that attempt to avoid potentially inadequate government administration. Some countries, including Rwanda, are moving toward universal coverage by mandating insurance through a decentralized national system that provides regulation and oversight for private and CBHI schemes (Saksena et al. 2011). CBHI has gained in popularity in many African countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Senegal, as well as Rwanda (Spaan et al. 2012).

### 1.2. Impact of Health Insurance

### 1.2.1. Use of health care

The impact of health insurance is usually assessed on use of healthcare services, financial protection, and health status. Among these three outcomes, more research has been done on the use of healthcare services, especially general health care, than on the other two outcomes (Giedion et al. 2013; Giedion et al. 2007; King et al. 2009; Nguyen et al. 2012; Thornton et al. 2010; Wagner et al. 2011; Wagstaff 2007; Wang et al. 2009). In one study, cooperative members enrolled in health insurance had a significantly higher number of outpatient health care visits as well as surgeries, compared with those who were part of uninsured cooperatives (Aggarwal 2010). In another rigorous study using propensity score matching, it was found that in Vietnam health insurance increased use of services, particularly inpatient care (Wagstaff 2007). While this program targets Vietnam's poor and requires members to enroll in Vietnam's SHI program, which provides services at hospitals and essential prescription medication, coverage in 2004 was only around 15 percent among the sample population; these enrollees were disproportionately poor compared with the sample. An evaluation of a CBHI program in Rural China, called RMHC, which included both reduced prices of health care as well as regulations for village doctors that aim to improve quality of care, showed that enrollment in this insurance scheme increased the probability of outpatient care by 70 percent (Wang et al. 2009). Using data from over 50 countries surveyed by the World Health Organization (WHO), a regression analysis showed that insured families (some or all members) were more likely to have had access to care or adult chronic care when last needed, compared with those without insurance (Wagner et al. 2011).

Maternal and child health services are typically covered in benefit packages of health insurance. However, few studies, especially those using rigorous methodology, have assessed the impact of health insurance on use of maternal and child health care. After employing propensity score matching to balance demographic characteristics such as region, age, marital status, and wealth assets, Mensah, Oppong and Schmidt (2010) found that in Ghana women with insurance under the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), compared with women without insurance, had significantly fewer birth complications ( 1.4 versus. 7.5 percent), had more births at a hospital ( 75 versus 53 percent), received professional assistance more commonly during birth ( 65 versus 47 percent), and had at least three prenatal check-ups ( 86 versus 72 percent) (Mensah et al. 2010). Postnatal women with insurance had check-ups and vaccinations for their children on average more than uninsured women ( 86 versus 71 percent). In assessing a pilot voucher program in Bangladesh, the authors compared the intervention and comparison areas with difference-in-differences methods and found that women in intervention areas had significantly higher probability of using antenatal care, institutional delivery, and postnatal care (Nguyen et al. 2012). Confirmed with both propensity score matching and difference-in-differences methods, Giedian and coauthors suggested that in Colombia the subsidized health insurance program increased the use of professionally attended delivery care as well as complete
immunization coverage among children, even though immunization was provided free in the public sector (Giedion et al. 2007). Several other studies have also demonstrated a positive association between use of maternal health care and health insurance coverage, but with less rigorous methodology (Kozhimannil et al. 2009; Smith and Sulzbach 2008).

Some research, however, has reported mixed findings regarding the impact of health insurance on use of health care. An evaluation of CBHI in one province in India employed a propensity score matching technique and did not find differences in maternal health care by health insurance coverage, either in use of prenatal services or delivery in private facilities (Aggarwal 2010). The author suggests that this was most likely because, at the time of the study, coverage of normal deliveries in private settings had been only recently added to the insurance scheme so that there was not enough time to measure meaningful change. Additionally, in this province in India maternal health fees were already negligible in government facilities.

### 1.2.2. Financial protection

Individuals with health insurance are more likely to use healthcare services and to use them more frequently than those without insurance; additionally, having insurance reduces out-of-pocket expenditures, although results are more pronounced in wealthier households (Aggarwal 2010; Acharya 2013). This can be seen in the reduction of borrowing or selling of assets in order to pay for care (Aggarwal 2010). While health insurance may not influence out-of-pocket spending on health care within the poorest households, it can help to avoid catastrophic costs (Wagstaff 2007). Likewise, Thornton and colleagues concluded from a oneyear experimental study of pre-and post-insurance implementation in Nicaragua that insurance does not provide cost savings, as out-of-pocket cost reductions are offset by the cost of the insurance premiums (Thornton et al. 2010). However, several rigorous studies confirm that both CBHI and SHI protect enrollees by reducing out-of-pocket spending and guard against catastrophic expenditures (Bauhoff et al. 2011; Nguyen and Wang 2013; Nguyen et al. 2011).

Studies on SHI in China and CBHI in Senegal and Ghana have demonstrated that out-of-pocket expenditures for facility-based delivery decrease with insurance coverage (Long et al. 2010; Smith and Sulzbach 2008). Both studies employed linear regression models of a logarithmic scale of out-of-pocket expenditures on facility-based delivery and found that the insurance significantly reduced expenditures on delivery care, even after controlling for covariates.

### 1.2.3. Health outcomes

Although it is generally expected that health insurance enrollment can improve health outcomes by reducing financial barriers to use of health services, research has not clearly demonstrated a causal link between health status and health insurance in developing countries (Escobar et al. 2010). Measuring changes in health status through indicators of mortality is not only methodologically difficult, but may not be sensitive enough to provide evidence of the impact of health insurance, particularly given that health insurance and thus research on it are relatively recent in developing countries(Escobar et al. 2010; Long et al. 2010).

## 2. Data and Methods

This study uses a propensity score matching method to assess the impact of health insurance status on antenatal and delivery care in eight countries spanning sub-Saharan Africa (Burundi, Gabon, Ghana, Namibia, and Rwanda), West Asia (Albania), and South and Southeast Asia (Cambodia and Indonesia).

### 2.1. Data Used in the Analysis

The data used in this study come from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). The DHS Program has been providing technical assistance in the implementation of more than 300 surveys spanning more than 90 developing countries. DHS surveys are a key source of nationally representative and comparative data on population and health indicators, including maternal health and health insurance coverage. We use data from DHS surveys that collected information on health insurance coverage of women and men. We focus on countries in Africa and Asia due to the lack of empirical data demonstrating the effects of health insurance on the use of healthcare services in these regions.

The study uses data on all interviewed women age 15-49 and men age $15-59^{1}$ to describe levels of health insurance coverage for 30 countries based on the most recent survey. To ensure adequate sample size, only countries in which levels of health insurance coverage among women exceed 10 percent are analyzed for the effects of health insurance on use of maternal health care. Eight countries are included in the evaluation of the effects of health insurance, with surveys conducted between 2008 and 2012. Data on women’s sexual and reproductive health behavior and outcomes are obtained by interviewing women of reproductive age (15-49). Information on socioeconomic characteristics of the women and their households is also collected. Our target population for assessing the effects of health insurance is women who reported a live birth in the five years preceding the survey.

### 2.2. Definitions of Variables

### 2.2.1. Dependent variables

The study explores four outcomes of use of maternal health care for the most recent birth: whether a woman made at least one antennal care visit (ANC1); whether a woman made at least four antenatal care visits (ANC4); whether the first antenatal care visit occurred within the first three months (ANCMONTH); and whether the woman gave birth in a healthcare facility (FACBIRTH). The selection of these outcomes is based on standards of prenatal and delivery care recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO 2004).

The DHS asked women about the number of antenatal care visits during pregnancy of the most recent birth, the timing of the first antenatal care visit, and the place of delivery. We constructed two measures of the number of visits: whether the woman made at least one visit, and whether the woman made at least four antenatal care visits. Because receiving good-quality care during pregnancy promotes better health outcomes for mothers and their children throughout the life course (AbouZahr and Wardlaw 2003), the study distinguishes between women who made at least one visit and those who made the standard of a minimum of four visits recommended by WHO.

WHO (2004) recommends that in order to detect and effectively treat underlying problems the first antenatal care visit occur as early as possible, and preferably within the first trimester. We constructed a measure of

[^0]whether the woman made her first antenatal care visit during the first three months of her pregnancy based on the question on timing of the first antenatal care visit. Additionally, we constructed an indicator of the quality of delivery care based on women's response to where the most recent delivery occurred.

All of the use measures are dichotomous, coded as 0 or 1. ANC1 and FACBIRTH include all women age 15-49 who had a live birth in the five years preceding the survey. However, ANC4 and ANCMONTH are specific to women who reported at least one antenatal care visit.

### 2.2.2. Independent variable

The main independent variable of interest is health insurance coverage. The DHS asked respondents whether they are covered by health insurance and the type of health insurance by which they are covered. We constructed a dichotomous measure of health insurance coverage. A variety of health insurance schemes exist and may differ, for example, in the range of services offered and reimbursement, which may have a different effect on use of health care. Data limitations did not enable us to distinguish between different types of health insurance. However, results are interpreted based on each country's health insurance mechanisms. Appendix A provides a summary of characteristics of health insurance schemes in the study countries.

### 2.2.3. Covariates

We controlled for a host of background characteristics of women and their households that can have a confounding effect on the use of pregnancy-related care seeking behavior (Acharya et al. 2013; Mensah et al. 2010). Use of maternal health care is shaped by a myriad of additional factors such as financial, geographic, and cultural barriers (Borghi et al. 2006). Because this is a secondary data analysis, our selection of covariates was limited to those variables available in the DHS.

Variables controlled for included: maternal age at the most recent birth, marital status, and employment status; mother's education, education of household head, and household wealth; mother's exposure to mass media; and child's birth order. Because place of residence can shape both access to health insurance and to healthcare services, we included regional dummies and a measure of whether the household is located in an urban area (coded 0 or 1 ) based on country-specific definitions. Similar variables have been controlled for in other analyses of the association between health insurance and use of health care (Dixon et al. 2014; Ettenger et al. 2014; Hong et al. 2011; Jütting 2004).

Maternal age at the time of the most recent birth was included as a continuous variable. Because the association between age and health insurance and use of health care may be non-linear, we also included a quadratic term of the variable. Mother's education is a self-reported measure reflecting the highest education level at the time of the survey and grade within that level. Our analysis used a recoded variable of mother's education and education of household head categorized into three groups: no education, primary education, and secondary education or higher. Marital status at the time of the survey was coded as never married, currently married, and formerly married. Employment status was coded as a dichotomous variable and includes both paid and unpaid work on family farms and businesses. The DHS collects data on various household assets and characteristics from which a country-specific wealth quintile index is then calculated based on a principal components analysis (Rutstein and Johnson 2004). Birth order was categorized in four groups: eldest, second, third, and fourth or higher.

### 2.3. Statistical Methods

We applied a propensity scoring matching (PSM) approach to evaluate the effect of health insurance coverage on women's use of antenatal and delivery care. The propensity to seek health services is likely to be correlated with factors that influence the propensity to enroll in health insurance, thereby introducing bias both due to observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Multivariate regression does not address the issue of selection bias. PSM methods are non-parametric estimation methods that address selection bias due to observed heterogeneity by matching a pool of treatment cases to control cases that are identical in their propensity to receive treatment whereby the set of observable characteristics $X$ are independent of assignment to treatment.

Developed by Rosenbum and Rubin (1983), this method has been used increasingly in a variety of research fields. Unlike other methods that match on a set of covariates X , which can lead to 'the curse of dimensionality' when there are many covariates, PSM methods match on the propensity to receive treatment (propensity score), since observations with the same propensity score share similar distributions of the covariates (Mocan and Tekin 2006). The propensity score is defined as a function of a vector of covariates X such the covariates are independent of the assignment to treatment ( $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{i}}$ ) (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). The average effect of treatment (ATE) on an outcome variable Y can then be estimated as the difference in outcomes between treatment and control cases after the control cases are reweighted by the propensity score of the distribution of treatment cases (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008):

$$
\tau_{A T E}=E(\tau)=E[Y(1)-Y(0)]
$$

The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is a more popular metric since it estimates the effect of treatment for individuals for whom the intervention was intended, in contrast to ATE which provides an estimate of the population average treatment effect (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008):

$$
\tau_{A T T}=E(\tau \mid D=1)=E[Y(1) \mid D=1]-E[Y(0) \mid D=1]
$$

The ATT is thus the difference between the expected outcome values with and without treatment for cases that received treatment (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). Since the counterfactual for cases that received treatment without treatment is not observed, it is estimated based on assumption that after adjusting for observed characteristics it is the same for $\mathrm{D}=1$ and $\mathrm{D}=0$ (Aggarwal 2010).

### 2.3.1. Estimating the propensity score

The first step in the PSM method was estimating the propensity score using a logit regression. This involved determining the covariates to be included in the specification of the propensity score. The selection of covariates can bias the estimate. Only variables unaffected by treatment (e.g. fixed over time or measured before treatment) should be included (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). A variable should be excluded if it is not correlated with the outcome, or if it is weakly correlated because it does not address confounding (Brookhart et al. 2006; Brooks and Ohsfeldt 2013) and can potentially add bias (Brookhart et al. 2006; Garrido et al. 2014; Ho et al. 2007; Imbens 2004). The inclusion of unrelated variables may make it harder to fulfill the common support condition-namely, ensuring that every treated case is matched to a control case (Bryson et al. 2002). In small samples, over-parameterized models may increase the variance of the propensity scores without necessarily increasing their bias (Augurzky and Schmidt 2001; Bryson et al. 2002).

Our selection of variables was guided by theory and consensus within the literature (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008; Rubin and Thomas 1996), as well as data available in the DHS. A variable was dropped only if it was not simultaneously correlated with both the treatment and outcome. Because the analytical sample differed by outcome, for every country the propensity score was estimated for two samples: all women who had a live birth in the last five years (ANC1 and FACBIRTH) and women who had at least one antenatal care visit (ANC4 and ANCMONTH). Propensity scores were generated using STATA’s pscore command.

### 2.3.2. Balancing test

The recoding of the covariates is determined by satisfying the balancing property-that is, that the average propensity score of treatment and control units do not differ within each group (Becker and Ichino 2002). We implemented several iterations of the estimation of the propensity score in which we recoded variables in order to satisfy the balancing property. The recoded variables are reflected in the results tables.

We imposed the common support as it may improve the quality of the match (Heckman et al. 1997). Imposing the common support condition ensures that each treated unit (women with health insurance) is matched with a corresponding control unit (women with no health insurance). However, this can result in loss of sample size (Lechner 2001) due to the exclusion of cases whose propensity score is greater than the maximum or less than the minimum score in the comparison group (Aggarwal 2010), possibly producing misleading results (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). We reported the number of off-support cases for each estimation of the propensity score.

### 2.3.3. Algorithm for matching and estimation of the effects of health insurance

Various methods of matching are available to create a comparison group that can be used to construct counterfactual outcomes for estimating treatment effects. No method is superior but each has a different tradeoff between quantity and quality of results (Becker and Ichino 2002) because of the different ways in which the method defines the neighborhood for matching and assigns weights (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). We used STATA's teffects psmatch command to estimate ATT using several different algorithms and selected the one that yielded the best match. The following matching algorithms were tested: nearest neighbor with and without replacement and radius matching within various calipers. ${ }^{2}$ The estimation of the variance of treatment effects includes variation due to the estimation of the propensity score and imputation of the common support (Aggarwal 2010). Unlike other STATA commands, teffects psmatch accounts for additional variance due to the estimation of the propensity score. ${ }^{3}$

### 2.3.4. Quality of matching

Several measures can be used to assess the quality of matching to ensure that the distribution of the covariates between the treatment and control group are the same. STATA's pstest command summarizes the balance of covariates between treatment and control groups both before and after matching. It also provides the standardized bias, pseudo- $R^{2}$, likelihood ratio test for joint insignificance, and two-sample ttest results, which can serve as indicators of the quality of matching. Standardized bias ranging between $3-$ 5 percent post-matching is deemed sufficient (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). Pseudo- $R^{2}$ indicates the extent to which the covariates explain the probability of receiving treatment; lower $R^{2}$ indicates reasonably good

[^1]matches. For logit models, to indicate a good match the likelihood ratio test of joint insignificance should be insignificant after matching (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). We selected the matching method that produced the best quality matching and reported its outcomes as well as the standardized bias, pseudo- $R^{2}$, likelihood ratio test for joint insignificance, and two-sample t-test.

## 3. Results

### 3.1. Health Insurance Coverage, Types, and Differentials

This section presents levels of health insurance coverage among adult women and men in 30 countries. In eight countries, Albania, Burundi, Cambodia, Gabon, Ghana, Indonesia, Namibia, and Rwanda, where the overall level of coverage was at 10 percent or higher, the section analyzes prevalence rates of specific types of insurance and differentials in coverage by respondents' background characteristics.

### 3.1.1. Levels of health insurance coverage

Figure 1 presents the percentage of interviewed women and men with any type of health insurance in 25 African countries. Most countries had fairly low levels of coverage. Women in 14 countries and men in 10 countries reported a coverage rate below 5 percent. In three countries-Rwanda, Gabon, and Ghana-over 30 percent of women and men had health insurance at the time of the survey. The highest level of coverage was found in Rwanda, at 71percent for women and 67 percent for men.

Figure 1. Percentage of women and men covered by health insurance in Africa


Figure 2 shows levels of coverage in five Asian countries for which the most recent DHS collected data on health insurance. Indonesia had the highest levels of health insurance coverage, at 37 percent for women and 41 percent for men in 2012. The Albania 2008-09 DHS showed a coverage rate of 22 percent for women and 29 percent for men. In Armenia and Azerbaijan the level of health insurance coverage was very low, especially among women.

In all 30 countries the gender gap in health insurance coverage favored men, with the exception of Cambodia, Gabon, Ghana, and Rwanda. Among the four countries where women had higher levels of coverage than men, the largest gap was found in Ghana, at an 8 percentage-point difference in 2008. However, in most countries the gender gap was small, with low coverage rates among both women and men.

Figure 2. Percentage of women and men covered by health insurance in Asia


### 3.1.2. Types of health insurance

Table 1 presents the percentage of women and men with specific types of health insurance in seven countries with relatively high levels of coverage. Gabon is not included in this table because the 2012 Gabon DHS did not collect data on types of insurance. Respondents could report more than one type of health insurance. Several major types of insurance schemes were observed in these countries.

Table 1. Percentage of women and men covered by specific types of health insurance in selected countries

| Country | Type of insurance | Women | Men |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Albania | State health insurance | 15.0 | 21.3 |
|  | State social insurance | 10.9 | 12.6 |
|  | Private/commercial purchased | 2.2 | 1.7 |
|  | Other | 2.5 | 4.5 |
|  | Total | 21.5 | 28.9 |
| Burundi | Mutual/community organization | 4.8 | 4.7 |
|  | Provided by employer | 4.4 | 5.5 |
|  | Private/commercially purchased | 0.9 | 0.0 |
|  | Other | 0.4 | 2.0 |
|  | Total | 10.4 | 12.1 |
| Cambodia | Health equity fund | 8.5 | 6.4 |
|  | Provided by employer | 0.2 | 0.4 |
|  | Private | 0.1 | 0.2 |
|  | Other | 1.9 | 1.0 |
|  | Total | 10.7 | 8.0 |
| Ghana | National/ district (nhis) | 38.8 | 29.7 |
|  | Provided by employer | 0.1 | 0.2 |
|  | Private/commercially purchased | 0.1 | 0.0 |
|  | Other | 1.1 | 1.2 |
|  | Total | 40.1 | 31.0 |
| Indonesia | Social security | 25.7 | 25.9 |
|  | Provided by employer | 6.9 | 10.5 |
|  | Private/commercially purchased | 2.9 | 3.9 |
|  | Other | 2.6 | 2.5 |
|  | Total | 37.1 | 40.9 |
| Namibia | Provided by employer | 8.9 | 11.4 |
|  | Social security | 4.5 | 5.7 |
|  | Mutual/community organization | 3.6 | 4.5 |
|  | Private | 2.5 | 4.6 |
|  | Other | 0.6 | 0.3 |
|  | Total | 18.4 | 21.8 |
| Rwanda | Mutual/community based health insurance | 68.0 | 63.9 |
|  | Rama | 2.1 | 1.8 |
|  | Privately purchased/commercial health | 0.3 | 0.3 |
|  | other | 0.9 | 0.7 |
|  | Total | 71.4 | 66.7 |

Note: In all the countries except Rwanda, respondents were allowed to report multiple types of insurance; so the sum of the percentages may exceed the total prevalence.

Gabon is not included in this table due to unavailability of data on types of insurance.

Social health insurance was the primary type of coverage in five countries (Albania, Cambodia, Ghana, Indonesia, and Namibia). Almost all Ghanaian women and men with health insurance were enrolled in the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). In Indonesia about a fourth (26 percent) of women and men were covered by social security.

Community-based health insurance was reported in a few countries. In Rwanda the vast majority of people who reported health insurance coverage were covered by Mutual Health Insurance, a community-based health insurance scheme. Community-based health insurance was also reported in Burundi and Namibia, although at much lower levels compared with Rwanda.

Employer-based health insurance was rarely reported except in Namibia, where it was the most common type of insurance, reported by 9 percent of women and 11 percent of men in 2009. Private or commercially purchased health insurance was uncommon in the study countries. The highest level of private insurance coverage was observed in Namibia, at less than 5 percent for both women and men.

### 3.1.3. Differentials in health insurance coverage

Table 2 and Table 3 report the percentage of women and men with any health insurance coverage at the time of the interview by background characteristics including respondents' age, marital status, education, employment status, household wealth status, and urban-rural residence.

Overall, women age 15-24 were less likely than older women to be covered by health insurance. The age differences were not substantial among women age 25-49 with the exception of Gabon, where coverage was considerably higher among women age 40-49 compared with all other age groups. A similar age difference in health insurance coverage was observed among men, with the lowest rates reported among men age 15-24. In five countries (Albania, Burundi, Gabon, Ghana, and Namibia) the oldest group(s) reported the highest level of health insurance coverage. In Namibia, for example, 40 percent of men age $40-49$ were covered by health insurance, more than double the rate among men under age 30 .

Across all eight countries studied, there was no clear pattern in health insurance coverage by marital status for both women and men. In four countries (Burundi, Ghana, Namibia, and Rwanda) currently married women and currently married men reported the highest levels of coverage. In three countries (Albania, Cambodia, and Gabon) never-married women had the lowest coverage.

Generally among women and men in the eight countries studied, health insurance coverage was positively associated with educational attainment. In Cambodia, however, health insurance rates were highest among women and men with no education, and lowest among those with a secondary education or higher.

In terms of employment status, in all of the countries except Rwanda employed women had higher coverage rates than unemployed women. The greatest disparity in health insurance coverage by employment status was found in Albania. One-half of employed women reported health insurance coverage compared with less than one-tenth of women unemployed at the time of the interview. The difference in coverage between employed and unemployed women was also notable in Namibia, at 31 percent among employed women compared with 8 percent among women who were unemployed. In Rwanda, conversely, a slightly higher percentage of unemployed women reported health insurance coverage compared with employed women. Aside from Albania and Namibia, employment-related differences in health insurance coverage in all countries were not as prominent among men as among women.
Table 2. Percentage of women with health insurance coverage, according to background characteristics

|  | Albania |  | Burundi |  | Cambodia |  | Gabon |  | Ghana |  | Indonesia |  | Namibia |  | Rwanda |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | \% | N | \% | N | \% | N | \% | N | \% | N | \% | N | \% | N | \% | N |
| Age |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15-19 | 11.6 | 1,478 | 7.5 | 2,359 | 10.0 | 3,734 | 35.9 | 1,784 | 38.5 | 1,025 | 32.8 | 6,927 | 10.4 | 2,245 | 64.4 | 2,945 |
| 20-24 | 12.6 | 976 | 8.9 | 1,832 | 10.2 | 3,155 | 37.1 | 1,637 | 34.7 | 878 | 34.5 | 6,305 | 11.6 | 1,854 | 73.1 | 2,683 |
| 25-29 | 26.0 | 848 | 11.8 | 1,608 | 11.1 | 3,262 | 37.4 | 1,485 | 41.6 | 832 | 33.9 | 6,959 | 18.7 | 1,622 | 75.3 | 2,494 |
| 30-34 | 22.3 | 866 | 14.1 | 1,064 | 10.7 | 2,167 | 47.2 | 1,211 | 43.0 | 644 | 36.8 | 6,876 | 22.1 | 1,416 | 75.0 | 1,822 |
| 35-39 | 25.3 | 1,097 | 11.5 | 1,067 | 10.3 | 2,044 | 46.9 | 986 | 42.5 | 638 | 42.1 | 6,882 | 24.1 | 1,045 | 73.2 | 1,447 |
| 40-44 | 27.5 | 1,232 | 13.2 | 745 | 12.2 | 2,300 | 56.8 | 746 | 45.0 | 470 | 39.3 | 6,252 | 29.9 | 928 | 70.2 | 1,168 |
| 45-49 | 28.3 | 1,088 | 10.6 | 714 | 10.6 | 2,093 | 57.8 | 574 | 39.4 | 429 | 41.4 | 5,407 | 29.6 | 688 | 70.2 | 1,112 |
| Marital status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Never married | 17.2 | 2,357 | 8.2 | 3,121 | 8.6 | 5,783 | 39.5 | 3,047 | 37.3 | 1,593 | 36.3 | 9,919 | 14.0 | 5,671 | 68.1 | 5,285 |
| Currently married | 23.1 | 4,910 | 14.9 | 3,760 | 10.8 | 11,515 | 41.2 | 1,597 | 44.4 | 2,232 | 37.4 | 33,291 | 37.8 | 1,949 | 80.3 | 4,799 |
| Living together | 26.1 | 91 | 5.2 | 1,661 | 32.7 | 112 | 45.4 | 2,878 | 36.5 | 644 | 39.7 | 174 | 10.1 | 1,500 | 65.6 | 2,098 |
| Widowed | 34.2 | 116 | 11.6 | 411 | 20.6 | 564 | 46.3 | 131 | 30.3 | 101 | 42.5 | 935 | 15.2 | 250 | 66.5 | 743 |
| Divorced/separated | 27.1 | 109 | 5.8 | 436 | 14.3 | 781 | 47.1 | 769 | 35.2 | 345 | 31.4 | 1,288 | 18.5 | 425 | 58.7 | 746 |
| Education |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| None | 0.0 | 26 | 5.4 | 4,211 | 17.4 | 2,973 | 19.0 | 373 | 32.6 | 1,042 | 31.6 | 1,500 | 3.7 | 650 | 66.2 | 2,119 |
| Primary | 9.2 | 3,813 | 10.8 | 4,042 | 12.6 | 9,265 | 47.0 | 1,786 | 31.2 | 988 | 31.8 | 15,125 | 6.1 | 2,433 | 70.5 | 9,337 |
| Secondary and higher | 34.2 | 3,745 | 27.5 | 1,136 | 4.9 | 6,516 | 42.8 | 6,263 | 45.9 | 2,886 | 40.2 | 28,982 | 24.2 | 6,716 | 80.1 | 2,216 |
| Employment status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Not currently employed | 9.2 | 5,308 | 9.4 | 2,494 | 9.5 | 5,592 | 39.7 | 4,742 | 39.2 | 1,240 | 35.0 | 20,348 | 8.4 | 5,445 | 73.4 | 3,761 |
| Currently employed | 50.3 | 2,276 | 10.7 | 6,895 | 11.2 | 13,162 | 46.4 | 3,680 | 40.4 | 3,676 | 38.8 | 25,259 | 30.8 | 4,354 | 70.6 | 9,910 |
| Wealth quintile |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lowest | 8.0 | 1,513 | 4.8 | 1,898 | 24.4 | 3,388 | 61.6 | 1,222 | 29.9 | 783 | 38.4 | 7,767 | 2.0 | 1,621 | 59.8 | 2,622 |
| Second | 11.6 | 1,486 | 4.8 | 1,910 | 15.0 | 3,516 | 39.0 | 1,621 | 32.4 | 900 | 34.6 | 8,784 | 3.9 | 1,667 | 68.8 | 2,661 |
| Middle | 16.0 | 1,533 | 6.3 | 1,854 | 8.9 | 3,594 | 35.9 | 1,784 | 38.5 | 979 | 31.7 | 9,243 | 8.9 | 1,882 | 73.4 | 2,736 |
| Fourth | 25.9 | 1,480 | 9.4 | 1,811 | 5.9 | 3,827 | 35.2 | 1,879 | 45.7 | 1,119 | 34.0 | 9,743 | 18.4 | 2,291 | 77.6 | 2,677 |
| Highest | 45.2 | 1,573 | 26.4 | 1,916 | 2.4 | 4,428 | 47.2 | 1,915 | 49.4 | 1,135 | 46.3 | 10,071 | 47.6 | 2,338 | 76.6 | 2,976 |
| Residence |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rural | 11.5 | 4,204 | 8.3 | 8,387 | 12.2 | 14,818 | 59.7 | 957 | 36.9 | 2,533 | 32.3 | 21,802 | 8.3 | 5,028 | 71.4 | 11,614 |
| Urban | 34.0 | 3,380 | 27.7 | 1,002 | 5.2 | 3,936 | 40.4 | 7,465 | 43.6 | 2,383 | 41.5 | 23,805 | 29.0 | 4,771 | 71.4 | 2,057 |
| Total | 21.5 | 7,584 | 10.4 | 9,389 | 10.7 | 18,754 | 42.6 | 8,422 | 40.1 | 4,916 | 37.1 | 45,607 | 18.4 | 9,799 | 71.4 | 13,671 |

Table 3. Percentage of men with health insurance coverage, according to background characteristics

|  | Albania |  | Burundi |  | Cambodia |  | Gabon |  | Ghana |  | Indonesia |  | Namibia |  | Rwanda |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | \% | N | \% | N | \% | N | \% | N | \% | N | \% | N | \% | N | \% | N |
| Age |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15-19 | 17.1 | 670 | 9.3 | 932 | 7.5 | 1,863 | 40.3 | 1,012 | 34.6 | 911 | 41.3 | 28 | 12.4 | 910 | 62.1 | 1,449 |
| 20-24 | 13.0 | 393 | 5.9 | 732 | 7.0 | 1,402 | 33.9 | 805 | 23.4 | 704 | 33.3 | 345 | 11.5 | 749 | 61.7 | 1,159 |
| 25-29 | 29.0 | 269 | 10.4 | 584 | 8.4 | 1,377 | 29.4 | 813 | 20.8 | 624 | 31.9 | 1,127 | 18.5 | 702 | 70.2 | 1038 |
| 30-34 | 35.5 | 273 | 15.0 | 442 | 8.6 | 1,014 | 35.2 | 776 | 36.0 | 533 | 37.8 | 1,674 | 28.8 | 586 | 73.5 | 710 |
| 35-39 | 33.4 | 372 | 17.2 | 388 | 9.1 | 835 | 36.1 | 715 | 32.4 | 528 | 42.4 | 1,775 | 32.2 | 398 | 67.3 | 490 |
| 40-44 | 37.3 | 501 | 15.2 | 349 | 8.0 | 956 | 40.6 | 534 | 31.7 | 394 | 46.8 | 1,693 | 40.1 | 331 | 70.3 | 430 |
| 45-49 | 41.0 | 536 | 15.0 | 331 | 8.2 | 792 | 44.5 | 453 | 30.0 | 364 | 45.4 | 1,371 | 40.0 | 235 | 67.0 | 412 |
| 50+ | na | na | 17.2 | 520 | na | na | 49.8 | 546 | 41.0 | 510 | 40.4 | 1,292 | na | na | 69.7 | 642 |
| Marital status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Never married | 19.1 | 1,291 | 9.6 | 1,653 | 6.9 | 3,181 | 34.4 | 2,346 | 29.4 | 1,942 | na | na | 15.1 | 2,544 | 62.3 | 2,879 |
| Currently married | 36.0 | 1,671 | 16.4 | 1,945 | 8.5 | 4,815 | 37.2 | 1,423 | 35.0 | 2,163 | 41.0 | 9,286 | 44.9 | 705 | 76.1 | 2,433 |
| Living together | 51.2 | 32 | 5.4 | 604 | 9.0 | 37 | 44.8 | 1,469 | 19.8 | 241 | 15.5 | 20 | 27.4 | 498 | 59.6 | 854 |
| Widowed | 58.9 | 4 | 10.4 | 31 | 16.4 | 54 | 25.6 | 29 | 29.4 | 26 | na | na | 24.4 | 12 | 43.0 | 54 |
| Divorced/separated | 38.9 | 15 | 4.7 | 47 | 10.4 | 152 | 36.3 | 387 | 16.8 | 195 | na | na | 7.6 | 151 | 40.0 | 108 |
| Education |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| None | 15.7 | 18 | 6.7 | 1,348 | 13.5 | 641 | 9.8 | 378 | 18.7 | 639 | 29.2 | 265 | 6.1 | 360 | 60.2 | 757 |
| Primary | 16.7 | 1,219 | 10.2 | 2,089 | 9.8 | 3,394 | 32.9 | 864 | 22.3 | 665 | 32.1 | 3,489 | 11.2 | 1,108 | 65.5 | 4,323 |
| Secondary and higher | 37.5 | 1,775 | 25.4 | 843 | 5.7 | 4,205 | 41.3 | 4,412 | 35.2 | 3,264 | 47.0 | 5,552 | 28.9 | 2,443 | 74.5 | 1,249 |
| Employment status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Not currently employed | 14.5 | 1,026 | 14.2 | 540 | 7.3 | 1,556 | 41.4 | 1,748 | 33.6 | 928 | 37.2 | 155 | 10.3 | 1,471 | 65.6 | 593 |
| Currently employed | 36.4 | 1,987 | 11.8 | 3,740 | 8.1 | 6,683 | 36.3 | 3,906 | 30.3 | 3,640 | 41.0 | 9,151 | 28.7 | 2,441 | 66.8 | 5,736 |
| Wealth quintile |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lowest | 14.5 | 475 | 5.0 | 686 | 16.4 | 1,454 | 48.3 | 830 | 17.6 | 809 | 41.3 | 1,596 | 1.8 | 560 | 53.9 | 937 |
| Second | 20.6 | 600 | 6.3 | 789 | 11.8 | 1,544 | 28.1 | 1,183 | 23.0 | 815 | 36.3 | 1,866 | 7.6 | 605 | 64.2 | 1,108 |
| Middle | 26.3 | 661 | 7.6 | 818 | 6.6 | 1,637 | 27.0 | 1,246 | 27.9 | 784 | 32.8 | 2,008 | 12.6 | 875 | 66.4 | 1,306 |
| Fourth | 32.5 | 625 | 11.8 | 907 | 4.4 | 1,696 | 36.0 | 1,204 | 37.7 | 1,079 | 38.7 | 1,962 | 24.9 | 963 | 73.0 | 1,391 |
| Highest | 46.3 | 652 | 24.3 | 1,080 | 2.8 | 1,908 | 53.5 | 1,191 | 42.6 | 1,081 | 56.3 | 1,875 | 49.2 | 909 | 70.6 | 1,586 |
| Residence |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rural | 21.0 | 1,622 | 9.7 | 3,649 | 8.8 | 6,542 | 48.9 | 739 | 26.1 | 2,443 | 34.5 | 4,567 | 10.0 | 1,951 | 66.7 | 5,324 |
| Urban | 38.1 | 1,391 | 25.5 | 631 | 4.7 | 1,697 | 36.2 | 4,915 | 36.6 | 2,125 | 47.2 | 4,739 | 33.5 | 1,960 | 66.4 | 1,005 |
| Total | 28.9 | 3,013 | 12.1 | 4,280 | 8.0 | 8,239 | 37.9 | 5,654 | 31.0 | 4,568 | 40.9 | 9,306 | 21.8 | 3,911 | 66.7 | 6,329 |

Health insurance coverage for women was positively associated with household wealth in five countries (Albania, Burundi, Ghana, Namibia, and Rwanda). Coverage was highest among women in the richest households and lowest among women in the poorest households. The most striking disparity between rich and poor was found in Albania and Namibia. In Namibia 48 percent of women in the richest households were covered by a health insurance compared with 2 percent of women in the poorest households. In Albania the difference between women in the highest and lowest wealth quintiles was 37 percentage points. An opposite relationship between household wealth and health insurance coverage was observed in Cambodia. While the coverage rate at the national level was only 11 percent for women, almost one in every four women in the poorest households reported health insurance coverage; a higher level than in any other wealth quintile. In Gabon and Indonesia the relationship between household wealth and insurance coverage was somewhat non-linear; coverage rates were highest among the poorest and the richest groups. It is important to note that in Gabon 62 percent of the poorest women were covered by health insurance; this represents the highest level of health insurance coverage among this wealth group in any of the eight countries. A similar pattern of wealth disparities in health insurance coverage was also observed among men.

With regard to the urban-rural differences, in five countries (Albania, Burundi, Ghana, Indonesia, and Namibia) both women and men in urban areas were more likely to report health insurance than their rural counterparts. In contrast, in Cambodia and Gabon coverage rates were higher in rural than urban areas for both women and men. The absolute urban-rural difference ranged from 7 to 20 percentage points for women, and from 4 to 10 percentage points for men. Rwandans in urban and rural areas had similar coverage rates, at 71 percent for women and 66-67 percent for men.

### 3.2. Propensity Score Estimation and the Quality of Matching

### 3.2.1. Propensity score estimation

As described in the section on methods, we assessed the effects of health insurance status on maternal health care use in eight countries in which health insurance rates exceeded 10 percent in order to ensure adequate sample size. We took three steps to implement the assessment. First, we ran logit models to estimate the propensity score, which is the predicted probability of being insured given a set of covariates. Second, the estimated propensity scores were used to match a group of individuals who were not insured but had comparable scores to those who were insured. Finally, we compared the outcomes of the insured and the uninsured to obtain the effects of health insurance on the insured (ATT).

This section describes the estimation results of the logit models in each of the eight countries. As the four outcomes of interest were based on two different samples, in each country there were two models for estimating propensity scores-the full-sample model and the sub-sample model. Appendices B-I report the coefficients and standard errors of covariates that were included in the propensity score estimation in individual countries.

Across all eight countries, household wealth status was a significant determinant of participation in health insurance. However, the direction of the relationship varied among countries. Net of the effects of other background characteristics, and consistent with the results of the bivariate analyses, wealth status was positively associated with women's participation in health insurance in five countries (Albania, Burundi, Ghana, Namibia, and Rwanda). In Cambodia and Gabon, however, the relationship was the inverse; women in poorer households were more likely to have health insurance coverage than women in wealthier households.

Women's education and the education of the head of household were important predictors of women's enrollment in health insurance. In most countries, women with higher levels of education were more likely
to report health insurance coverage, with the exception of Namibia, where the association was statistically non-significant. Since it is common for individuals to enroll in health insurance as part of households, the education of the household head was expected to affect women's participation in health insurance. A positive association between education of the household head and women's health insurance status was observed in Burundi, Ghana, Indonesia, and Namibia. Results from Cambodia illustrate a counterintuitive relationship: both women's education and education of household head were negatively associated with health insurance coverage.

Women's employment status was excluded from several models because it was neither associated with health insurance status nor associated with the outcomes of interest. When included, current employment was positively associated with health insurance status in most countries except Rwanda, where the relationship was reversed.

Birth order (which can be interpreted as the number of children a woman had) was negatively associated with women's health insurance status in most models. Higher parity was associated with lower chances of being covered by health insurance. In Cambodia, however, women with more children were more likely to be enrolled in health insurance.

The urban-rural gap in insurance status that was observed in the bivariate analysis was largely diminished after controlling for other covariates. As expected, in all eight countries regional differences in health coverage remained statistically significant even after controlling for background characteristics. The magnitude and statistical significance of age, marital status, and mass media exposure on health insurance enrollment differed by country, with no consistent pattern.

### 3.2.2. The quality of propensity score matching

After the propensity score was estimated, common support between the control and treatment groups was examined by assessing the range of propensity scores for both groups on a histogram graph. The distribution of the propensity scores illustrated a satisfactory overlap between the insured and the uninsured in all countries (graphs are available upon request from the authors).

As discussed previously, we experimented with various propensity score matching algorithms. The final approach was chosen according to the quality of matching, which was assessed based on several model parameters including the mean and median of absolute biases of covariates, pseudo- $R^{2}$, and standard Likelihood ratio test $\mathrm{X}^{2}$. The pre- and post-matching comparisons on means and percent of absolute bias reduced for individual covariates were also taken into consideration in assessing the quality of matching.

Table 4 presents the results of the best quality matching method as well as quality measurements before and after matching for full and sub-samples in each country.

Radius matching generally resulted in the best quality of matching in most countries with caliper width ranging from 0.01 to 0.05 . It is expected that smaller calipers result in better quality of matching but also entail a greater possibility of losing treated cases that do not have a matched control (Grilli and Rampichini 2011). Therefore, to achieve a good-quality matching and maximize the use of data from treated cases, the choice of caliper was determined by two criteria: the quality of matching and the least number of unmatched treated cases. The nearest neighbor matching was chosen for both samples in Burundi for its best quality of matching over other algorithms.
Table 4. Propensity score matching performance: results of the mean and median absolute bias, pseudo- $\boldsymbol{R}^{2}$ and Likelihood ratio (LR) tests

| Country | Matching approach |  | Sample | Mean | Median | Std. dev. | Pseudo- $R^{2}$ | LR $\mathrm{X}^{2}$ | $p>\mathrm{X}^{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Albania | Full sample | Radius matching (caliper=0.025) | Unmatched | 36.9 | 22.1 | 34.6 | 0.312 | 420.24 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | Matched | 7.0 | 4.9 | 7.4 | 0.022 | 16.01 | 0.523 |
|  | Subsample | Radius matching (caliper=0.025) | Unmatched | 42.4 | 22.4 | 36.3 | 0.305 | 411.28 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | Matched | 6.6 | 5.0 | 5.8 | 0.016 | 11.04 | 0.683 |
| Burundi | Full sample | Nearest neighbor | Unmatched | 33.3 | 17.1 | 32.2 | 0.271 | 1,080.66 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | Matched | 5.3 | 4.2 | 3.9 | 0.016 | 30.52 | 0.106 |
|  | Subsample | Nearest neighbor | Unmatched | 37.8 | 33.6 | 34.9 | 0.255 | 1,016.15 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | Matched | 3.8 | 1.7 | 4.6 | 0.013 | 24.78 | 0.100 |
| Cambodia | Full sample | Radius matching (caliper=0.01) | Unmatched | 20.5 | 13.7 | 19.0 | 0.111 | 626.33 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | Matched | 1.2 | 1.1 | 0.6 | 0.001 | 2.39 | 1.000 |
|  | Subsample | Radius matching (caliper=0.01) | Unmatched | 20.5 | 13.7 | 19.0 | 0.111 | 626.33 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | Matched | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 0.001 | 3.15 | 1.000 |
| Gabon | Full sample | Radius matching (caliper=0.01) | Unmatched | 20.0 | 18.6 | 12.1 | 0.137 | 736.87 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | Matched | 2.1 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 0.003 | 16.13 | 0.950 |
|  | Subsample | Radius matching (caliper=0.05) | Unmatched | 21.4 | 20.4 | 12.0 | 0.135 | 727.22 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | Matched | 2.0 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 0.002 | 11.57 | 0.984 |
| Ghana | Full sample | Radius matching (caliper=0.012) | Unmatched | 16.4 | 14.6 | 12.0 | 0.158 | 403.83 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | Matched | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 0.002 | 4.47 | 1.000 |
|  | Subsample | Radius matching (caliper=0.011) | Unmatched | 17.0 | 16.4 | 11.9 | 0.158 | 403.64 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | Matched | 2.0 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 0.002 | 4.33 | 1.000 |
| Indonesia | Full sample | Radius matching (caliper=0.020) | Unmatched | 8.4 | 7.3 | 5.7 | 0.038 | 756.85 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | Matched | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.000 | 4.96 | 1.000 |
|  | Subsample | Radius matching (caliper=0.01) | Unmatched | 8.9 | 8.1 | 5.7 | 0.038 | 756.66 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | Matched | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.000 | 2.83 | 1.000 |
| Namibia | Full sample | Radius matching (caliper=0.05) | Unmatched | 36.0 | 28.1 | 32.9 | 0.383 | 1,082.65 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | Matched | 3.2 | 2.8 | 2.1 | 0.008 | 8.75 | 1.000 |
|  | Subsample | Radius matching (caliper=0.02) | Unmatched | 36.8 | 28.1 | 33.5 | 0.366 | 1,033.89 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | Matched | 3.6 | 3.9 | 2.6 | 0.009 | 9.57 | 0.999 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ntinued |


| Country | Matching approach |  | Sample | Mean | Median | Std. dev. | Pseudo- $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | LR X ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | $p>\mathrm{x}^{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rwanda | Full sample | Radius matching (caliper=0.01) | Unmatched | 11.1 | 9.2 | 8.9 | 0.066 | 472.45 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | Matched | 3.1 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 0.006 | 75.87 | 0.000 |
|  | Subsample | Radius matching <br> (caliper=0.01) | Unmatched | 11.1 | 9.2 | 8.9 | 0.066 | 472.45 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  | Matched | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.001 | 14.08 | 0.899 |

Overall, in all countries matching substantially reduced the mean and median biases between the insured and the uninsured with respect to the observed covariates included in the models. The mean absolute bias was less than 5 percent in the majority of models-the threshold for decent quality matches (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). In 9 of the 16 models, mean absolute bias was 2 percent or less. Despite a significant reduction in bias after matching, mean absolute bias was the highest in the models for Albania (approximately 7 percent), but statistically non-significant.

Comparisons on individual covariates are reported in Appendices J-Q. In four countries (Cambodia, Ghana, Indonesia, and Rwanda), the post-matching standardized biases of all covariates across all models were less than 5 percent. In Albania and Namibia several covariates showed post-matching bias greater than 5 percent, but not statistically significant. Post-matching standardized bias of individual covariates in Burundi and Gabon was less satisfactory, although mean bias was 5 percent or less. In Gabon significant bias between the insured and uninsured persisted after matching for two education categories in the full-sample model and the fifth wealth quintile in the sub-sample model. In Burundi, six variables in the full-sample model and one variable in the sub-sample model showed significant bias after matching.

Pseudo- $R^{2}$ comes from the regressions of the propensity score on all covariates used in matching on both matched and unmatched samples. It should be substantially reduced after matching if the covariates are well matched between the insured and uninsured groups (Aggarwal 2010). Table 4 indicates fairly low Pseudo- $R^{2}$ in all models. In all models except the full-sample model for Rwanda, the Likelihood-ratio test of joint insignificance of all covariates was insignificant after matching, indicating similar distributions of observed covariates after matching.

Due to imposing the common support, some women (mostly from the uninsured group) were excluded from the analysis after the matching process. Table 5 presents the number of women off the common support.

Table 5. Number of cases off the common support in propensity score matching

|  | Full sample | Sub-sample |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Albania | 8 | 12 |
| Burundi | 18 | 4 |
| Cambodia | 21 | 17 |
| Gabon | 3 | 0 |
| Ghana | 37 | 43 |
| Indonesia | 4 | 1 |
| Namibia* | 339 | 141 |
| Rwanda | 28 | 25 |

* Among those off the common support, only one case is from the insured group for both samples


### 3.3. Effects of Health Insurance Using Propensity Score Matching (PSM)

This section reports the results of the PSM used to estimate the effects of health insurance on four outcomes: having at least one antenatal visit (ANC1), four or more antenatal visits (ANC4), first antenatal visit in first three months of the pregnancy (ANCMONTH), and delivery in a healthcare facility (FACBIRTH). ANC1 and FACBIRTH are based on the full sample of all women who had a live birth in the five years preceding the survey. ANC4 and ANCMONTH are based on a sub-sample of women who had at least one antenatal
care visit. Table 6 presents the differences in outcomes between the insured and uninsured before matching as well as the effects of health insurance (ATT) estimated based on the matched samples.

Table 6. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of health insurance on utilization of selected maternal health services

| Outcomes | Means before matching |  |  |  | Average treatment effect on the treated |  |  | Number of cases on support |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Insured | Uninsured | Difference | pvalue | ATT | SE | pvalue |  |
| Albania |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ANC $1^{1}$ | 0.964 | 0.964 | 0.000 | 0.989 |  |  |  |  |
| ANC 4 | 0.830 | 0.624 | 0.207 | 0.000 | 0.064 | 0.056 | 0.247 | 1,265 |
| First ANC visit in first 3 months | 0.894 | 0.746 | 0.148 | 0.000 | 0.092 | 0.053 | 0.084 | 1,265 |
| Facility delivery | 0.985 | 0.956 | 0.029 | 0.023 | 0.014 | 0.022 | 0.519 | 1,317 |
| Burundi |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ANC $1^{1}$ | 0.990 | 0.990 | 0.000 | 0.967 |  |  |  |  |
| ANC 4 | 0.402 | 0.332 | 0.070 | 0.000 | -0.019 | 0.039 | 0.622 | 4,771 |
| First ANC visit in first |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Facility delivery | 0.827 | 0.624 | 0.203 | 0.000 | 0.014 | 0.030 | 0.642 | 4,806 |
| Cambodia |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ANC 1 | 0.824 | 0.884 | -0.059 | 0.000 | 0.0408 | 0.0176 | 0.020 | 5,978 |
| ANC 4 | 0.563 | 0.683 | -0.119 | 0.000 | -0.0104 | 0.0252 | 0.680 | 5,211 |
| First ANC visit in first 3 months | 0.595 | 0.686 | -0.091 | 0.000 | -0.0029 | 0.02618 | 0.913 | 5,211 |
| Facility delivery | 0.479 | 0.586 | -0.107 | 0.000 | 0.073 | 0.0226 | 0.001 | 5,978 |
| Gabon |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ANC 1 | 0.909 | 0.938 | -0.030 | 0.000 | -0.023 | 0.014 | 0.105 | 3,932 |
| ANC 4 | 0.728 | 0.781 | -0.053 | 0.000 | -0.003 | 0.024 | 0.914 | 3,626 |
| First ANC visit in first     <br> 3 months $^{1}$ 0.574 0.602 -0.028 0.086 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Facility delivery | 0.818 | 0.882 | -0.065 | 0.000 | -0.043 | 0.019 | 0.025 | 3,932 |
| Ghana |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ANC 1 | 0.986 | 0.946 | 0.039 | 0.000 | -0.0036 | 0.0085 | 0.672 | 1,837 |
| ANC 4 | 0.895 | 0.770 | 0.126 | 0.000 | 0.0771 | 0.0257 | 0.003 | 1,753 |
| First ANC visit in first |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Facility delivery | 0.740 | 0.471 | 0.269 | 0.000 | 0.1058 | 0.0319 | 0.001 | 1,837 |
| Indonesia |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ANC 1 | 0.975 | 0.945 | 0.030 | 0.000 | 0.016 | 0.004 | 0.000 | 14,954 |
| ANC 4 | 0.911 | 0.870 | 0.041 | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.006 | 0.000 | 14,318 |
| First ANC visit in first 3 months | 0.810 | 0.775 | 0.036 | 0.000 | 0.017 | 0.008 | 0.033 | 14,318 |
| Facility delivery | 0.625 | 0.529 | 0.096 | 0.000 | 0.049 | 0.009 | 0.000 | 14,954 |

(Continued...)

Table 6. - Continued

| Outcomes | Means before matching |  |  |  | Average treatment effect on the treated |  |  | Number of cases on support |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Insured | Uninsured | Difference | pvalue | ATT | SE | pvalue |  |
| Namibia |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ANC 1 | 0.986 | 0.957 | 0.029 | 0.000 | -0.0012 | 0.0114 | 0.916 | 2,950 |
| ANC 4 | 0.909 | 0.800 | 0.110 | 0.000 | 0.0209 | 0.03 | 0.486 | 3,005 |
| First ANC visit in first 3 months | 0.538 | 0.292 | 0.246 | 0.000 | 0.1585 | 0.0509 | 0.002 | 3,005 |
| Facility delivery | 0.969 | 0.798 | 0.171 | 0.000 | 0.0325 | 0.0206 | 0.115 | 2,950 |
| Rwanda |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ANC 1 | 0.990 | 0.965 | 0.025 | 0.000 | 0.0154 | 0.0056 | 0.006 | 6,122 |
| ANC 4 | 0.379 | 0.318 | 0.061 | 0.000 | 0.0195 | 0.0203 | 0.337 | 6,016 |
| First ANC visit in first 3 months | 0.411 | 0.332 | 0.080 | 0.000 | 0.017 | 0.0206 | 0.410 | 6,016 |
| Facility delivery | 0.765 | 0.613 | 0.152 | 0.000 | 0.0745 | 0.0186 | 0.000 | 6,122 |

${ }^{1}$ ATT was not estimated because the raw difference in the outcome between the insured and uninsured was statistically non-significant.

### 3.3.1. Effect of health insurance on number of ANC visits

Irrespective of health insurance status, most women in all eight countries made at least one antenatal care visit. In four countries (Ghana, Indonesia, Namibia, and Rwanda) the proportion of women reporting at least one antenatal care visit was higher among insured women than uninsured women. In Cambodia and Gabon health insurance coverage seemed to have a negative impact on ANC access. In Albania and Burundi the difference between the two groups was statistically non-significant; therefore this outcome was not analyzed using PSM.

After matching, health insurance status no longer significantly influenced women's probability of making one antenatal care visit in three countries (Gabon, Ghana, and Namibia), which means the differences seen in the unmatched sample were due to the biases in covariates that were both related to participation in health insurance and the outcome. After the bias was eliminated or reduced, the differences in the outcomes were no longer significant. However, in Indonesia and Rwanda after matching, the impact of health insurance on increasing women's chance of accessing antenatal care remained significant, although the magnitude of the impact decreased compared with before matching. It is noteworthy that in Cambodia the impact of health insurance was negative before matching but positive and statistically significant after matching. This could be because some of the covariates on which we matched, such as education and household wealth, were negatively associated with women's health insurance status, as described earlier, but positively associated with access to antenatal care.

The prevalence of four or more antenatal care visits varied by country. Among women who reported at least one antenatal visit, over 70 percent in Gabon, Ghana, Indonesia, and Namibia had four or more visits, regardless of health insurance status. In contrast, the prevalence of four or more antenatal care visits was relatively low in the other four countries, especially Burundi and Rwanda. The raw differences in the prevalence of four or more antenatal care visits between insured and uninsured women ranged from 4 percentage points in Indonesia to 21 percentage points in Albania and were statistically significant in all countries. In Cambodia health insurance status appeared to have a negative impact on making four or more antenatal care visits.

After matching on covariates that could potentially introduce bias, the positive effect of health insurance coverage was eliminated in all countries except Ghana and Indonesia. Health insurance coverage contributed to an 8 percentage-point increase in access to four or more antenatal care visits in Ghana and a 3 percentage-point increase in Indonesia.

### 3.3.2. Effect of health insurance on timing of the first ANC visit

In terms of the timing of the first antenatal care visit, Table 6 shows that more than one-half of women in Albania, Cambodia, Gabon, Ghana, and Indonesia started antenatal care in the first trimester regardless of insurance status. Most women in the remaining three countries waited until the second or third trimester before making the first visit. Before matching, the difference between insured and uninsured women was significant in all countries except Gabon. Health insurance seemed to increase the likelihood of women starting antenatal care early, with the exception of Cambodia, where insured women seemed less likely to make the first visit in the first trimester.

After matching, a similar effect was observed as with the above two outcomes-the effect of health insurance on the timing of the first antenatal care visit disappeared in several countries including Cambodia, Ghana, and Rwanda. Its effect remained significant in Namibia, Burundi, and Indonesia. In these three countries, health insurance coverage increased the use of antenatal care within the first trimester of pregnancy by 15,8 , and 2 percentage points, respectively.

### 3.3.3. Effect of health insurance on facility delivery

At least one-half of women in all study countries delivered their most recent birth in a healthcare facility. The raw differences between insured and uninsured women were significant in all countries. Health insurance seemed to be associated with a greater likelihood of delivering in a healthcare facility, with the exception of Cambodia and Gabon, where insured women appeared less likely to do so.

After matching, the effect of health insurance on delivery in a healthcare facility was positive and statistically significant in four of the eight countries (Cambodia, Ghana, Indonesia, and Rwanda). In these countries, health insurance coverage contributed to a 5-11 percentage-point increase in the receipt of facility-based delivery care. In Albania, Burundi, and Namibia health insurance coverage had a small positive but statistically non-significant effect, at a 1-3 percentage-point increase. Even after adjusting for possible bias due to observed characteristics, health insurance status had a negative and statistically significant effect in Gabon.

## 4. Discussion and Conclusion

This study examined levels of health insurance coverage in 30 low- and middle-income countries using nationally representative DHS data. We also assessed the impact of health insurance status on the use of maternal health care in eight countries.

Health insurance coverage is generally low across all countries. Many countries have coverage rates under 5 percent for both women and men. The observation of low enrollment is not surprising. Health insurance programs in the developing world are still in the early stages, although they are attracting increasing attention as countries seek the means to address financial barriers that limit access to health care and try to find ways to protect families from catastrophic out-of-pocket expenditures (Spaan et al. 2012).

A few countries included in this study already have widespread health insurance coverage-Rwanda, Gabon, Ghana, and Indonesia. Rwanda has the highest rate of coverage of any study country, with more than two-thirds of women and men reporting health insurance coverage in 2010. The community-based health insurance in Rwanda, known as Mutuelle de Santé, was initiated in 2004 and has been heavily promoted and subsidized by the government. The reach of the Mutuelle has steadily increased, bringing more Rwandans under the umbrella of health insurance due to effective promotion campaigns and low premiums, including a zero premium for the extremely poor, as well as the broad range of coverage of preventive and curative care services provided at various levels of health facilities in Rwanda (Saksena et al. 2011). Enrollment in the Mutuelle has risen further after passage of the mutual health insurance law in 2007(Ministry of Health of Rwanda 2010).

While in most countries men have slightly higher coverage rates than women, it is important to note that women's rates are higher than men's in several countries with relatively high levels of coverage. This finding could be because women, especially women of reproductive age, have greater demand for maternal health services related to childbearing, which are usually covered by health insurance schemes.

It would be expected that social health insurance and community-based health insurance are more common than employer-based health insurance and commercial health insurance in low- and middle-income countries. Commercial health insurance is the least common scheme in these countries due to the nature of its financing and the complexity of administration and regulation (Drechsleri and Jüttingii 2005).

In all countries except Cambodia, educational attainment is associated with a greater likelihood of participating in health insurance, even after adjusting for other factors that affect participation. This finding is consistent with previous studies in Rwanda and elsewhere (Adebayo et al. 2014; Cofie et al. 2013). Our results also indicate that the education of the head of the household matters, in addition to the individual's education. In many societies household heads are often the primary decision-makers on important family matters, including seeking health care and enrolling in health insurance (Vallieres et al. 2013).

Household wealth is strongly correlated with participation in health insurance. In five of the eight countries studied, we found a positive association between wealth and insurance status after adjusting for other factors. In some countries the relationship is reversed, however, with women in poorer households more likely to have health insurance coverage than women in more affluent households. In several countries health insurance mechanisms primarily target the poor and heavily subsidize or even remove premiums for them. In Rwanda, for example, the extremely poor are not required to pay a premium for the Mutuelle program (Saksena et al. 2011). In Indonesia full subsidization is provided to low-income households (Sparrow et al. 2010)). Nonetheless, reduced premiums may not equalize access to health insurance. Despite the provisions of the Mutuelle program meant to target the poor, Rwandan women in the poorest households remain much less likely to be covered by health insurance than women in the richest households. Health
insurance premiums are just one factor influencing enrollment; many other factors also play a role-for example, perceived need for enrollment, knowledge of health insurance, and cultural factors, as well as an individual's health condition (Acharya et al. 2013; Cofie et al. 2013; Thornton et al. 2010). Additionally, women in poorer households may not be knowledgeable of their health insurance status if membership is household based, thereby leading to underreporting from this segment of the population.

In Cambodia and Gabon poor women are more likely than the rich to have health insurance coverage, suggesting that the targeting of the poor in these countries has been effective. In Cambodia, Health Equity Funds, the main insurance mechanisms, are intended to improve financial access to health care for the poor (Annear et al. 2008). Although national coverage is still low and some areas suffer from program discontinuation, our results confirm that Health Equity Funds are accomplishing their objective of reaching the poor. We were not able to examine specific health insurance types in Gabon due to lack of data. The literature shows that the main scheme in Gabon is a social health insurance known as CNAMGS. Launched in 2008, CNAMGS primarily targets the poorest people in the country (Humphreys 2013).

The urban-rural gap in health insurance coverage disappears in most countries after controlling for background characteristics of women and their households, but there is regional variation in insurance coverage in all of the study countries.

Our results indicate that, even after matching on a number of observed background characteristics that can otherwise bias estimates of the effects of health insurance on use of maternal care, health insurance coverage has a positive impact on women's access to at least one antenatal care visit in Indonesia, Rwanda and Cambodia, and in Ghana and Indonesia insurance coverage has a positive impact on making at least four antenatal visits, as recommended by WHO. The characteristics of health insurance schemes in these countries may partially explain the higher frequency of antenatal visits.

The primary health system in Indonesia consists of three schemes: Askes, Jamsostek, and Askeskin. Akes and Jamsostek have limited coverage of the population and are for the formal sector. Askeskin targets the informal sector and has the largest share of beneficiaries, especially those with low income. Askeskin covers most types of care with no cost sharing. The positive effect of health insurance status both on making one antenatal visit and on making four antenatal visits is consistent with previous evaluations of these programs, in increasing the use of public health services (Aji et al. 2013; Sparrow et al. 2010). Our results are also consistent with findings from Taiwan, where the provision of 10 free antenatal care visits under the national health insurance scheme resulted in an increase in the frequency of antenatal care visits with the rollout of the program (Chen et al. 2003).

Rwanda's community-based health insurance aims to increase use of health care, especially for the poor. Our analysis showed that, although the great majority of Rwandan women receive antenatal care, only about one-third meet the recommended standard of at least four antenatal visits. A possible reason might be that many women lack knowledge about the extent of health services covered by insurance.

Similarly, in Cambodia health insurance enrollment has positive effect on women making one antenatal visit but not the recommended four visits. This finding may be partially explained by the overall low coverage of health insurance in Cambodia and the limited coverage of antenatal care in Health Equity Funds, the primary insurance mechanism.

The finding of a positive effect of health insurance on making four antenatal care visits in Ghana is consistent with another study using the same methodology but different data sources (Long et al. 2010; Mensah et al. 2009).

In all countries the number of antenatal care visits can also be influenced by the facility and provider, if health insurance schemes increase financial incentives for clinics and doctors to provide more antenatal care visits compared with hospitals and medical assistants (Chen et al. 2003). Other factors such as the cost of transportation can introduce prohibitive costs not covered by health insurance (Borghi et al. 2006). Our reliance on secondary data did not enable us to account for these factors in our analyses.

We also assessed the effect of health insurance on the timing of the first antenatal visit, which has been largely neglected by existing research that has mostly focused on the frequency of antenatal care visits. Health insurance status shows positive effects on initiating antenatal care in the first trimester in three of the eight countries (Namibia, Burundi, and Indonesia) even after matching on covariates that can bias the estimate of the difference in the timing of the first antenatal care visit that can be attributed to health insurance coverage. Similar findings were observed in a study of community-based health insurance in three West African countries, in which health insurance membership was associated with greater likelihood of starting antenatal care within the first trimester in Senegal, although not in Mali and Ghana (Smith and Sulzbach 2008). While our results indicate that in Ghana health insurance affects frequency of antenatal care, the effect is not statistically significant for the timing of antenatal care. A similar finding was observed in a regression analysis of timing of antennal care in Ghana (Dixon et al. 2014). The authors argue that it is possible for health insurance status to have a different effect on these two outcomes of using maternal health care because the early use of antenatal care requires that women know that they are pregnant (Dixon et al. 2014).

When assessing the impact of health insurance on the use of facility-based delivery care, we found strong evidence of positive effects of health insurance in Cambodia, Ghana, Indonesia, and Rwanda, where delivery care is fully covered by health insurance. These findings are consistent with other studies (Hong et al. 2011; Mensah et al. 2009; Smith and Sulzbach 2008). Unexpectedly, in Gabon we found that health insurance status contributes to a decrease in facility delivery care. Unintended effects of health insurance status on use of healthcare services have been documented in other studies. In a systematic review of the impact of health insurance in Africa and Asia, the authors identified four studies showing negative effects of social health insurance on resource mobilization (Spaan et al. 2012). Another study in Columbia found that women who were covered by health insurance were less likely to be offered and less likely to receive HIV testing during antenatal visits compared with women without insurance (Ettenger et al. 2014).

A growing number of studies have documented the impact of health insurance on the use of health services in developing countries, but very few have used rigorous methods, such as propensity score matching or a quasi-experimental approach, to assess its impact on use of maternal care across a range of countries. The matching technique eliminates bias due to selection on observable characteristics, but bias can still result from variable omission and unobserved heterogeneity. Because our assessment relied on secondary data, we could not include other factors such as provider type and health insurance characteristics that could influence both enrollment in health insurance and use of maternal care. The matching was carefully done but the results are not free of bias, and the estimates could be improved by including other important confounders, such as the outcome of a previous pregnancy.

Our adjusted estimates of the effects of health insurance show positive and statistically significant effects for at least one measure of the use of maternal health care in seven of the eight countries studied. Indonesia stands out for the most systematic effect of health insurance across all measures of use of maternal health services, followed by Cambodia, Rwanda, and Ghana. Only in Albania is there no significant impact. Sample sizes in Albania were smaller relative to other study countries, making results more sensitive to bias because of model specification.

Overall, our results point to a significant increase in the uptake of recommended standards of adequate maternal health care attributable to health insurance coverage. The results contribute to the body of evidence
available for health insurance policymaking, by using rigorous methods to demonstrate the impact of health insurance. By revealing the positive impact of health insurance on the use of antenatal care and facilitybased delivery care, our findings suggest that in some contexts enrollment in health insurance can reduce inequality in access to maternal health care. Additional research is needed to identify what particular aspects of health insurance design can improve these impacts.

## References

AbouZahr, C. 2003. "Safe Motherhood: A Brief History of the Global Movement 1947-2002." British Medical Bulletin 67(1): 13-25.

AbouZahr, C., and T. Wardlaw. 2003. Antenatal Care in Developing Countries: Promises, Achievements and Missed Opportunities: An Analysis of Trends, Levels and Differentials, 1990-2001. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization.

Acharya, A., S. Vellakkal, F. Taylor, E. Masset, A. Satija, M. Burke, and S. Ebrahim. 2013. The Impact of Health Insurance Schemes for the Informal Sector in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: A Systematic Review. Policy research working paper 6324. Washington DC, USA: The Word Bank, Development Economics Vice Presidency, Partnership, Capacity Building Unit.

Adebayo, E.F., J.E. Ataguba, O.A. Uthman, C.I. Okwundu, K.T. Lamont, and C.S. Wiysonge. 2014. "Factors That Affect the Uptake of Community-Based Health Insurance in Low-Income and MiddleIncome Countries: A Systematic Protocol." BMJ Open 4(2): e004167.

Aggarwal, A. 2010. "Impact Evaluation of India's 'Yeshasvini' Community-Based Health Insurance Programme." Health Economics 19: 5-35.

Aji, B., M. de Allegri, A. Souares, and R. Sauerborn. 2013. "The Impact of Health Insurance Programs on Out-of-Pocket Expenditures in Indonesia: An Increase or a Decrease?" Int J Environ Res Public Health 10(7): 2995-3013.

Annear, P.L., M. Bigdeli, R.C. Eang, and B. Jacobs. 2008. "Providing Access to Health Services for the Poor: Health Equity in Cambodia." In Studies in Health Services Organisation \& Policy, edited by W. Van Lerberghe, G. Kegels, and V. de Brouwere. Antwerp, Belgium: ITGPress.

Augurzky, B., and C.M. Schmidt. 2001. The Propensity Score: A Means to an End. Discussion paper 271. Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

Bauhoff, S., D.R. Hotchkiss, and O. Smith. 2011. "The Impact of Medical Insurance for the Poor in Georgia: A Regression Discontinuity Approach." Health Econ 20(11): 1362-78.

Becker, S.O., and A. Ichino. 2002. "Estimation of Average Treatment Effects Based on Propensity Scores." The Stata Journal 2: 358-77.

Borghi, J., T. Ensor, A. Somanathan, C. Lissner, and A. Mills. 2006. "Mobilising Financial Resources for Maternal Health." Lancet 368(9545): 1457-65.

Brookhart, M.A., S. Schneeweiss, K.J. Rothman, R.J. Glynn, J. Avorn, and T. Stürmer. 2006. "Variable Selection for Propensity Score Models." American Journal of Epidemiology 163(12): 1149-56.

Brooks, J.M., and R.L. Ohsfeldt. 2013. "Squeezing the Balloon: Propensity Scores and Unmeasured Covariate Balance." Health Services Research 48(4): 1487-507.

Bryson, A., R. Dorsett, and S. Purdon. 2002. The Use of Propensity Score Matching in the Evaluation of Active Labour Market Policies. Working paper No.4. London, United Kingdom: Department for Work and Pensions.

Caliendo, M., and S. Kopeinig. 2008. "Some Practical Guidance for the Implementation of Propensity Score Matching." Journal of Economic Surveys 22(1): 31-72.

Chen, C.S., T.C. Liu, and L.M. Chen. 2003. "National Health Insurance and the Antenatal Care Use: A Case in Taiwan." Health Policy 64(1): 99-112.

Cheng, S.H., and T.L. Chiang. 1998. "Disparity of Medical Care Utilization among Different Health Insurance Schemes in Taiwan." Social Science \& Medicine 47(5): 613-20.

Cofie, P., M. de Allegri, B. Kouyate, and R. Sauerborn. 2013. "Effects of Information, Education, and Communication Campaign on a Community-Based Health Insurance Scheme in Burkina Faso." Glob Health Action 6: 20791.

Dixon, J., E.Y. Tenkorang, I.N. Luginaah, V.Z. Kuuire, and G.O. Boateng. 2014. "National Health Insurance Scheme Enrolment and Antenatal Care among Women in Ghana: Is There Any Relationship?" Tropical Medicine \& International Health 19(1): 98-106.

Dong, H. 2012. "Book Review: The Impact of Health Insurance in Low- and Middle-Income Countries, edited by C.C. Griffin, M.L. Escobar, and R.P. Shaw, Washington DC, USA: The Brookings Institution Press." Journal of International Development 24(4): 529-30.

Drechsleri, D., and J.P. Jüttingii. 2005. Private Health Insurance in Low- and Middle-Income Countries. Paris, France: OECD Development Centre.

El-Shazly, M., M. Abdel-Fattah, A. Zaki, R. Bedwani, S. Assad, G. Tognoni, and A. Nicolucci. 2000. "Health Care for Diabetic Patients in Developing Countries: A Case from Egypt." Public Health (Nature) 114(4): 276.

Ensor, T., and J. Ronoh. 2005. "Effective Financing of Maternal Health Services: A Review of the Literature." Health Policy 75(1): 49-58.

Escobar, M.L., C.C. Griffin, and R.P. Shaw. 2010. The Impact of Health Insurance in Low- and MiddleIncome Countries. Washington DC, USA: Brookings Institution Press.

Ettenger, A., T. Bärnighausen, and A. Castro. 2014. "Health Insurance for the Poor Decreases Access to HIV Testing in Antenatal Care: Evidence of an Unintended Effect of Health Insurance Reform in Colombia." Health Policy and Planning 29(3): 352-8.

Garrido, M.M., A.S. Kelley, J. Paris, K. Roza, D.E. Meier, R.S. Morrison, and M.D. Aldridge. 2014. "Methods for Constructing and Assessing Propensity Scores." Health Services Research Published online April 30, 2014.

Giedion, U., E.A. Alfonso, and B.Y. Diaz. 2013. The Impact of Universal Coverage Schemes in the Developing Countries. Washington DC, USA: The World Bank.

Giedion, U., B.Y. Diaz, and E.A. Alfonso. 2007. The Impact of Subsized Health Insurance on Access, Utilization and Health Status: The Case of Colombia. Washington DC, USA: The World Bank.

Grilli, L., and C. Rampichini. 2011. "Propensity Scores for the Estimation of Average Treatment Effects in Observational Studies." In Training Sessions on Causal Inference. Bristol, United Kingdom: Universit di Firenze.

Heckman, J., H. Ichimura, and P. Todd. 1997. "Matching as an Econometric Evaluation Estimator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Programme." Review of Economic Studies 64: 605-54.

Ho, D.E., K. Imai, G. King, and E.A. Stuart. 2007. "Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference." Political Analysis 15(3): 199-236.

Hong, R., M. Ayad, and F. Ngabo. 2011. "Being Insured Improves Safe Delivery Practices in Rwanda." Journal of Community Health 36(5): 779-84.

Hsiao, W.C., and P.R. Shaw. 2007. Social Health Insurance for Developing Nations. WBI Development Studies. Washington DC, USA: The World Bank.

Humphreys, G. 2013. "Gabon Gets Everyone under One Social Health Insurance Roof." Bull World Health Organ 91: 318-9.

Imbens, G.W. 2004. "Nonparametric Estimation of Average Treatment Effects under Exogeneity: A Review." Review of Economics and Statistics 86(1): 4-29.

Jütting, J.P. 2005. "Chapter 4: Evaluating the Impact of Community-Based Health Insurance on Social Exclusion and the Access to Health Care: A Comparative Analysis for Senegal, India, Rwanda and Thailand." In Health Insurance for the Poor in Developing Countries, Aldershot, Hampshire, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate: OECD Development Centre.

Jütting, J.P. 2004. "Do Community-Based Health Insurance Schemes Improve Poor People’s Access to Health Care? Evidence from Rural Senegal." World Development 32(2): 273-88.

King, G., E. Gakidou, K. Imai, J. Lakin, R.T. Moore, C. Nall, N. Ravishankar, M. Vargas, M.M. TellezRojo, J.E. Avila, M.H. Avila, and H.H. Llamas. 2009. "Public Policy for the Poor? A Randomised Assessment of the Mexican Universal Health Insurance Programme." Lancet 373(9673): 1447-54.

Kozhimannil, K.B., M.R. Valera, A.S. Adams, and D. Ross-Degnan. 2009. "The Population-Level Impacts of a National Health Insurance Program and Franchise Midwife Clinics on Achievement of Prenatal and Delivery Care Standards in the Philippines." Health Policy (Amsterdam, Netherlands) 92(1): 55-64.

Lechner, M. 2001. "Identification and Estimation of Causal Effects of Multiple Treatments under the Conditional Independence Assumption." In Econometric Evaluation of Labour Market Policies, edited by M. Lechner, and F Pfeiffer, page 1-18. Heidelberg, Germany: Physica.

Long, Q., T. Zhang, L. Xu, S. Tang, and E. Hemminki. 2010. "Utilisation of Maternal Health Care in Western Rural China under a New Rural Health Insurance System (New Co-Operative Medical System)." Tropical Medicine \& International Health 15(10): 1210-7.

Mensah, J., J.R. Oppong, and C.M. Schmid. 2009. Ghana's National Health Insurance Scheme in the Context of the Health Mdgs. Ruhr Economic Papers. Essen, Germany: Ruhr-Universität Bochum (RUB), Department of Economics.

Mensah, J., J.R. Oppong, and C.M. Schmidt. 2010. "Ghana's National Health Insurance Scheme in the Context of the Health Mdgs: An Empirical Evaluation Using Propensity Score Matching." Health Economics 19(S1): 95-106.

Ministry of Health of Rwanda. 2010. Rwanda Community Based Health Insurance Policy. Kigali, Rwanda: Rwanda Ministry of Health.

Mocan, N.H., and E. Tekin. 2006. "Catholic Schools and Bad Behavior: A Propensity Score Matching Analysis." Contributions in Economic Analysis and Policy 5(1).

Nguyen, H., and W. Wang. 2013. "The Effects of Free Government Health Insurance among Small Children: Evidence from the Free Care for Children under Six Policy in Vietnam." Int J Health Plann Manage 28(1): 3-15.

Nguyen, H.T., L. Hatt, M. Islam, N.L. Sloan, J. Chowdhury, J.O. Schmidt, A. Hossain, and H. Wang. 2012. "Encouraging Maternal Health Service Utilization: An Evaluation of the Bangladesh Voucher Program." Soc Sci Med 74(7): 989-96.

Nguyen, H.T., Y. Rajkotia, and H. Wang. 2011. "The Financial Protection Effect of Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme: Evidence from a Study in Two Rural Districts." Int J Equity Health 10: 4.

Robyn, P.J., R. Sauerborn, and T. Bärnighausen. 2013. "Provider Payment in Community-Based Health Insurance Schemes in Developing Countries: A Systematic Review." Health Policy and Planning 28(2): 111-22.

Rosenbaum, P.R., and D.B. Rubin. 1983. "The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects." Biometrika 70: 41-55.

Rubin, D.B., and N. Thomas. 1996. "Matching Using Estimated Propensity Scores: Relating Theory to Practice." Biometrics 52(1): 249-64.

Rutstein, S.O., and K.B. Johnson. 2004. The DHS Wealth Index. DHS Comparative Reports No. 6. Calverton, Maryland, USA: ORC Macro.

Saksena, P., A.F. Antunes, K. Xu, L. Musango, and G. Carrin. 2011. "Mutual Health Insurance in Rwanda: Evidence on Access to Care and Financial Risk Protection." Health Policy 99(3): 203-9.

Smith, K.V., and S. Sulzbach. 2008. "Community-Based Health Insurance and Access to Maternal Health Services: Evidence from Three West African Countries." Social Science \& Medicine 66(12): 2460-73.

Spaan, E., J. Mathijssen, N. Tromp, F. McBain, A. ten Have, and R. Baltussen. 2012. "The Impact of Health Insurance in Africa and Asia: A Systematic Review." Bull World Health Organ 90(9): 685-92.

Sparrow, R., A. Suryahadi, and W. Widyanti. 2010. Social Health Insurance for the Poor: Targeting and Impact of Indonesia's Askeskin Program. Jakarta, Indonesia: SMERU Research Institute.

Thornton, R.L., L.E. Hatt, E.M. Field, M. Islam, F.S. Diaz, and M.A. Gonzalez. 2010. "Social Security Health Insurance for the Informal Sector in Nicaragua: A Randomized Evaluation." Health Econ 19(Suppl): 181-206.

Vallieres, F., A. Hansen, E. McAuliffe, E.L. Cassidy, P. Owora, S. Kappler, and E. Gathuru. 2013. "Head of Household Education Level as a Factor Influencing Whether Delivery Takes Place in the Presence of a Skilled Birth Attendant in Busia, Uganda: A Cross-Sectional Household Study." BMC Pregnancy Childbirth 13: 48.

Wagner, A.K., A.J. Graves, S.K. Reiss, R. LeCates, F. Zhang, and D. Ross-Degnan. 2011. "Access to Care and Medicines, Burden of Health Care Expenditures, and Risk Protection: Results from the World Health Survey." Health Policy 100(2-3): 151-8.

Wagstaff, A. 2007. Health Insurance for the Poor: Initial Impacts of Vietnam's Health Care Fund for the Poor. Vol. 11. Washington DC, USA: World Bank Publications.

Wagstaff, A. 2010. "Social Health Insurance Reexamined." Health Econ 19(5): 503-17.
Wang, H., W. Yip, L. Zhang, and W.C. Hsiao. 2009. "The Impact of Rural Mutual Health Care on Health Status: Evaluation of a Social Experiment in Rural China." Health Economics 18(S2): S65-82.

WHO. 2004. Standards for Maternal and Newborn Health: Provision of Effective Antenatal Care (Section 1.6). Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization. Available online at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2007/a91272.pdf.
Appendix
Appendix Table A. Characteristics of health insurance schemes in eight study countries

|  | Albania | Burundi | Cambodia | Gabon | Ghana | Indonesia | Namibia | Rwanda |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Date established | 1995 (1) | 1984 (4) | $\begin{aligned} & 1998 \text { (7); } \\ & 2005 ; \\ & 2000(7) \end{aligned}$ | 2008 (9) | 2003 (12) | $\begin{aligned} & 2004 ; \\ & 2008(15) \end{aligned}$ | Information not available | 1999 (24)-2003 |
| Type of insurance scheme | SHI: Bismark model, National Health, administered by the Health Insurance Institute (1) | La Carte D'Assurance Maladie (CAM); CBHI - 29 schemes in 2009: MSAG w/ 14 and MUSCABU w/15 schemes (6) | CBHI: SKY and CAAFW; SHI for formal sector workers; HEF for extreme poor | National Health Insurance and Social Welfare Fund (CNAMGS) | District Mutual, Private Mutual and Private Commercial Schemes (12) | Askeskin, Jamkesmas SHI, Askes (civil servants), Asabri (police/military) Jamsostek (formal private) $(15,17)$ | Gov't (Public Service Employee Med Aid Scheme PSEMAS)(19) and private "medical aid funds" (21) | Mutual (CBHI), <br> RAMA (Formal), Military (MMI, formal), Private |
| Percent of target or total population covered | 40\% of total population (2) | 10-25\% (6) | SKY-3-14\% <br> (2008); CAAFW <br> 31\% (2009) (7); | 40\% (11) | 33 percent of the Ghanaian population (13) | 40\% of 100\% goal (16) | 5\% of population has private, $10 \%$ has PSEMAS, rest depend on public health care (flat fees) $(19,20)$ | 91\% of total in 2010 (25) |
| Participating providers | Public and private, in 2011: 610 personnel, 690 pharmacies, 160 agencies, 80 drugstores, 421 PHC centers, 39 secondary and tertiary facilities (1) | Public, private, NGO | Information not available | Public and private health structures and pharmacies (11) | Local health compounds, health centres, clinics, hospitals (14) | Public (926) and private (220) <br> providers, 1146 facilities (15) | Information not available | Local health centers (dispensaries, health posts, centers, district and national hospitals), public only (26) |

Appendix Table A. - Continued

|  | Albania | Burundi | Cambodia | Gabon | Ghana | Indonesia | Namibia | Rwanda |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Enrollment requirements | Compulsory for all employed | Information not available | CBHI- voluntary, informal sector ; HEF- extreme poor; SHIcompulsory, formal sector (7) | Currently: Poor Gabonese people and government workers; goal is all 1.5 million citizens by the end of 2014 (10) | Every Ghanaian except Armed Forces and Police (12) | Mandatory for civil servants, formal private sector, police and military (17) | PSEMAS- civil servant, Private - voluntary | Every Rwandan (24) |
| Premium payments | 3-7\% for workers "active" persons, (50/50 between employer/emplo yee( state covers (1) | varies | Free for extreme poor through Health Equity Fund HEF (7) | 2.5-4.1\% of pay, low income 100\% subsidized (11) | GH\$7.2 (minimum) to GH\$48.00 (maximum), 0\$ for indigent, pregnant women, children $<18$ and adults $>70$ yrs old, annually (12) | Askeskin- fully subsidized, (@ Rp5000/44c per month) (17) | In PSEMAS, employers pay 20\% of premium, private plans vary | ~ \$6 per person per year + 10\% copay at health center/hospital (26), sliding scale |
| Coverage of maternal health services <br> Antenatal care | Prenatal care is free, but poor quality (3) | 100\% (4) | Vouchers for women at some facilities starting in 2007: 3-4 ANC visits, delivery, 1 | Maternal health care- 100\% (9) | Prenatal - 100\% <br> Delivery normal - 100\% | Antenatal and normal or complicated delivery - 100\% (18) | Information not available | ANC-100\% |
| Delivery- normal <br> Deliverycomplicated |  |  | postnatal visit, fees are waived (8) |  | Delivery complicatedcertain procedures 100\% (13) |  |  |  |

[^2]Appendix Table A. - Continued
7. http://www.who.int/healthsystems/topics/financing/healthreport/48_CHI.pdf
8. http://www.rbfhealth.org/system/files/Can\ vouchers\ deliver\ An\ evaluation\ of\ subsidies\ for\ maternal\ health\ care\ in\ Cambodia.pdf
9. http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/91/5/13-020513/en/
10. http://www.gemalto.com/brochures/download/gabon.pdf
11. http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/universal-coverage-preparing-public-insurance-system-launch-2014
12. http://www.nhis.gov.gh/
13. http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ifpridp01309.pdf
14. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3645172/
15. http://healthmarketinnovations.org/program/jamkesmas-scheme
16. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/13304/74996.pdf?sequence=1
17. http://www.smeru.or.id/report/workpaper/askeskin/askeskin_eng.pdf
18. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer//W3P/IB/2011/03/08/000333037_20110308235022/Rendered/PDF/600380BRI0Heal10BOX358307B01PUBLIC1.pdf
19. http://www.economist.com.na/special-focus/1499-health-insurance-affordability-still-a-challenge
20. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/press/books/2011/theimpactofhealthinsuranceonlowandmiddleincomecountries/theimpactofhealthinsurance_fulltext.pdf\#page=48
21. http://sun.com.na/health/medical-aids-get-grading.61843
22. http://www.iss.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/iss/Documents/DevlSSues/DevISSues_Volume_10_number_2__November_2008_01.pdf
23. http://www.shopsproject.org/sites/default/files/resources/Final\ Namibia\ PSA\ 4-19-11.pdf
24. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2649549/
25. http://www.globalhealthcheck.org/?p=324
26. http://www.gov.rw/Health-System

## Appendix Table B. Estimates of the (logit) propensity score models, Albania

| Variable | Full sample |  | Sub-sample |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Coefficient | S.E. | Coefficient | S.E. |
| Maternal age at most recent birth (continuous) ${ }^{1}$ | 0.191 | 0.148 |  |  |
| Maternal age at most recent birth squared ${ }^{1}$ | -0.002 | 0.002 |  |  |
| Education (ref.: none) |  |  |  |  |
| Primary | 16.914 | 0.000 | 15.823 | 0.000 |
| Secondary or higher | 17.459*** | 0.214 | 16.490*** | 0.217 |
| Marital status (ref.: never married) ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Currently married | -0.653 | 2.256 |  |  |
| Formerly married | -0.142 | 2.329 |  |  |
| Birth order (ref.: first child) |  |  |  |  |
| Second | -0.571* | 0.233 | -0.300 | 0.212 |
| Third | -0.923** | 0.295 | -0.524* | 0.256 |
| Fourth or more | -1.170** | 0.360 | -0.652* | 0.313 |
| Employment status (ref.: not currently employed) |  |  |  |  |
| Currently employed | $2.198 * * *$ | 0.180 | $2.373^{* * *}$ | 0.183 |
| Education of head of household (ref.: none) |  |  |  |  |
| Primary | -0.056 | 0.527 | 0.230 | 0.588 |
| Secondary or higher | 0.251 | 0.537 | 0.497 | 0.598 |
| Wealth terciles (ref.: first tercile) |  |  |  |  |
| Second | 0.269 | 0.296 | 0.389 | 0.305 |
| Third | 1.151** | 0.367 | 1.260*** | 0.377 |
| Mass media exposure ${ }^{2}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Exposed to media at least once a week | 0.335 | 0.829 | 0.183 | 0.833 |
| Residence (ref.: rural) |  |  |  |  |
| Urban | 0.436 | 0.284 | 0.430 | 0.291 |
| Region (ref.: Coastal) |  |  |  |  |
| Central | 0.185 | 0.257 | 0.118 | 0.260 |
| Mountain | 0.895*** | 0.249 | 0.876*** | 0.253 |
| Urban Tirana | -0.139 | 0.298 | -0.152 | 0.298 |
| Constant | -22.948 | 0.000 | -19.591*** | 1.008 |
| N | 1,325 |  | 1,277 |  |
| $\boldsymbol{l o g}$ pseudolikelihood | -460 |  | -437 |  |

* p<0.05. ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$
${ }^{1}$ Not included in the estimation of the propensity score for the sub-sample
${ }^{2}$ Mass media exposure is defined as read newspaper, listen to radio, or watch TV at least once a week


## Appendix Table C. Estimates of the (logit) propensity score models, Burundi

| Variable | Full sample |  | Sub-sample |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Coefficient | S.E. | Coefficient | S.E. |
| Maternal age at most recent birth (continuous) ${ }^{1}$ | 0.150* | 0.067 |  |  |
| Maternal age at most recent birth (squared) ${ }^{1}$ | -0.002 | 0.001 |  |  |
| Education (ref.: none) |  |  |  |  |
| Primary | 0.611*** | 0.125 | 0.531*** | 0.122 |
| Secondary or higher | 1.520*** | 0.188 | 1.489*** | 0.181 |
| Marital status (ref.: never married) ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Currently married | 0.792** | 0.288 |  |  |
| Formerly married | 0.140 | 0.352 |  |  |
| Birth order (ref.: first child) |  |  |  |  |
| Second | -0.072 | 0.172 | 0.279 | 0.161 |
| Third | -0.071 | 0.189 | 0.497** | 0.164 |
| Fourth or more | -0.488* | 0.199 | 0.455** | 0.139 |
| Employment status (ref.: not currently employed) ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Currently working | $0.463^{* * *}$ | 0.129 |  |  |
| Education of Household head (ref.: none) |  |  |  |  |
| Primary | 0.148 | 0.126 | 0.150 | 0.125 |
| Secondary or higher | $1.064^{* * *}$ | 0.178 | $1.188^{* * *}$ | 0.173 |
| Wealth quintiles (ref.: poorest) |  |  |  |  |
| Second quintile | 0.193 | 0.224 | 0.190 | 0.223 |
| Third quintile | 0.289 | 0.222 | 0.303 | 0.221 |
| Fourth quintile | 0.948*** | 0.206 | 0.928*** | 0.206 |
| Richest | 1.630*** | 0.210 | $1.638 * * *$ | 0.209 |
| Mass media exposure ${ }^{2}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Exposed to media at least once a week | 0.205 | 0.119 | 0.225 | 0.118 |
| Residence (ref.: rural) |  |  |  |  |
| Urban | $0.723^{* * *}$ | 0.151 | $0.612^{* * *}$ | 0.149 |
| Region (ref.: Bujumbura) |  |  |  |  |
| North | 1.123*** | 0.196 | $1.182^{* * *}$ | 0.190 |
| Centre-east | 1.521*** | 0.193 | 1.568*** | 0.189 |
| West | 0.482* | 0.222 | 0.494* | 0.217 |
| South | $1.078 * * *$ | 0.196 | 1.172*** | 0.190 |
| Constant | -8.652*** | 1.000 | $-5.178^{* * *}$ | 0.279 |
| N | 4,824 |  | 4,775 |  |
| $\boldsymbol{l o g}$ pseudolikelihood | -1,451 |  | -1,470 |  |

[^3]
## Appendix Table D. Estimates of the (logit) propensity score models, Cambodia

| Variable | Full sample |  | Sub-sample |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Coefficient | S.E. | Coefficient | S.E. |
| Maternal age at birth | -0.107* | 0.048 | -0.087 | 0.054 |
| Maternal age at birth squared | 0.002* | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Education (ref.: no education) |  |  |  |  |
| Primary education | -0.203* | 0.087 | -0.153 | 0.101 |
| Secondary or higher | -0.855*** | 0.142 | -0.760*** | 0.151 |
| Marital status (ref.: never married) ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Currently married | -1.129 | 1.457 |  |  |
| Formerly married | -1.006 | 1.466 |  |  |
| Birth order (ref.: first child) |  |  |  |  |
| 2 | 0.291** | 0.108 | 0.230* | 0.114 |
| 3 | 0.280* | 0.130 | 0.214 | 0.140 |
| 4 or higher | 0.380** | 0.141 | 0.412** | 0.153 |
| Employment status (ref.: not currently employed) |  |  |  |  |
| Currently employed | 0.104 | 0.079 | 0.065 | 0.086 |
| Education of head of the household (ref.: no education) |  |  |  |  |
| Primary education | -0.082 | 0.090 | -0.177 | 0.101 |
| Secondary or higher | -0.316** | 0.119 | -0.423*** | 0.127 |
| Mass media exposure (ref.: not exposed) ${ }^{\mathbf{2}}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Exposed to media at least once a week | -0.009 | 0.077 | -0.066 | 0.085 |
| Wealth tercile (ref.: first tercile) |  |  |  |  |
| Second | -0.453*** | 0.085 | -0.532*** | 0.093 |
| Third | $-1.286^{* * *}$ | 0.129 | $-1.343^{* * *}$ | 0.136 |
| Residence (ref.: rural) |  |  |  |  |
| Urban | 0.130 | 0.110 | 0.096 | 0.118 |
| Provinces (ref.: Northwestern provinces) ${ }^{3}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Southern provinces | -0.110 | 0.099 | -0.257* | 0.112 |
| Southwestern provinces | $0.535^{* * *}$ | 0.091 | 0.451*** | 0.103 |
| Siem Reap, Takeo, and Kandal | -0.702*** | 0.135 | -0.835*** | 0.146 |
| Phnom Penh | $-1.410^{* * *}$ | 0.428 | -1.454*** | 0.430 |
| Constant | 1.684 | 1.612 | 0.576 | 0.762 |
| N | 5,999 |  | 5,228 |  |
| log pseudolikelihood | -2,489 |  | -2,066 |  |

* $p<0.05$. ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$
${ }^{1}$ Not included in the estimation of the propensity score for the sub-sample
${ }^{2}$ Mass media exposure is defined as read newspaper, listen to radio, or watch TV at least once a week
${ }^{3}$ Northwestern provinces include Kampong Thom, Kratie, Preah Vihear \& Steung Treng, Mondol Kiri/Rattanak Kiri Southern provinces include Kampong Cham, Svay Rieng, Kampong Speu, Pursat, and Kampot/Kep
Southwestern provinces include Kampong Chhang, Preah Sihanouk/Daoh Kong, Battambang/Pailin, Banteay Mean Chey, and Otdar Mean Chey


## Appendix Table E. Estimates of the (logit) propensity score models, Gabon

| Variable | Full sample |  | Sub-sample |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Coefficient | S.E. | Coefficient | S.E. |
| Maternal age at most recent birth (continuous) | 0.101* | 0.042 | 0.075 | 0.043 |
| Maternal age at most recent birth (squared) | -0.001 | 0.001 | -0.001 | 0.001 |
| Education (ref.: none) |  |  |  |  |
| Primary | 1.345*** | 0.183 | 1.480*** | 0.208 |
| Secondary or higher | $1.433^{* * *}$ | 0.186 | $1.538^{* * *}$ | 0.208 |
| Marital status (ref.: never married) ${ }^{\mathbf{1}}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Currently married | -0.089 | 0.100 |  |  |
| Formerly married | -0.316* | 0.149 |  |  |
| Birth order (ref.: first child) |  |  |  |  |
| Second | 0.189 | 0.116 | 0.175 | 0.116 |
| Third | 0.319* | 0.138 | 0.304* | 0.140 |
| Fourth or more | 0.484** | 0.148 | 0.416** | 0.149 |
| Employment status (ref.: not currently employed) ${ }^{\mathbf{1}}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Currently employed | 0.178* | 0.077 |  |  |
| Education of household head (ref.: none) |  |  |  |  |
| Primary | -0.015 | 0.133 | 0.021 | 0.140 |
| Secondary | -0.022 | 0.132 | 0.047 | 0.137 |
| Wealth quintiles (ref.: poorest) |  |  |  |  |
| Second quintile | -0.259* | 0.106 | -0.249* | 0.108 |
| Third quintile | -0.348** | 0.127 | -0.361** | 0.128 |
| Fourth quintile | -0.520*** | 0.144 | -0.533*** | 0.145 |
| Richest | -0.198 | 0.158 | -0.227 | 0.159 |
| Mass media exposure ${ }^{2}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Exposed to media at least once a week | -0.172 | 0.111 | -0.146 | 0.118 |
| Residence (ref.: rural) |  |  |  |  |
| Urban | -0.055 | 0.092 | 0.009 | 0.095 |
| Region (ref.: Libreville-Port-Gentil) |  |  |  |  |
| Estuaire | $0.458^{* *}$ | 0.157 | 0.463** | 0.159 |
| Haut-Ogooué | 1.725*** | 0.151 | 1.678*** | 0.151 |
| Moyen-Ogooué | 1.206*** | 0.167 | 1.221*** | 0.169 |
| Ngounié | 1.522*** | 0.155 | 1.480*** | 0.158 |
| Nyanga | 0.691*** | 0.161 | 0.666*** | 0.165 |
| Ogooué Maritime | 0.347* | 0.165 | 0.338* | 0.168 |
| Ogooué-Ivindo | 1.801*** | 0.156 | 1.707*** | 0.161 |
| Ogooué-Lolo | 1.413*** | 0.163 | $1.384^{* * *}$ | 0.165 |
| Woleu-Ntem | 0.234 | 0.166 | 0.303 | 0.172 |
| Constant | $-3.768^{* * *}$ | 0.590 | -3.667*** | 0.616 |
| N | 3,935 |  | 3,626 |  |
| log pseudolikelihood | -2,320 |  | -2,173 |  |

* $p<0.05$. ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$
${ }^{1}$ Not included in the estimation of the propensity score for the sub-sample
${ }^{2}$ Mass media exposure is defined as read newspaper, listen to radio, or watch TV at least once a week


## Appendix Table F. Estimates of the (logit) propensity score models, Ghana

| Variable | Full sample |  | Sub-sample |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Coefficient | S.E. | Coefficient | S.E. |
| Maternal age at birth | 0.326*** | 0.071 | 0.320*** | 0.072 |
| Maternal age at birth squared | -0.005*** | 0.001 | -0.005*** | 0.001 |
| Education (ref.: no education) |  |  |  |  |
| Primary education | -0.077 | 0.165 | -0.100 | 0.167 |
| Secondary or higher | 0.459** | 0.167 | 0.444** | 0.168 |
| Marital status (ref.: never married) |  |  |  |  |
| Currently married | 0.682* | 0.270 | 0.664* | 0.277 |
| Formerly married | 0.484 | 0.339 | 0.506 | 0.346 |
| Birth order (ref.: first child) |  |  |  |  |
| 2 | -0.689*** | 0.183 | -0.720*** | 0.186 |
| 3 | -0.965*** | 0.206 | -0.943*** | 0.208 |
| 4 or higher | -0.875*** | 0.221 | -0.842*** | 0.222 |
| Employment status (ref.: not currently employed) ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Currently employed | 0.052 | 0.161 |  |  |
| Education of head of the household (ref.: no education) |  |  |  |  |
| Primary education | -0.101 | 0.186 | -0.079 | 0.188 |
| Secondary or higher | 0.360* | 0.156 | 0.331* | 0.157 |
| Mass media exposure (ref.: not exposed) ${ }^{\mathbf{2}}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Exposed to media at least once a week | 0.106 | 0.141 | 0.129 | 0.144 |
| Wealth quintile (ref.: first quintile) |  |  |  |  |
| Second | $0.786^{* * *}$ | 0.168 | 0.678*** | 0.170 |
| Middle | $0.948 * * *$ | 0.197 | $0.867^{* * *}$ | 0.199 |
| Fourth | 1.552*** | 0.221 | $1.455^{* * *}$ | 0.222 |
| Highest | 2.009*** | 0.275 | 1.901*** | 0.276 |
| Residence (ref.: rural) |  |  |  |  |
| Urban | 0.002 | 0.147 | 0.004 | 0.148 |
| Region (ref.: Western) |  |  |  |  |
| Central | -0.897*** | 0.271 | -0.858** | 0.274 |
| Greater Accra | -1.484*** | 0.264 | -1.443*** | 0.265 |
| Volta | -0.012 | 0.245 | 0.031 | 0.250 |
| Eastern | 0.817*** | 0.239 | 0.818*** | 0.243 |
| Ashanti | 0.020 | 0.212 | 0.023 | 0.214 |
| Brong Ahafo | 1.236*** | 0.239 | $1.247^{* *}$ | 0.243 |
| Northern | 0.580* | 0.244 | 0.528* | 0.246 |
| Upper West | 1.336*** | 0.245 | 1.251*** | 0.248 |
| Constant | -7.225*** | 1.011 | -7.002*** | 1.017 |
| N | 1,874 |  | 1,796 |  |
| log pseudolikelihood | -1,064 |  | -1,036 |  |

[^4]${ }^{1}$ Not included in the estimation of the propensity score for the sub-sample
${ }^{2}$ Mass media exposure is defined as read newspaper, listen to radio, or watch TV at least once a week

## Appendix Table G. Estimates of the (logit) propensity score models, Indonesia

| Variable | Full sample |  | Sub-sample |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Coefficient | S.E. | Coefficient | S.E. |
| Maternal age at most recent birth (ref.: 15-19) |  |  |  |  |
| 20-24 | -0.012 | 0.104 | 0.019 | 0.107 |
| 25-29 | 0.182 | 0.104 | 0.194 | 0.107 |
| 30-34 | 0.344** | 0.109 | 0.353** | 0.111 |
| 35-39 | 0.477*** | 0.114 | 0.504*** | 0.115 |
| 40-44 | 0.432*** | 0.126 | $0.453 * * *$ | 0.125 |
| 45-49 | 0.342 | 0.181 | 0.382* | 0.184 |
| Education (ref.: none) |  |  |  |  |
| Primary | 0.408** | 0.126 | 0.090 | 0.143 |
| Secondary or higher | $0.707^{* * *}$ | 0.127 | 0.375** | 0.144 |
| Marital status (ref.: never married) |  |  |  |  |
| Currently married | 0.796 | 0.679 | 0.347 | 0.725 |
| Formerly married | 0.697 | 0.687 | 0.261 | 0.732 |
| Birth order (ref.: first child) ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Second | 0.031 | 0.047 |  |  |
| Third | 0.015 | 0.060 |  |  |
| Fourth or more | 0.041 | 0.068 |  |  |
| Birth order ${ }^{2}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Second or higher |  |  | 0.040 | 0.046 |
| Employment status (ref.: not currently employed) |  |  |  |  |
| Currently employed | $0.244^{* * *}$ | 0.035 | $0.264^{* * *}$ | 0.036 |
| Education of household head |  |  |  |  |
| Primary education or higher | 0.329*** | 0.090 | 0.225* | 0.094 |
| Wealth quintiles (ref.: poorest) |  |  |  |  |
| Second quintile | -0.067 | 0.053 | -0.100 | 0.054 |
| Third quintile | -0.133* | 0.058 | -0.162** | 0.058 |
| Fourth quintile | 0.015 | 0.061 | -0.015 | 0.062 |
| Richest | 0.386*** | 0.067 | 0.363 *** | 0.068 |
| Mass media exposure ${ }^{3}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Exposed to media at least once a week | 0.124* | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.055 |
| Residence (ref.: rural) |  |  |  |  |
| Urban | 0.250*** | 0.039 | $0.241^{* * *}$ | 0.040 |
| Region (ref.: Sumatera) |  |  |  |  |
| Java | -0.144** | 0.050 | -0.151** | 0.050 |
| Bali and Nusa Tenggara | $0.747^{* *}$ | 0.066 | 0.701*** | 0.067 |
| Kalimantan | 0.331*** | 0.061 | 0.339*** | 0.062 |
| Sulawesi | 0.322*** | 0.053 | 0.332*** | 0.054 |
| Maluku and Papua | 0.558*** | 0.064 | 0.630*** | 0.068 |
| Constant | -2.931*** | 0.699 | -1.989** | 0.746 |
| N | 14,958 |  | 14,319 |  |
| $\boldsymbol{l o g}$ pseudolikelihood | -9,690 |  | -9,329 |  |

* p<0.05. ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$
${ }^{1}$ Not included in the estimation of the propensity score for the sub-sample
${ }^{2}$ Not included in the estimation of the propensity score for the full sample
${ }^{3}$ Mass media exposure is defined as read newspaper, listen to radio, or watch TV at least once a week


## Appendix Table H. Estimates of the (logit) propensity score models, Namibia

| Variable | Full sample |  | Sub-sample |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Coefficient | S.E. | Coefficient | S.E. |
| Maternal age at birth | 0.203* | 0.096 | 0.255** | 0.096 |
| Maternal age at birth squared | -0.002 | 0.002 | -0.002 | 0.002 |
| Education (ref.: no education) |  |  |  |  |
| Primary education | -0.298 | 0.411 | -0.505 | 0.416 |
| Secondary or higher | 0.728 | 0.384 | 0.451 | 0.386 |
| Marital status (ref.: never married) ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Currently married | 0.894*** | 0.158 |  |  |
| Formerly married | 0.456 | 0.308 |  |  |
| Birth order (ref.: first child) |  |  |  |  |
| 2 | -0.560** | 0.195 | -0.395* | 0.191 |
| 3 | -0.669** | 0.229 | -0.498* | 0.225 |
| 4 or higher | -0.990*** | 0.262 | -0.763** | 0.260 |
| Employment status (ref.: not currently employed) |  |  |  |  |
| Currently employed | 1.230*** | 0.150 | $1.262^{* * *}$ | 0.151 |
| Education of head of the household (ref.: no education) |  |  |  |  |
| Primary education | -0.246 | 0.277 | -0.190 | 0.278 |
| Secondary or higher | 0.654** | 0.254 | 0.750** | 0.252 |
| Mass media exposure (ref.: not exposed) ${ }^{2}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Exposed to media at least once a week | 0.884* | 0.360 | 1.003** | 0.376 |
| Wealth quintile (ref.: first quintile) |  |  |  |  |
| Second | 0.245 | 0.380 | 0.197 | 0.381 |
| Middle | 1.021** | 0.349 | 0.993** | 0.349 |
| Fourth | $1.783^{* * *}$ | 0.363 | 1.779*** | 0.360 |
| Highest | 3.389*** | 0.389 | 3.452*** | 0.388 |
| Residence (ref.: rural) |  |  |  |  |
| Urban | -0.405* | 0.176 | -0.507** | 0.175 |
| Region (ref.: Caprivi) |  |  |  |  |
| Erongo | 0.148 | 0.385 | 0.166 | 0.388 |
| Hardap | 0.161 | 0.430 | -0.028 | 0.438 |
| Karas | 0.741 | 0.400 | 0.650 | 0.400 |
| Kavango | 0.812* | 0.408 | 0.933* | 0.410 |
| Khomas | 0.565 | 0.362 | 0.458 | 0.364 |
| Kunene | 0.537 | 0.457 | 0.624 | 0.456 |
| Ohangwena | 1.849*** | 0.398 | 1.610*** | 0.398 |
| Omusati | 1.298*** | 0.391 | 1.102** | 0.388 |
| Oshana | 0.483 | 0.397 | 0.329 | 0.397 |
| Oshikoto | 0.979* | 0.392 | 0.888* | 0.394 |
| Otjozondjupa | 0.695 | 0.384 | 0.595 | 0.386 |
| Constant | -10.931*** | 1.453 | -11.252*** | 1.471 |
| N | 3,289 |  | 3,14 |  |
| $\boldsymbol{l o g}$ pseudolikelihood | -773 |  | -769 |  |

* $p<0.05$. ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$
${ }^{1}$ Not included in the prediction of the propensity score for the sub-sample
${ }^{2}$ Mass media exposure is defined as read newspaper, listen to radio, or watch TV at least once a week


## Appendix Table I. Estimates of the (logit) propensity score models, Rwanda

| Variable | Full sample |  | Sub-sample |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Coefficient | S.E. | Coefficient | S.E. |
| Maternal age at birth | $0.169 * * *$ | 0.042 | $0.157^{* *}$ | 0.043 |
| Maternal age at birth squared | -0.002*** | 0.001 | -0.002** | 0.001 |
| Education (ref.: no education) |  |  |  |  |
| Primary education | 0.194* | 0.080 | 0.174* | 0.081 |
| Secondary or higher | 0.531*** | 0.150 | 0.554*** | 0.153 |
| Marital status (ref.: never married) |  |  |  |  |
| Currently married | 0.494*** | 0.119 | 0.526*** | 0.121 |
| Formerly married | -0.142 | 0.141 | -0.102 | 0.144 |
| Birth order (ref.: first child) |  |  |  |  |
| 2 | -0.480*** | 0.102 | -0.470*** | 0.103 |
| 3 | -0.576*** | 0.118 | -0.559*** | 0.119 |
| 4 or higher | -0.896*** | 0.123 | -0.868*** | 0.124 |
| Employment status (ref.: not currently employed) |  |  |  |  |
| Currently employed | -0.162* | 0.079 | -0.155 | 0.080 |
| Education of head of the household (ref.: no education) |  |  |  |  |
| Primary education | 0.026 | 0.076 | 0.024 | 0.077 |
| Secondary or higher | 0.146 | 0.139 | 0.134 | 0.140 |
| Mass media exposure (ref.: not exposed) ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Exposed to media at least once a week | 0.330*** | 0.068 | 0.331*** | 0.070 |
| Wealth quintile (ref.: first quintile) |  |  |  |  |
| Second | 0.297*** | 0.087 | 0.276** | 0.089 |
| Middle | 0.536*** | 0.096 | $0.515^{* * *}$ | 0.097 |
| Fourth | $0.750^{* * *}$ | 0.104 | $0.723^{* *}$ | 0.105 |
| Highest | $0.962^{* * *}$ | 0.135 | 0.923*** | 0.136 |
| Residence (ref.: rural) |  |  |  |  |
| Urban | 0.187 | 0.126 | 0.185 | 0.127 |
| Region (ref.: Kigali city) |  |  |  |  |
| South | 1.107*** | 0.149 | 1.090*** | 0.150 |
| West | $1.397^{* * *}$ | 0.154 | 1.383 *** | 0.155 |
| North | 1.534*** | 0.163 | 1.506*** | 0.164 |
| East | 0.806*** | 0.148 | 0.791*** | 0.149 |
| Constant | $-3.456 * * *$ | 0.624 | $-3.264^{* * *}$ | 0.634 |
| N | 6,150 |  | 6,041 |  |
| log pseudolikelihood | -3,352 |  | -3,273 |  |

[^5]Appendix Table J. Mean biases of covariates before and after matching, Albania

| Variable | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Sample | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ |
|  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Maternal age at most recent birth (continuous) ${ }^{1}$ | Unmatched | 28.869 | 27.227 | 30.1 |  | 4.36 | 0.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 28.835 | 29.630 | -14.6 | 51.6 | -1.64 | 0.101 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Maternal age at most recent birth squared ${ }^{1}$ | Unmatched | 860.880 | 773.100 | 27.8 |  | 4.06 | 0.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 859.210 | 912.260 | -16.8 | 39.6 | -1.85 | 0.064 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Marital status ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Never married | Unmatched | 0.000 | 0.001 | -4.4 |  | -0.51 | 0.609 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.1 | 98.8 | -0.06 | 0.956 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Currently married | Unmatched | 0.982 | 0.989 | -5.6 |  | -0.89 | 0.376 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.981 | 0.951 | 24.8 | -344.6 | 1.92 | 0.055 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Formerly married | Unmatched | 0.018 | 0.010 | 6.5 |  | 1.04 | 0.298 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.019 | 0.049 | -25.2 | -289.5 | -1.92 | 0.055 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| None | Unmatched | 0.000 | 0.014 | -17.0 |  | -1.99 | 0.046 | 0.000 | 0.014 | -17.0 |  | -1.99 | 0.046 |
|  | Matched | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.2 | 98.8 | -0.21 | 0.830 | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.3 | 98.1 | -0.26 | 0.795 |
| Primary | Unmatched | 0.273 | 0.689 | -91.4 |  | -13.35 | 0.000 | 0.273 | 0.689 | -91.4 |  | -13.35 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.281 | 0.289 | -1.9 | 97.9 | -0.22 | 0.827 | 0.273 | 0.293 | -4.5 | 95.1 | -0.51 | 0.612 |
| Secondary or higher | Unmatched | 0.727 | 0.297 | 95.2 |  | 13.96 | 0.000 | 0.727 | 0.297 | 95.2 |  | 13.96 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.719 | 0.710 | 1.9 | 98.0 | 0.22 | 0.824 | 0.727 | 0.707 | 4.6 | 95.2 | 0.51 | 0.607 |
| Employment status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Currently not employed | Unmatched | 0.364 | 0.878 | -124.9 |  | -20.82 | 0.000 | 0.364 | 0.878 | -124.9 |  | -20.82 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.375 | 0.372 | 0.7 | 99.5 | 0.06 | 0.949 | 0.364 | 0.357 | 1.7 | 98.6 | 0.16 | 0.871 |
| Currently employed | Unmatched | 0.636 | 0.122 | 124.9 |  | 20.82 | 0.000 | 0.636 | 0.122 | 124.9 |  | 20.82 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.625 | 0.628 | -0.7 | 99.5 | -0.06 | 0.949 | 0.636 | 0.643 | -1.7 | 98.6 | -0.16 | 0.871 |
| Mass media exposure ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No exposure to media | Unmatched | 0.007 | 0.024 | -13.4 |  | -1.73 | 0.084 | 0.007 | 0.024 | -13.4 |  | -1.73 | 0.084 |
|  | Matched | 0.007 | 0.006 | 0.9 | 93.5 | 0.15 | 0.881 | 0.008 | 0.006 | 1.9 | 86.0 | 0.32 | 0.752 |
| Exposure to media at least once a week | Unmatched | 0.993 | 0.976 | 13.4 |  | 1.73 | 0.084 | 0.993 | 0.976 | 13.4 |  | 1.73 | 0.084 |
|  | Matched | 0.993 | 0.994 | -0.9 | 93.5 | -0.15 | 0.881 | 0.992 | 0.994 | -1.9 | 86.0 | -0.32 | 0.752 |
| Education of household head |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| None | Unmatched | 0.018 | 0.050 | -17.4 |  | -2.28 | 0.023 | 0.018 | 0.050 | -17.4 |  | -2.28 | 0.023 |
|  | Matched | 0.019 | 0.019 | 0.0 | 99.9 | 0.00 | 0.999 | 0.016 | 0.016 | -0.3 | 98.2 | -0.05 | 0.960 |
| Primary | Unmatched | 0.349 | 0.631 | -58.8 |  | -8.65 | 0.000 | 0.349 | 0.631 | -58.8 |  | -8.65 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.360 | 0.383 | -4.9 | 91.7 | -0.56 | 0.578 | 0.356 | 0.398 | -8.9 | 84.9 | -0.99 | 0.323 |
| Secondary or higher | Unmatched | 0.633 | 0.319 | 66.1 |  | 9.86 | 0.000 | 0.633 | 0.319 | 66.1 |  | 9.86 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.622 | 0.598 | 4.9 | 92.6 | 0.55 | 0.581 | 0.628 | 0.585 | 9.1 | 86.2 | 0.99 | 0.320 |


| Variable | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ | Mean |  | \% bias | \% biasreduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ |
|  | Sample | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Birth order |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Eldest | Unmatched | 0.342 | 0.259 | 18.1 |  | 2.74 | 0.006 | 0.342 | 0.259 | 18.1 |  | 2.74 | 0.006 |
|  | Matched | 0.337 | 0.334 | 0.7 | 96.2 | 0.08 | 0.939 | 0.324 | 0.345 | -4.6 | 74.7 | -0.50 | 0.619 |
| Second | Unmatched | 0.378 | 0.336 | 8.8 |  | 1.30 | 0.192 | 0.378 | 0.336 | 8.8 |  | 1.30 | 0.192 |
|  | Matched | 0.378 | 0.338 | 8.5 | 3.4 | 0.98 | 0.329 | 0.403 | 0.377 | 5.4 | 38.0 | 0.60 | 0.549 |
| Third | Unmatched | 0.182 | 0.229 | -11.6 |  | -1.67 | 0.095 | 0.182 | 0.229 | -11.6 |  | -1.67 | 0.095 |
|  | Matched | 0.184 | 0.218 | -8.6 | 26.1 | -1.00 | 0.320 | 0.182 | 0.182 | 0.1 | 99.6 | 0.01 | 0.995 |
| Fourth or more | Unmatched | 0.098 | 0.176 | -22.8 |  | -3.15 | 0.002 | 0.098 | 0.176 | -22.8 |  | -3.15 | 0.002 |
|  | Matched | 0.101 | 0.110 | -2.7 | 88.3 | -0.34 | 0.731 | 0.091 | 0.096 | -1.6 | 93.2 | -0.21 | 0.837 |
| Wealth terciles |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| First | Unmatched | 0.200 | 0.490 | -63.9 |  | -8.88 | 0.000 | 0.200 | 0.490 | -63.9 |  | -8.88 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.206 | 0.226 | -4.4 | 93.2 | -0.56 | 0.579 | 0.186 | 0.223 | -8.2 | 87.2 | -1.04 | 0.301 |
| Second | Unmatched | 0.364 | 0.409 | -9.2 |  | -1.35 | 0.176 | 0.364 | 0.409 | -9.2 |  | -1.35 | 0.176 |
|  | Matched | 0.375 | 0.418 | -8.9 | 3.3 | -1.03 | 0.306 | 0.391 | 0.437 | -9.4 | -1.8 | -1.04 | 0.297 |
| Third | Unmatched | 0.436 | 0.102 | 81.3 |  | 14.03 | 0.000 | 0.436 | 0.102 | 81.3 |  | 14.03 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.419 | 0.356 | 15.4 | 81.1 | 1.50 | 0.134 | 0.423 | 0.340 | 20.2 | 75.2 | 1.92 | 0.055 |
| Residence |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rural | Unmatched | 0.273 | 0.615 | -73.4 |  | -10.56 | 0.000 | 0.273 | 0.615 | -73.4 |  | -10.56 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.281 | 0.308 | -5.9 | 91.9 | -0.70 | 0.485 | 0.265 | 0.299 | -7.2 | 90.2 | -0.84 | 0.400 |
| Urban | Unmatched | 0.727 | 0.385 | 73.4 |  | 10.56 | 0.000 | 0.727 | 0.385 | 73.4 |  | 10.56 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.719 | 0.692 | 5.9 | 91.9 | 0.70 | 0.485 | 0.735 | 0.701 | 7.2 | 90.2 | 0.84 | 0.400 |
| Region |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Coastal | Unmatched | 0.167 | 0.257 | -22.1 |  | -3.12 | 0.002 | 0.167 | 0.257 | -22.1 |  | -3.12 | 0.002 |
|  | Matched | 0.172 | 0.166 | 1.5 | 93.0 | 0.19 | 0.846 | 0.182 | 0.138 | 10.8 | 51.0 | 1.35 | 0.177 |
| Central | Unmatched | 0.233 | 0.291 | -13.4 |  | -1.93 | 0.053 | 0.233 | 0.291 | -13.4 |  | -1.93 | 0.053 |
|  | Matched | 0.240 | 0.200 | 9.1 | 32.1 | 1.11 | 0.267 | 0.213 | 0.173 | 9.2 | 31.3 | 1.15 | 0.252 |
| Mountain | Unmatched | 0.349 | 0.344 | 1.1 |  | 0.16 | 0.870 | 0.349 | 0.344 | 1.1 |  | 0.16 | 0.870 |
|  | Matched | 0.333 | 0.384 | -10.7 | -867.9 | -1.23 | 0.219 | 0.332 | 0.431 | -20.9 | -1783.2 | -2.31 | 0.021 |
| Urban Tirana | Unmatched | 0.251 | 0.108 | 38.0 |  | 6.23 | 0.000 | 0.251 | 0.108 | 38.0 |  | 6.23 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.255 | 0.250 | 1.3 | 96.6 | 0.13 | 0.896 | 0.273 | 0.258 | 4.0 | 89.5 | 0.38 | 0.701 |

[^6]Appendix Table K. Mean biases of covariates before and after matching, Burundi

| Variable | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Sample | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ |
|  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Maternal age at most recent birth (continuous) ${ }^{1}$ | Unmatched | 29.446 | 28.296 | 17.1 |  | 4.04 | 0.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 29.394 | 30.206 | -12.1 | 29.4 | -2.28 | 0.023 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Maternal age at most recent birth squared ${ }^{1}$ | Unmatched | 907.900 | 850.520 | 14.1 |  | 3.35 | 0.001 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 905.460 | 957.270 | -12.7 | 9.7 | -2.38 | 0.017 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Marital status ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Never married | Unmatched | 0.030 | 0.034 | -2.1 |  | -0.50 | 0.618 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.031 | 0.023 | 4.2 | -100.9 | 0.83 | 0.405 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Currently married | Unmatched | 0.927 | 0.877 | 17.0 |  | 3.85 | 0.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.925 | 0.954 | -9.9 | 41.8 | -2.28 | 0.023 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Formerly married | Unmatched | 0.043 | 0.090 | -18.9 |  | -4.15 | 0.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.044 | 0.022 | 8.9 | 52.9 | 2.28 | 0.023 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| None | Unmatched | 0.196 | 0.538 | -75.9 |  | -17.24 | 0.000 | 0.196 | 0.538 | -75.9 |  | -17.24 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.201 | 0.238 | -8.1 | 89.3 | -1.64 | 0.102 | 0.198 | 0.202 | -1.0 | 98.7 | -0.20 | 0.840 |
| Primary | Unmatched | 0.402 | 0.407 | -1.1 |  | -0.26 | 0.793 | 0.402 | 0.407 | -1.1 |  | -0.26 | 0.793 |
|  | Matched | 0.413 | 0.404 | 1.8 | -67.2 | 0.33 | 0.741 | 0.406 | 0.403 | 0.6 | 44.8 | 0.11 | 0.913 |
| Secondary or higher | Unmatched | 0.402 | 0.055 | 90.9 |  | 30.23 | 0.000 | 0.402 | 0.055 | 90.9 |  | 30.23 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.386 | 0.358 | 7.3 | 92.0 | 1.06 | 0.287 | 0.397 | 0.395 | 0.4 | 99.6 | 0.06 | 0.956 |
| Employment status ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Not currently employed | Unmatched | 0.167 | 0.210 | -10.8 |  | -2.57 | 0.010 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.172 | 0.164 | 1.9 | 82.6 | 0.36 | 0.717 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Currently employed | Unmatched | 0.833 | 0.790 | 10.8 |  | 2.57 | 0.010 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.828 | 0.836 | -1.9 | 82.6 | -0.36 | 0.717 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mass media exposure |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No access to any media | Unmatched | 0.197 | 0.443 | -54.6 |  | -12.43 | 0.000 | 0.197 | 0.443 | -54.6 |  | -12.43 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.203 | 0.217 | -3.3 | 94.0 | -0.66 | 0.506 | 0.199 | 0.193 | 1.3 | 97.6 | 0.27 | 0.786 |
| Exposure to media at least once a week | Unmatched | 0.803 | 0.557 | 54.6 |  | 12.43 | 0.000 | 0.803 | 0.557 | 54.6 |  | 12.43 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.797 | 0.783 | 3.3 | 94.0 | 0.66 | 0.506 | 0.801 | 0.807 | -1.3 | 97.6 | -0.27 | 0.786 |
| Education of household head |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| None | Unmatched | 0.193 | 0.478 | -63.3 |  | -14.34 | 0.000 | 0.193 | 0.478 | -63.3 |  | -14.34 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.198 | 0.188 | 2.3 | 96.4 | 0.48 | 0.631 | 0.192 | 0.179 | 2.9 | 95.4 | 0.62 | 0.533 |
| Primary | Unmatched | 0.378 | 0.462 | -17.1 |  | -4.14 | 0.000 | 0.378 | 0.462 | -17.1 |  | -4.14 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.388 | 0.392 | -0.9 | 94.8 | -0.17 | 0.868 | 0.382 | 0.385 | -0.6 | 96.5 | -0.11 | 0.912 |
| Secondary or higher | Unmatched | 0.429 | 0.060 | 95.0 |  | 31.16 | 0.000 | 0.429 | 0.060 | 95.0 |  | 31.16 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.414 | 0.420 | -1.5 | 98.4 | -0.22 | 0.826 | 0.426 | 0.436 | -2.6 | 97.2 | -0.38 | 0.703 |


| Variable | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ |
|  | Sample | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Birth order |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Eldest | Unmatched | 0.185 | 0.185 | -0.2 |  | -0.06 | 0.955 | 0.185 | 0.185 | -0.2 |  | -0.06 | 0.955 |
|  | Matched | 0.184 | 0.132 | 13.2 | -5577.8 | 2.61 | 0.009 | 0.183 | 0.180 | 0.7 | -221.1 | 0.14 | 0.889 |
| Second | Unmatched | 0.193 | 0.177 | 4.2 |  | 1.05 | 0.296 | 0.193 | 0.177 | 4.2 |  | 1.05 | 0.296 |
|  | Matched | 0.189 | 0.185 | 1.1 | 73.1 | 0.21 | 0.835 | 0.196 | 0.163 | 8.6 | -103.8 | 1.62 | 0.106 |
| Third | Unmatched | 0.182 | 0.151 | 8.4 |  | 2.10 | 0.035 | 0.182 | 0.151 | 8.4 |  | 2.10 | 0.035 |
|  | Matched | 0.181 | 0.201 | -5.5 | 34.0 | -0.96 | 0.335 | 0.179 | 0.157 | 5.9 | 30.0 | 1.08 | 0.280 |
| Fourth or higher | Unmatched | 0.441 | 0.487 | -9.4 |  | -2.28 | 0.022 | 0.441 | 0.487 | -9.4 |  | -2.28 | 0.022 |
|  | Matched | 0.446 | 0.482 | -7.1 | 24.4 | -1.30 | 0.193 | 0.442 | 0.500 | -11.7 | -24.6 | -2.16 | 0.031 |
| Wealth quintile |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Poorest | Unmatched | 0.056 | 0.222 | -49.5 |  | -10.31 | 0.000 | 0.056 | 0.222 | -49.5 |  | -10.31 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.057 | 0.065 | -2.2 | 95.6 | -0.57 | 0.571 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.00 | 1.000 |
| 2nd quintile | Unmatched | 0.072 | 0.220 | -43.1 |  | -9.20 | 0.000 | 0.072 | 0.220 | -43.1 |  | -9.20 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.073 | 0.084 | -3.0 | 93.1 | -0.70 | 0.481 | 0.073 | 0.073 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.00 | 1.000 |
| 3 rd quintile | Unmatched | 0.080 | 0.200 | -35.2 |  | -7.65 | 0.000 | 0.080 | 0.200 | -35.2 |  | -7.65 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.082 | 0.079 | 0.9 | 97.6 | 0.20 | 0.842 | 0.081 | 0.076 | 1.7 | 95.2 | 0.40 | 0.689 |
| 4th quintile | Unmatched | 0.149 | 0.181 | -8.6 |  | -2.06 | 0.040 | 0.149 | 0.181 | -8.6 |  | -2.06 | 0.040 |
|  | Matched | 0.153 | 0.159 | -1.6 | 81.7 | -0.30 | 0.765 | 0.147 | 0.154 | -2.0 | 77.3 | -0.38 | 0.706 |
| Richest | Unmatched | 0.644 | 0.176 | 108.0 |  | 28.81 | 0.000 | 0.644 | 0.176 | 108.0 |  | 28.81 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.634 | 0.614 | 4.7 | 95.6 | 0.78 | 0.434 | 0.642 | 0.641 | 0.3 | 99.7 | 0.06 | 0.955 |
| Residence |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rural | Unmatched | 0.519 | 0.864 | -80.3 |  | -22.76 | 0.000 | 0.519 | 0.864 | -80.3 |  | -22.76 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.533 | 0.545 | -2.7 | 96.6 | -0.43 | 0.664 | 0.523 | 0.560 | -8.5 | 89.5 | -1.35 | 0.176 |
| Urban | Unmatched | 0.481 | 0.136 | 80.3 |  | 22.76 | 0.000 | 0.481 | 0.136 | 80.3 |  | 22.76 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.467 | 0.455 | 2.7 | 96.6 | 0.43 | 0.664 | 0.477 | 0.440 | 8.5 | 89.5 | 1.35 | 0.176 |
| Region |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bujumbura | Unmatched | 0.213 | 0.074 | 40.5 |  | 11.82 | 0.000 | 0.213 | 0.074 | 40.5 |  | 11.82 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.219 | 0.201 | 5.1 | 87.3 | 0.80 | 0.425 | 0.214 | 0.218 | -1.3 | 96.9 | -0.20 | 0.844 |
| North | Unmatched | 0.202 | 0.243 | -9.9 |  | -2.37 | 0.018 | 0.202 | 0.243 | -9.9 |  | -2.37 | 0.018 |
|  | Matched | 0.206 | 0.160 | 11.0 | -10.5 | 2.18 | 0.030 | 0.205 | 0.132 | 17.5 | -76.4 | 3.61 | 0.000 |
| Center East | Unmatched | 0.296 | 0.283 | 3.0 |  | 0.73 | 0.466 | 0.296 | 0.283 | 3.0 |  | 0.73 | 0.466 |
|  | Matched | 0.279 | 0.308 | -6.5 | -118.0 | -1.19 | 0.234 | 0.294 | 0.321 | -6.1 | -105.0 | -1.11 | 0.267 |
| West | Unmatched | 0.083 | 0.192 | -32.1 |  | -7.04 | 0.000 | 0.083 | 0.192 | -32.1 |  | -7.04 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.085 | 0.082 | 0.9 | 97.3 | 0.20 | 0.845 | 0.084 | 0.090 | -1.7 | 94.7 | -0.38 | 0.703 |
| South | Unmatched | 0.206 | 0.208 | -0.6 |  | -0.13 | 0.893 | 0.206 | 0.208 | -0.6 |  | -0.13 | 0.893 |
|  | Matched | 0.211 | 0.248 | -9.1 | -1543.4 | -1.61 | 0.108 | 0.203 | 0.238 | -8.6 | -1461.6 | -1.56 | 0.119 |

[^7]Appendix Table L. Mean biases of covariates before and after matching, Cambodia

| Variable | Sample | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | pvalue | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | pvalue |
|  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Maternal age at birth | Unmatched | 27.636 | 26.938 | 10.8 |  | 3.29 | 0.001 | 27.636 | 26.938 | 10.8 |  | 3.29 | 0.001 |
|  | Matched | 27.627 | 27.498 | 2.0 | 81.4 | 0.45 | 0.656 | 27.105 | 27.006 | 1.5 | 85.8 | 0.32 | 0.747 |
| Maternal age at birth squared | Unmatched | 809.390 | 763.760 | 11.9 |  | 3.67 | 0.000 | 809.390 | 763.760 | 11.9 |  | 3.67 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 808.990 | 800.340 | 2.3 | 81.0 | 0.50 | 0.618 | 776.650 | 769.550 | 1.9 | 84.4 | 0.39 | 0.695 |
| Education |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No education | Unmatched | 0.331 | 0.174 | 36.9 |  | 11.78 | 0.000 | 0.331 | 0.174 | 36.9 |  | 11.78 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.330 | 0.323 | 1.7 | 95.4 | 0.35 | 0.723 | 0.274 | 0.266 | 1.9 | 95.0 | 0.37 | 0.709 |
| Primary education | Unmatched | 0.573 | 0.512 | 12.2 |  | 3.61 | 0.000 | 0.573 | 0.512 | 12.2 |  | 3.61 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.574 | 0.584 | -2.0 | 83.6 | -0.47 | 0.642 | 0.611 | 0.623 | -2.4 | 80.4 | -0.51 | 0.609 |
| Secondary or higher | Unmatched | 0.096 | 0.314 | -56.2 |  | -14.74 | 0.000 | 0.096 | 0.314 | -56.2 |  | -14.74 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.096 | 0.093 | 0.7 | 98.7 | 0.22 | 0.829 | 0.114 | 0.110 | 1.0 | 98.2 | 0.26 | 0.792 |
| Marital status ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Never married | Unmatched | 0.001 | 0.000 | 3.1 |  | 1.20 | 0.231 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.000 | 0.001 | -2.9 | 5.4 | -0.86 | 0.389 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Currently married | Unmatched | 0.949 | 0.952 | -1.4 |  | -0.41 | 0.684 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.950 | 0.952 | -0.7 | 51.4 | -0.15 | 0.878 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Formerly married | Unmatched | 0.050 | 0.048 | 1.0 |  | 0.31 | 0.759 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.050 | 0.048 | 1.0 | 3.6 | 0.23 | 0.820 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Birth order |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 | Unmatched | 0.226 | 0.315 | -20.0 |  | -5.72 | 0.000 | 0.226 | 0.315 | -20.0 |  | -5.72 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.227 | 0.233 | -1.3 | 93.2 | -0.33 | 0.744 | 0.259 | 0.263 | -0.7 | 96.5 | -0.15 | 0.884 |
| 2 | Unmatched | 0.269 | 0.281 | -2.8 |  | -0.83 | 0.408 | 0.269 | 0.281 | -2.8 |  | -0.83 | 0.408 |
|  | Matched | 0.269 | 0.268 | 0.3 | 88.3 | 0.08 | 0.939 | 0.279 | 0.280 | -0.2 | 93.5 | -0.04 | 0.970 |
| 3 | Unmatched | 0.177 | 0.178 | 0.0 |  | 0.00 | 0.997 | 0.177 | 0.178 | 0.0 |  | 0.00 | 0.997 |
|  | Matched | 0.178 | 0.183 | -1.2 | -9541.0 | -0.28 | 0.778 | 0.174 | 0.179 | -1.5 | -11409.6 | -0.31 | 0.758 |
| 4 or higher | Unmatched | 0.328 | 0.227 | 22.7 |  | 6.97 | 0.000 | 0.328 | 0.227 | 22.7 |  | 6.97 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.326 | 0.317 | 2.1 | 90.9 | 0.45 | 0.650 | 0.288 | 0.278 | 2.1 | 90.6 | 0.44 | 0.659 |
| Employment status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Not currently employed | Unmatched | 0.294 | 0.308 | -3.1 |  | -0.91 | 0.362 | 0.294 | 0.308 | -3.1 |  | -0.91 | 0.362 |
|  | Matched | 0.294 | 0.302 | -1.9 | 38.6 | -0.44 | 0.661 | 0.306 | 0.312 | -1.3 | 59.0 | -0.26 | 0.792 |
| Currently employed | Unmatched | 0.706 | 0.692 | 3.1 |  | 0.91 | 0.362 | 0.706 | 0.692 | 3.1 |  | 0.91 | 0.362 |
|  | Matched | 0.706 | 0.698 | 1.9 | 38.6 | 0.44 | 0.661 | 0.694 | 0.688 | 1.3 | 59.0 | 0.26 | 0.792 |
| Education of head of the household |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No education | Unmatched | 0.274 | 0.171 | 25.0 |  | 7.83 | 0.000 | 0.274 | 0.171 | 25.0 |  | 7.83 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.273 | 0.269 | 0.9 | 96.2 | 0.20 | 0.840 | 0.262 | 0.257 | 1.2 | 95.3 | 0.23 | 0.818 |
| Primary education | Unmatched | 0.550 | 0.474 | 15.3 |  | 4.52 | 0.000 | 0.550 | 0.474 | 15.3 |  | 4.52 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.551 | 0.556 | -1.0 | 93.6 | -0.23 | 0.820 | 0.543 | 0.551 | -1.7 | 89.0 | -0.35 | 0.725 |
| Secondary or higher | Unmatched | 0.176 | 0.355 | -41.5 |  | -11.47 | 0.000 | 0.176 | 0.355 | -41.5 |  | -11.47 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.176 | 0.175 | 0.2 | 99.4 | 0.06 | 0.952 | 0.195 | 0.192 | 0.8 | 98.0 | 0.19 | 0.850 |


| Appendix Table L. - Continued |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Variable | Sample | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | pvalue | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | pvalue |
|  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Mass media exposure ${ }^{2}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Not exposed to media | Unmatched | 0.522 | 0.364 | 32.2 |  | 9.64 | 0.000 | 0.522 | 0.364 | 32.2 |  | 9.64 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.523 | 0.525 | -0.4 | 98.6 | -0.10 | 0.919 | 0.499 | 0.501 | 0.3 | 99.2 | -0.05 | 0.957 |
| Exposed to media at least once a week | Unmatched | 0.478 | 0.636 | -32.2 |  | -9.64 | 0.000 | 0.478 | 0.636 | -32.2 |  | -9.64 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.477 | 0.475 | 0.4 | 98.6 | 0.10 | 0.919 | 0.501 | 0.499 | 0.3 | 99.2 | 0.05 | 0.957 |
| Wealth tercile |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| First | Unmatched | 0.571 | 0.307 | 55.1 |  | 16.71 | 0.000 | 0.571 | 0.307 | 55.1 |  | 16.71 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.570 | 0.578 | -1.6 | 97.1 | -0.35 | 0.725 | 0.539 | 0.543 | -0.8 | 98.5 | -0.17 | 0.868 |
| Second | Unmatched | 0.292 | 0.281 | 2.3 |  | 0.69 | 0.489 | 0.292 | 0.281 | 2.3 |  | 0.69 | 0.489 |
|  | Matched | 0.293 | 0.291 | 0.3 | 86.2 | 0.07 | 0.941 | 0.305 | 0.308 | -0.7 | 72.1 | -0.13 | 0.894 |
| Third | Unmatched | 0.137 | 0.411 | -64.6 |  | -17.31 | 0.000 | 0.137 | 0.411 | -64.6 |  | -17.31 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.137 | 0.131 | 1.4 | 97.8 | 0.41 | 0.680 | 0.155 | 0.149 | 1.6 | 97.5 | 0.40 | 0.688 |
| Residence |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rural | Unmatched | 0.842 | 0.698 | 34.7 |  | 9.60 | 0.000 | 0.842 | 0.698 | 34.7 |  | 9.60 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.842 | 0.848 | -1.5 | 95.7 | -0.39 | 0.693 | 0.831 | 0.836 | -1.3 | 96.2 | -0.31 | 0.756 |
| Urban | Unmatched | 0.158 | 0.302 | -34.7 |  | -9.60 | 0.000 | 0.158 | 0.302 | -34.7 |  | -9.60 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.158 | 0.152 | 1.5 | 95.7 | 0.39 | 0.693 | 0.169 | 0.164 | 1.3 | 96.2 | 0.31 | 0.756 |
| Provinces ${ }^{3}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Northwestern provinces | Unmatched | $0.298$ | 0.247 | 11.4 |  | 3.45 | 0.001 | 0.298 | $0.247$ | 11.4 |  | 3.45 | 0.001 |
|  | Matched | 0.296 | 0.299 | -0.7 | 93.8 | -0.16 | 0.873 | 0.243 | 0.246 | -0.5 | 95.3 | -0.12 | 0.907 |
| Southern provinces | Unmatched | 0.232 | 0.260 | -6.6 |  | -1.93 | 0.054 | 0.232 | 0.260 | -6.6 |  | -1.93 | 0.054 |
|  | Matched | 0.232 | 0.236 | -0.8 | 87.4 | -0.19 | 0.846 | 0.240 | 0.242 | -0.5 | 93.1 | -0.10 | 0.923 |
| Southwestern provinces | Unmatched | 0.385 | 0.252 | 28.9 |  | 8.88 | 0.000 | 0.385 | 0.252 | 28.9 |  | 8.88 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.386 | 0.380 | 1.3 | 95.4 | 0.29 | 0.769 | 0.422 | 0.416 | 1.3 | 95.6 | 0.25 | 0.805 |
| Siem Reap, Takeo, and Kandal | Unmatched | 0.080 | 0.172 | -28.1 |  | -7.57 | 0.000 | 0.080 | 0.172 | -28.1 |  | -7.57 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.080 | 0.076 | 1.1 | 96.2 | 0.30 | 0.765 | 0.088 | 0.085 | 0.9 | 96.9 | 0.21 | 0.830 |
| Phnom Penh | Unmatched | 0.006 | 0.069 | -33.9 |  | -8.08 | 0.000 | 0.006 | 0.069 | -33.9 |  | -8.08 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.006 | 0.009 | -1.6 | 95.4 | -0.81 | 0.420 | 0.007 | 0.011 | -2.3 | 93.2 | -0.96 | 0.338 |

${ }^{1}$ Not included in the estimation of the propensity score for the sub-sample
${ }^{3}$ Northwestern provinces include Kampong Thom, Kratie, Preah Vihear \& Steung Treng, Mondol Kiri/Rattanak Kiri
Southern provinces include Kampong Cham, Svay Rieng, Kampong Speu, Pursat, and Kampot/Kep
Southwestern provinces include Kampong Chhang, Preah Sihanouk/Daoh Kong, Battambang/Pailin, Banteay Mean Chey, and Otdar Mean Chey
Appendix Table M. Mean biases of covariates before and after matching, Gabon

| Variable | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Sample | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ |
|  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Maternal age at most recent birth (continuous) | Unmatched | 27.618 | 24.831 | 38.1 |  | 11.75 | 0.000 | 27.618 | 24.831 | 38.1 |  | 11.75 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 27.598 | 27.883 | -3.9 | 89.8 | -1.25 | 0.212 | 27.358 | 27.251 | 1.5 | 96.1 | 0.46 | 0.648 |
| Maternal age at most recent birth squared | Unmatched | 820.640 | 665.800 | 37.4 |  | 11.51 | 0.000 | 820.640 | 665.800 | 37.4 |  | 11.51 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 819.310 | 836.860 | -4.2 | 88.7 | -1.32 | 0.186 | 805.920 | 798.090 | 1.9 | 94.9 | 0.58 | 0.563 |
| Marital status ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Never married | Unmatched | 0.195 | 0.237 | -10.1 |  | -3.16 | 0.002 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.196 | 0.189 | 1.6 | 84.5 | 0.55 | 0.585 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Currently married | Unmatched | 0.712 | 0.675 | 8.0 |  | 2.48 | 0.013 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.712 | 0.721 | -2.0 | 74.7 | -0.69 | 0.491 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Formerly married | Unmatched | 0.093 | 0.088 | 1.7 |  | 0.53 | 0.597 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.093 | 0.090 | 1.0 | 41.9 | 0.33 | 0.741 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| None | Unmatched | 0.030 | 0.081 | -22.3 |  | -7.16 | 0.000 | 0.030 | 0.081 | -22.3 |  | -7.16 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.030 | 0.026 | 2.0 | 91.0 | 0.93 | 0.351 | 0.022 | 0.020 | 0.8 | 96.4 | 0.41 | 0.682 |
| Primary | Unmatched | 0.439 | 0.298 | 29.6 |  | 9.14 | 0.000 | 0.439 | 0.298 | 29.6 |  | 9.14 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.439 | 0.422 | 3.5 | 88.1 | 1.13 | 0.257 | 0.409 | 0.387 | 4.8 | 83.8 | 1.49 | 0.135 |
| Secondary or higher | Unmatched | 0.530 | 0.621 | -18.4 |  | -5.69 | 0.000 | 0.530 | 0.621 | -18.4 |  | -5.69 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.531 | 0.553 | -4.3 | 76.3 | -1.44 | 0.151 | 0.569 | 0.593 | -5.0 | 72.6 | -1.60 | 0.109 |
| Employment status ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Not currently employed | Unmatched | 0.542 | 0.627 | $-17.4$ |  | -5.38 | 0.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.543 | 0.553 | -2.0 | 88.6 | -0.66 | $0.512$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Currently employed | Unmatched | 0.458 | 0.373 | 17.4 |  | 5.38 | 0.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.457 | 0.447 | 2.0 | 88.6 | 0.66 | 0.512 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mass media exposure |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No access to any media | Unmatched | 0.234 | 0.133 | 26.4 |  | 8.08 | 0.000 | 0.234 | 0.133 | 26.4 |  | 8.08 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.233 | 0.234 | -0.2 | 99.3 | -0.05 | 0.958 | 0.193 | 0.187 | 1.6 | 94.0 | 0.49 | 0.623 |
| Exposure to media at least once a week | Unmatched | 0.766 | 0.867 | -26.4 |  | -8.08 | 0.000 | 0.766 | 0.867 | -26.4 |  | -8.08 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.767 | 0.766 | 0.2 | 99.3 | 0.05 | 0.958 | 0.807 | 0.813 | -1.6 | 94.0 | -0.49 | 0.623 |
| Education of household head |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| None | Unmatched | 0.102 | 0.108 | -1.9 |  | -0.60 | 0.549 | 0.102 | 0.108 | -1.9 |  | -0.60 | 0.549 |
|  | Matched | 0.102 | 0.100 | 0.7 | 61.5 | 0.25 | 0.800 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.2 | 91.0 | 0.06 | 0.954 |
| Primary | Unmatched | 0.368 | 0.290 | 16.6 |  | 5.14 | 0.000 | 0.368 | 0.290 | 16.6 |  | 5.14 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.367 | 0.337 | 6.3 | 61.9 | 2.08 | 0.037 | 0.344 | 0.325 | 4.1 | 75.5 | 1.29 | 0.197 |
| Secondary or higher | Unmatched | 0.530 | 0.602 | -14.6 |  | -4.52 | 0.000 | 0.530 | 0.602 | -14.6 |  | -4.52 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.531 | 0.563 | -6.5 | 55.6 | -2.15 | 0.032 | 0.562 | 0.581 | -4.0 | 72.8 | -1.27 | 0.206 |

Appendix Table M. - Continued

| Variable | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Sample | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ |
|  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Birth order |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Eldest | Unmatched | 0.181 | 0.315 | -31.4 |  | -9.88 | 0.000 | 0.181 | 0.315 | -31.4 |  | -9.88 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.181 | 0.185 | -1.0 | 96.8 | -0.37 | 0.709 | 0.192 | 0.200 | -1.8 | 94.3 | -0.61 | 0.542 |
| Second | Unmatched | 0.179 | 0.227 | -12.1 |  | -3.78 | 0.000 | 0.179 | 0.227 | -12.1 |  | -3.78 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.179 | 0.164 | 3.7 | 69.5 | 1.32 | 0.188 | 0.189 | 0.178 | 2.7 | 77.4 | 0.91 | 0.365 |
| Third | Unmatched | 0.153 | 0.155 | -0.7 |  | -0.22 | 0.825 | 0.153 | 0.155 | -0.7 |  | -0.22 | 0.825 |
|  | Matched | 0.153 | 0.157 | -1.2 | -72.2 | -0.41 | 0.683 | 0.155 | 0.160 | -1.4 | -100.3 | -0.45 | 0.653 |
| Fourth or higher | Unmatched | 0.488 | 0.303 | 38.5 |  | 11.89 | 0.000 | 0.488 | 0.303 | 38.5 |  | 11.89 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.487 | 0.493 | -1.3 | 96.7 | -0.41 | 0.684 | 0.463 | 0.462 | 0.4 | 99.1 | 0.11 | 0.911 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Poorest | Unmatched | 0.530 | 0.324 | 42.5 |  | 13.13 | 0.000 | 0.530 | 0.324 | 42.5 |  | 13.13 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.529 | 0.508 | 4.3 | 89.8 | 1.40 | 0.162 | 0.488 | 0.459 | 5.9 | 86.0 | 1.84 | 0.066 |
| 2nd quintile | Unmatched | 0.206 | 0.238 | -7.6 |  | -2.36 | 0.018 | 0.206 | 0.238 | -7.6 |  | -2.36 | 0.018 |
|  | Matched | $0.206$ | $0.203$ | 0.8 | 89.8 | 0.27 | 0.790 | 0.224 | 0.224 | -0.1 | 98.8 | -0.03 | 0.977 |
| 3rd quintile | Unmatched | 0.113 | 0.185 | -20.6 |  | -6.48 | 0.000 | 0.113 | 0.185 | -20.6 |  | -6.48 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.113 | 0.120 | -1.9 | 90.7 | -0.71 | 0.478 | 0.122 | 0.129 | -1.9 | 90.9 | -0.64 | 0.523 |
| 4th quintile | Unmatched | 0.076 | 0.150 | -23.6 |  | -7.49 | 0.000 | 0.076 | 0.150 | -23.6 |  | -7.49 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.076 | 0.076 | -0.2 | 99.3 | -0.06 | 0.950 | 0.083 | 0.086 | -0.8 | 96.6 | -0.29 | 0.771 |
| Richest | Unmatched | 0.076 | 0.103 | -9.5 |  | -2.96 | 0.003 | 0.076 | 0.103 | -9.5 |  | -2.96 | 0.003 |
|  | Matched | $0.076$ | 0.093 | -5.9 | 37.7 | -2.02 | 0.043 | 0.083 | 0.102 | -6.7 | 28.9 | -2.12 | 0.034 |
| Residence |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rural | Unmatched | 0.420 | 0.293 | 26.8 |  | 8.29 | 0.000 | 0.420 | 0.293 | 26.8 |  | 8.29 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.419 | 0.405 | 3.0 | 89.0 | 0.96 | 0.339 | 0.379 | 0.360 | 4.0 | 85.0 | 1.26 | 0.207 |
| Urban | Unmatched | 0.580 | 0.707 | -26.8 |  | -8.29 | 0.000 | 0.580 | 0.707 | -26.8 |  | -8.29 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.581 | 0.595 | -3.0 | 89.0 | -0.96 | 0.339 | 0.621 | 0.640 | -4.0 | 85.0 | -1.26 | 0.207 |
| Region |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Libreville-Port-Gentil | Unmatched | 0.079 | 0.242 | -45.4 |  | -14.54 | 0.000 | 0.079 | 0.242 | -45.4 |  | -14.54 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.079 | 0.084 | -1.3 | 97.1 | -0.57 | 0.569 | 0.086 | 0.092 | -1.6 | 96.6 | -0.63 | 0.531 |
| Estuaire | Unmatched | 0.065 | 0.111 | -16.2 |  | -5.13 | 0.000 | 0.065 | 0.111 | -16.2 |  | -5.13 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.066 | 0.063 | 1.0 | 94.1 | 0.37 | 0.710 | 0.070 | 0.068 | 0.7 | 95.6 | 0.26 | 0.797 |
| Haut-Ogooué | Unmatched | 0.140 | 0.073 | 21.9 |  | 6.68 | 0.000 | 0.140 | 0.073 | 21.9 |  | 6.68 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.140 | 0.137 | 1.2 | 94.7 | 0.35 | 0.730 | 0.151 | 0.150 | 0.3 | 98.7 | 0.08 | 0.938 |
| Moyen-Ogooué | Unmatched | 0.081 | 0.064 | 6.4 |  | 1.97 | 0.049 | 0.081 | 0.064 | 6.4 |  | 1.97 | 0.049 |
|  | Matched | 0.081 | 0.088 | -2.9 | 55.4 | -0.89 | 0.373 | 0.085 | 0.087 | -0.9 | 85.4 | -0.28 | 0.782 |
| Ngounié | Unmatched | 0.146 | 0.082 | 20.2 |  | 6.16 | 0.000 | 0.146 | 0.082 | 20.2 |  | 6.16 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.146 | 0.144 | 0.6 | 97.0 | 0.18 | 0.857 | 0.144 | 0.147 | -1.0 | 95.1 | -0.28 | 0.779 |
| Nyanga | Unmatched | 0.079 | 0.092 | -4.7 |  | -1.47 | 0.142 | 0.079 | 0.092 | -4.7 |  | -1.47 | 0.142 |
|  | Matched | 0.079 | 0.079 | 0.2 | 95.1 | 0.08 | 0.935 | 0.078 | 0.077 | 0.2 | 95.8 | 0.07 | 0.947 |
| Ogooué Maritime | Unmatched | 0.051 | 0.089 | -14.8 |  | -4.68 | 0.000 | 0.051 | 0.089 | -14.8 |  | -4.68 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.051 | 0.053 | -0.7 | 95.4 | -0.26 | 0.792 | 0.054 | 0.056 | -0.7 | 95.4 | -0.24 | 0.808 |

Appendix Table M. - Continued

| Variable | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ |
|  | Sample | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Ogooué-Ivindo | Unmatched | 0.197 | 0.079 | 34.7 |  | 10.51 | 0.000 | 0.197 | 0.079 | 34.7 |  | 10.51 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.196 | 0.189 | 1.8 | 94.8 | 0.52 | 0.601 | 0.168 | 0.156 | 3.6 | 89.7 | 1.05 | 0.294 |
| Ogooué-Lolo | Unmatched | 0.110 | 0.067 | 15.3 |  | 4.68 | 0.000 | 0.110 | 0.067 | 15.3 |  | 4.68 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.111 | 0.109 | 0.6 | 96.1 | 0.18 | 0.856 | 0.114 | 0.114 | -0.1 | 99.2 | -0.03 | 0.972 |
| Woleu-Ntem | Unmatched | 0.052 | 0.101 | -18.8 |  | -5.96 | 0.000 | 0.052 | 0.101 | -18.8 |  | -5.96 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.052 | 0.055 | -1.1 | 94.2 | -0.43 | 0.667 | 0.050 | 0.053 | -0.9 | 95.2 | -0.35 | 0.730 |

Appendix Table N. Mean biases of covariates before and after matching, Ghana

| Variable | Sample | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | pvalue | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | pvalue |
|  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Maternal age at birth | Unmatched | 28.386 | 27.715 | 9.9 |  | 2.09 | 0.037 | 28.386 | 27.715 | 9.9 |  | 2.09 | 0.037 |
|  | Matched | 28.380 | 28.293 | 1.3 | 87.1 | 0.26 | 0.793 | 28.394 | 28.278 | 1.7 | 82.7 | 0.34 | 0.730 |
| Maternal age at birth squared | Unmatched | 846.760 | 819.430 | 6.8 |  | 1.44 | 0.149 | 846.760 | 819.430 | 6.8 |  | 1.44 | 0.149 |
|  | Matched | 846.720 | 840.050 | 1.7 | 75.6 | 0.34 | 0.730 | 847.810 | 839.860 | 2 | 70.9 | 0.4 | 0.686 |
| Education |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No education | Unmatched | 0.260 | 0.373 | -24.4 |  | -5.16 | 0.000 | 0.260 | 0.373 | -24.4 |  | -5.16 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.264 | 0.249 | 3.2 | 86.8 | 0.65 | 0.513 | 0.268 | 0.248 | 4.3 | 82.2 | 0.87 | 0.385 |
| Primary education | Unmatched | 0.180 | 0.281 | -24.1 |  | -5.07 | 0.000 | 0.180 | 0.281 | -24.1 |  | -5.07 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.183 | 0.182 | 0.2 | 99.2 | 0.04 | 0.967 | 0.181 | 0.187 | -1.3 | 94.5 | -0.27 | 0.785 |
| Secondary or higher | Unmatched | 0.559 | 0.346 | 43.8 |  | 9.41 | 0.000 | 0.559 | 0.346 | 43.8 |  | 9.41 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.553 | 0.569 | -3.2 | 92.7 | -0.61 | 0.544 | 0.551 | 0.566 | -3 | 93.2 | -0.55 | 0.581 |
| Marital status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Never married | Unmatched | 0.038 | 0.071 | -14.8 |  | -3.07 | 0.002 | 0.038 | 0.071 | -14.8 |  | -3.07 | 0.002 |
|  | Matched | 0.039 | 0.036 | 1.5 | 90.1 | 0.34 | 0.737 | 0.039 | 0.036 | 1.1 | 92.7 | 0.25 | 0.806 |
| Currently married | Unmatched | 0.906 | 0.865 | 12.8 |  | 2.70 | 0.007 | 0.906 | 0.865 | 12.8 |  | 2.7 | 0.007 |
|  | Matched | 0.907 | 0.906 | 0.2 | 98.1 | 0.05 | 0.959 | 0.906 | 0.903 | 0.9 | 92.9 | 0.19 | 0.851 |
| Formerly married | Unmatched | 0.056 | 0.063 | -3.0 |  | -0.65 | 0.517 | 0.056 | 0.063 | -3 |  | -0.65 | 0.517 |
|  | Matched | 0.054 | 0.058 | -1.7 | 43.5 | -0.34 | 0.732 | 0.055 | 0.061 | -2.3 | 26.1 | -0.43 | 0.664 |
| Birth order |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 | Unmatched | 0.256 | 0.201 | 13.2 |  | 2.85 | 0.004 | 0.256 | 0.201 | 13.2 |  | 2.85 | 0.004 |
|  | Matched | 0.249 | 0.249 | 0 | 99.7 | 0.01 | 0.994 | 0.251 | 0.258 | -1.5 | 88.6 | -0.27 | 0.784 |
| 2 | Unmatched | 0.216 | 0.206 | 2.3 |  | 0.50 | 0.618 | 0.216 | 0.206 | 2.3 |  | 0.5 | 0.618 |
|  | Matched | 0.215 | 0.225 | -2.3 | -0.4 | -0.44 | 0.657 | 0.210 | 0.216 | -1.4 | 38.6 | -0.27 | 0.786 |
| 3 | Unmatched | 0.157 | 0.172 | -4.0 |  | -0.86 | 0.391 | 0.157 | 0.172 | -4 |  | -0.86 | 0.391 |
|  | Matched | 0.159 | 0.154 | 1.3 | 67.5 | 0.26 | 0.797 | 0.157 | 0.159 | -0.5 | 87.2 | -0.1 | 0.921 |
| 4 or higher | Unmatched | 0.371 | 0.421 | -10.2 |  | -2.18 | 0.030 | 0.371 | 0.421 | -10.2 |  | -2.18 | 0.030 |
|  | Matched | 0.377 | 0.372 | 0.9 | 90.9 | 0.18 | 0.857 | 0.381 | 0.367 | 2.9 | 71.9 | 0.55 | 0.581 |
| Employment status ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Not currently employed | Unmatched | $0.132$ | $0.137$ | $-1.6$ |  | $-0.34$ | $0.735$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.132 | 0.142 | -2.8 | -77.4 | -0.54 | 0.590 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Currently employed | Unmatched | 0.868 | 0.863 | 1.6 |  | 0.34 | 0.735 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.868 | 0.858 | 2.8 | -77.4 | 0.54 | 0.590 |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Appendix Table N. - Continued

| Variable | Sample | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | pvalue | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $\begin{gathered} \text { p- } \\ \text { value } \end{gathered}$ |
|  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Education of head of the household |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No education | Unmatched | 0.229 | 0.374 | -31.9 |  | -6.74 | 0.000 | 0.229 | 0.374 | -31.9 |  | -6.74 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.230 | 0.218 | 2.6 | 91.9 | 0.54 | 0.589 | 0.232 | 0.217 | 3.2 | 89.9 | 0.67 | 0.504 |
| Primary education | Unmatched | 0.109 | 0.182 | -21.1 |  | -4.41 | 0.000 | 0.109 | 0.182 | -21.1 |  | -4.41 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.110 | 0.104 | 1.8 | 91.7 | 0.38 | 0.702 | 0.112 | 0.108 | 1.1 | 94.7 | 0.24 | 0.810 |
| Secondary or higher | Unmatched | 0.663 | 0.444 | 45.1 |  | 9.59 | 0.000 | 0.663 | 0.444 | 45.1 |  | 9.59 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.659 | 0.677 | -3.7 | 91.8 | -0.73 | 0.465 | 0.656 | 0.675 | -3.8 | 91.5 | -0.75 | 0.453 |
| Mass media exposure |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Not exposed to media | Unmatched | 0.157 | 0.253 | -23.9 |  | -5.03 | 0.000 | 0.157 | 0.253 | -23.9 |  | -5.03 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched |  | 0.160 | 2.1 | 91.2 | 0.45 | 0.653 | 0.156 | 0.150 | 1.5 | 93.7 | 0.32 | 0.751 |
| Exposed to media | Unmatched | 0.843 | 0.747 | 23.9 |  | 5.03 | 0.000 | 0.843 | 0.747 | 23.9 |  | 5.03 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.840 | 0.848 | -2.1 | 91.2 | -0.45 | 0.653 | 0.844 | 0.850 | -1.5 | 93.7 | -0.32 | 0.751 |
| Wealth quintile |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| First | Unmatched | 0.150 | 0.321 | -41 |  | -8.54 | 0.000 | 0.150 | 0.321 | -41 |  | -8.54 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.153 | 0.152 | 0.4 | 99 | 0.1 | 0.924 | 0.156 | 0.151 | 1.3 | 96.9 | 0.28 | 0.778 |
| Second | Unmatched | 0.212 | 0.242 | -7.3 |  | -1.55 | 0.121 | 0.212 | 0.242 | -7.3 |  | -1.55 | 0.121 |
|  | Matched | 0.218 | 0.228 | -2.3 | 68.4 | -0.45 | 0.656 | 0.214 | 0.225 | -2.5 | 65 | -0.49 | 0.624 |
| Middle | Unmatched | 0.190 | 0.188 | 0.5 |  | 0.10 | 0.918 | 0.190 | 0.188 | 0.5 |  | 0.1 | 0.918 |
|  | Matched | 0.192 | 0.201 | -2.2 | -360.7 | -0.42 | 0.675 | 0.196 | 0.210 | -3.6 | -651.9 | -0.67 | 0.505 |
| Fourth | Unmatched | 0.254 | 0.154 | 24.9 |  | 5.41 | 0.000 | 0.254 | 0.154 | 24.9 |  | 5.41 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.253 | 0.238 | 3.8 | 84.9 | 0.67 | 0.500 | 0.253 | 0.235 | 4.5 | 82 | 0.79 | 0.428 |
| Highest | Unmatched | 0.195 | 0.095 | 28.6 |  | 6.29 | 0.000 | 0.195 | 0.095 | 28.6 |  | 6.29 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.183 | 0.182 | 0.4 | 98.5 | 0.07 | 0.942 | 0.181 | 0.179 | 0.4 | 98.5 | 0.08 | 0.940 |
| Residence |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rural | Unmatched | 0.539 | 0.539 | -28.7 |  | -6.18 | 0.000 | 0.539 | 0.678 | -28.7 |  | -6.18 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.548 | 0.548 | -2.2 | 92.4 | -0.41 | 0.682 | 0.546 | 0.560 | -3.1 | 89.4 | -0.57 | 0.572 |
| Urban | Unmatched | 0.461 | 0.322 | 28.7 |  | 6.18 | 0.000 | 0.461 | 0.322 | 28.7 |  | 6.18 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.452 | 0.442 | 2.2 | 92.4 | 0.41 | 0.682 | 0.454 | 0.440 | 3.1 | 89.4 | 0.57 | 0.572 |

Appendix Table N. - Continued

| Variable | Sample | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | pvalue | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | pvalue |
|  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Region |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Western | Unmatched | 0.094 | 0.099 | -1.5 |  | -0.33 | 0.742 | 0.094 | 0.099 | -1.5 |  | -0.33 | 0.742 |
|  | Matched | 0.096 | 0.088 | 2.7 | -73.9 | 0.53 | 0.596 | 0.094 | 0.090 | 1.2 | 21.7 | 0.23 | 0.814 |
| Central | Unmatched | 0.044 | 0.106 | -23.4 |  | -4.83 | 0.000 | 0.044 | 0.106 | -23.4 |  | -4.83 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.046 | 0.046 | -0.2 | 99.1 | -0.05 | 0.961 | 0.047 | 0.049 | -0.9 | 96.1 | -0.21 | 0.833 |
| Greater Accra | Unmatched | 0.077 | 0.127 | -16.5 |  | -3.45 | 0.001 | 0.077 | 0.127 | -16.5 |  | -3.45 | 0.001 |
|  | Matched | 0.077 | 0.075 | 0.4 | 97.3 | 0.10 | 0.923 | 0.079 | 0.075 | 1.1 | 93.4 | 0.23 | 0.815 |
| Volta | Unmatched | 0.077 | 0.101 | -8.5 |  | -1.79 | 0.073 | 0.077 | 0.101 | -8.5 |  | -1.79 | 0.073 |
|  | Matched | 0.079 | 0.084 | -1.7 | 80.6 | -0.33 | 0.741 | 0.080 | 0.085 | -1.8 | 78.4 | -0.36 | 0.718 |
| Eastern | Unmatched | 0.123 | 0.070 | 17.8 |  | 3.90 | 0.000 | 0.123 | 0.070 | 17.8 |  | 3.9 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.124 | 0.127 | -1.1 | 93.8 | -0.19 | 0.851 | 0.124 | 0.122 | 0.8 | 95.7 | 0.13 | 0.896 |
| Ashanti | Unmatched | 0.183 | 0.153 | 7.9 |  | 1.71 | 0.087 | 0.183 | 0.153 | 7.9 |  | 1.71 | 0.087 |
|  | Matched | 0.187 | 0.201 | -3.8 | 52.5 | -0.69 | 0.492 | 0.189 | 0.202 | -3.3 | 58.3 | -0.59 | 0.552 |
| Brong Ahafo | Unmatched | 0.153 | 0.076 | 24.4 |  | 5.38 | 0.000 | 0.153 | 0.076 | 24.4 |  | 5.38 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.145 | 0.146 | -0.2 | 99.1 | -0.04 | 0.970 | 0.141 | 0.144 | -1.1 | 95.5 | -0.19 | 0.851 |
| Northern | Unmatched | 0.119 | 0.177 | -16.4 |  | -3.46 | 0.001 | 0.119 | 0.177 | -16.4 |  | -3.46 | 0.001 |
|  | Matched | 0.121 | 0.120 | 0.4 | 97.4 | 0.09 | 0.930 | 0.120 | 0.117 | 0.9 | 94.4 | 0.19 | 0.848 |
| Upper West | Unmatched | 0.129 | 0.091 | 12.4 |  | 2.69 | 0.007 | 0.129 | 0.091 | 12.4 |  | 2.69 | 0.007 |
|  | Matched | 0.125 | 0.113 | 4.0 | 67.5 | 0.75 | 0.455 | 0.126 | 0.115 | 3.5 | 71.3 | 0.65 | 0.517 |

Appendix Table $O$. Mean biases of covariates before and after matching, Indonesia

| Variable | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ |
|  | Sample | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Maternal age at most recent birth |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15-19 years | Unmatched | 0.028 | 0.041 | -7.0 |  | -4.10 | 0.000 | 0.028 | 0.041 | -7.0 |  | -4.10 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.028 | 0.029 | -0.3 | 95.6 | -0.19 | 0.853 | 0.027 | 0.028 | -0.4 | 94.3 | -0.24 | 0.813 |
| 20-24 years | Unmatched | 0.157 | 0.217 | -15.6 |  | -9.22 | 0.000 | 0.157 | 0.217 | -15.6 |  | -9.22 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.157 | 0.161 | -1.1 | 92.7 | -0.66 | 0.510 | 0.156 | 0.160 | -1.0 | 93.3 | -0.60 | 0.549 |
| 25-29 years | Unmatched | 0.266 | 0.283 | -3.8 |  | -2.27 | 0.023 | 0.266 | 0.283 | -3.8 |  | -2.27 | 0.023 |
|  | Matched | 0.267 | 0.267 | -0.2 | 96.0 | -0.08 | 0.933 | 0.268 | 0.267 | 0.0 | 99.0 | 0.02 | 0.984 |
| 30-34 years | Unmatched | 0.261 | 0.228 | 7.6 |  | 4.55 | 0.000 | 0.261 | 0.228 | 7.6 |  | 4.55 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.261 | 0.258 | 0.5 | 93.2 | 0.28 | 0.783 | 0.261 | 0.258 | 0.7 | 90.9 | 0.36 | 0.717 |
| 35-39 years | Unmatched | 0.192 | 0.150 | 11.1 |  | 6.71 | 0.000 | 0.192 | 0.150 | 11.1 |  | 6.71 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.191 | 0.186 | 1.3 | 88.1 | 0.69 | 0.488 | 0.192 | 0.188 | 1.1 | 90.3 | 0.56 | 0.579 |
| 40-44 years | Unmatched | 0.082 | 0.066 | 5.9 |  | 3.57 | 0.000 | 0.082 | 0.066 | 5.9 |  | 3.57 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.082 | 0.083 | -0.5 | 92.2 | -0.24 | 0.810 | 0.081 | 0.083 | -0.8 | 86.9 | -0.40 | 0.689 |
| 45-49 years | Unmatched | 0.015 | 0.015 | 0.4 |  | 0.26 | 0.795 | 0.015 | 0.015 | 0.4 |  | 0.26 | 0.795 |
|  | Matched | 0.015 | 0.015 | -0.3 | 39.6 | -0.14 | 0.888 | 0.014 | 0.015 | -0.3 | 34.7 | -0.15 | 0.878 |
| Marital status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Never married | Unmatched | 0.001 | 0.001 | -1.8 |  | -1.06 | 0.287 | 0.001 | 0.001 | -1.8 |  | -1.06 | 0.287 |
|  | Matched | 0.001 | 0.001 | -0.2 | 86.7 | -0.16 | 0.874 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.0 | 99.9 | 0.00 | 0.999 |
| Currently married | Unmatched | 0.974 | 0.971 | 1.7 |  | 1.03 | 0.301 | 0.974 | 0.971 | 1.7 |  | 1.03 | 0.301 |
|  | Matched | 0.974 | 0.973 | 0.5 | 73.9 | 0.25 | 0.801 | 0.974 | 0.974 | 0.2 | 90.1 | 0.10 | 0.923 |
| Formerly married | Unmatched | 0.026 | 0.028 | -1.4 |  | -0.86 | 0.387 | 0.026 | 0.028 | -1.4 |  | -0.86 | 0.387 |
|  | Matched | 0.026 | 0.027 | -0.4 | 71.2 | -0.23 | 0.817 | 0.025 | 0.026 | -0.2 | 87.9 | -0.10 | 0.922 |
| Education |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| None | Unmatched | 0.018 | 0.031 | -9.0 |  | -5.23 | 0.000 | 0.018 | 0.031 | -9.0 |  | -5.23 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.018 | 0.019 | -0.6 | 92.9 | -0.40 | 0.687 | 0.015 | 0.015 | 0.0 | 99.8 | 0.01 | 0.989 |
| Primary | Unmatched | 0.261 | 0.338 | -16.9 |  | -10.04 | 0.000 | 0.261 | 0.338 | -16.9 |  | -10.04 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.261 | 0.265 | -0.8 | 95.1 | -0.47 | 0.640 | 0.256 | 0.259 | -0.7 | 96.0 | -0.38 | 0.706 |
| Secondary or higher | Unmatched | 0.722 | 0.631 | 19.5 |  | 11.60 | 0.000 | 0.722 | 0.631 | 19.5 |  | 11.60 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.721 | 0.717 | 1.0 | 94.8 | 0.58 | 0.563 | 0.730 | 0.727 | 0.6 | 96.7 | 0.37 | 0.713 |
| Employment status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Not currently employed | Unmatched | 0.462 | 0.539 | -15.6 |  | -9.33 | 0.000 | 0.462 | 0.539 | -15.6 |  | -9.33 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.462 | 0.469 | -1.4 | 91.0 | -0.77 | 0.443 | 0.462 | 0.467 | -1.0 | 93.7 | -0.53 | 0.598 |
| Currently employed | Unmatched | 0.538 | 0.461 | 15.6 |  | 9.33 | 0.000 | 0.538 | 0.461 | 15.6 |  | 9.33 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.538 | 0.531 | 1.4 | 91.0 | 0.77 | 0.443 | 0.538 | 0.533 | 1.0 | 93.7 | 0.53 | 0.598 |

Appendix Table O. - Continued

| Variable | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ | Mean |  | \% bias | \% biasreduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ |
|  | Sample | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Mass media exposure ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No access to any media | Unmatched | 0.138 | 0.157 | -5.3 |  | -3.18 | 0.001 | 0.138 | 0.157 | -5.3 |  | -3.18 | 0.001 |
|  | Matched | 0.138 | 0.139 | -0.1 | 98.0 | -0.06 | 0.952 | 0.134 | 0.134 | -0.1 | 98.6 | -0.04 | 0.967 |
| Exposure to media at least once a week | Unmatched | 0.862 | 0.843 | 5.3 |  | 3.18 | 0.001 | 0.862 | 0.843 | 5.3 |  | 3.18 | 0.001 |
|  | Matched | 0.862 | 0.861 | 0.1 | 98.0 | 0.06 | 0.952 | 0.866 | 0.866 | 0.1 | 98.6 | 0.04 | 0.967 |
| Education of household head |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No education | Unmatched | 0.034 | 0.058 | -11.7 |  | -6.83 | 0.000 | 0.034 | 0.058 | -11.7 |  | -6.83 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.034 | 0.036 | -1.1 | 90.5 | -0.69 | 0.488 | 0.032 | 0.034 | -0.8 | 93.3 | -0.49 | 0.621 |
| Primary education or higher | Unmatched | 0.966 | 0.942 | 11.7 |  | 6.83 | 0.000 | 0.966 | 0.942 | 11.7 |  | 6.83 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.966 | 0.964 | 1.1 | 90.5 | 0.69 | 0.488 | 0.968 | 0.966 | 0.8 | 93.3 | 0.49 | 0.621 |
| Birth order ${ }^{2}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Eldest | Unmatched | 0.317 | 0.368 | -10.6 |  | -6.35 | 0.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.317 | 0.319 | -0.3 | 96.9 | -0.18 | 0.855 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Second | Unmatched | 0.310 | 0.299 | 2.3 |  | 1.41 | 0.160 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.309 | 0.307 | 0.6 | 76.1 | 0.31 | 0.760 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Third | Unmatched | 0.188 | 0.168 | 5.3 |  | 3.17 | 0.002 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.188 | 0.186 | 0.4 | 92.0 | 0.23 | 0.822 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fourth or higher | Unmatched | 0.185 | 0.166 | 5.1 |  | 3.08 | 0.002 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.185 | 0.188 | -0.7 | 86.5 | -0.37 | 0.712 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Birth order - recode ${ }^{3}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Eldest | Unmatched |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.317 | 0.368 | -10.6 |  | -6.35 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.320 | 0.321 | -0.3 | 96.9 | -0.18 | 0.858 |
| Second or more | Unmatched |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.683 | 0.632 | 10.6 |  | 6.35 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.680 | 0.679 | 0.3 | 96.9 | 0.18 | 0.858 |
| Wealth quintiles |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Poorest | Unmatched | 0.261 | 0.298 | -8.2 |  | -4.87 | 0.000 | 0.261 | 0.298 | -8.2 |  | -4.87 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.261 | 0.261 | 0.2 | 98.1 | 0.09 | 0.932 | 0.251 | 0.252 | -0.1 | 98.9 | -0.05 | 0.959 |
| 2nd quintile | Unmatched | 0.189 | 0.213 | -6.1 |  | -3.63 | 0.000 | 0.189 | 0.213 | -6.1 |  | -3.63 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.189 | 0.193 | -1.0 | 83.5 | -0.56 | 0.576 | 0.189 | 0.191 | -0.6 | 90.3 | -0.33 | 0.744 |
| 3rd quintile | Unmatched | 0.171 | 0.195 | -6.2 |  | -3.68 | 0.000 | 0.171 | 0.195 | -6.2 |  | -3.68 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.171 | 0.172 | -0.3 | 95.2 | -0.17 | 0.867 | 0.173 | 0.173 | -0.1 | 98.9 | -0.04 | 0.970 |
| 4th quintile | Unmatched | 0.179 | 0.171 | 2.1 |  | 1.23 | 0.217 | 0.179 | 0.171 | 2.1 |  | 1.23 | 0.217 |
|  | Matched | 0.179 | 0.175 | 1.0 | 51.8 | 0.54 | 0.589 | 0.182 | 0.180 | 0.7 | 67.2 | 0.36 | 0.719 |
| Richest | Unmatched | 0.200 | 0.123 | 21.0 |  | 12.85 | 0.000 | 0.200 | 0.123 | 21.0 |  | 12.85 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.200 | 0.199 | 0.2 | 99.1 | 0.10 | 0.922 | 0.205 | 0.204 | 0.1 | 99.4 | 0.07 | 0.948 |


| Appendix Table O. - Continued |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Variable | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $p>\|t\|$ |
|  | Sample | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Residence |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rural | Unmatched | 0.485 | 0.575 | -18.1 |  | -10.89 | 0.000 | 0.485 | 0.485 | -18.1 |  | -10.89 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.485 | 0.483 | 0.5 | 97.1 | 0.29 | 0.773 | 0.478 | 0.475 | 0.5 | 97.4 | 0.25 | 0.803 |
| Urban | Unmatched | 0.515 | 0.425 | 18.1 |  | 10.89 | 0.000 | 0.515 | 0.425 | 18.1 |  | 10.89 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.515 | 0.517 | -0.5 | 97.1 | -0.29 | 0.773 | 0.522 | 0.525 | -0.5 | 97.4 | -0.25 | 0.803 |
| Region |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sumatera | Unmatched | 0.267 | 0.315 | -10.5 |  | -6.29 | 0.000 | 0.267 | 0.315 | -10.5 |  | -6.29 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.267 | 0.264 | 0.6 | 94.0 | 0.36 | 0.722 | 0.270 | 0.266 | 0.9 | 91.4 | 0.50 | 0.617 |
| Java | Unmatched | 0.217 | 0.259 | -9.7 |  | -5.80 | 0.000 | 0.217 | 0.259 | -9.7 |  | -5.80 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.218 | 0.216 | 0.3 | 96.6 | 0.19 | 0.851 | 0.221 | 0.221 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.00 | 0.999 |
| Bali and Nusa Tenggara | Unmatched | 0.116 | 0.070 | 15.7 |  | 9.65 | 0.000 | 0.116 | 0.070 | 15.7 |  | 9.65 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.116 | 0.123 | -2.5 | 83.9 | -1.24 | 0.216 | 0.117 | 0.122 | -1.7 | 89.5 | -0.80 | 0.425 |
| Kalimantan | Unmatched | 0.114 | 0.105 | 2.9 |  | 1.74 | 0.082 | 0.114 | 0.105 | 2.9 |  | 1.74 | 0.082 |
|  | Matched | 0.114 | 0.113 | 0.4 | 87.3 | 0.20 | 0.844 | 0.113 | 0.113 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.00 | 1.000 |
| Sulawesi | Unmatched | 0.172 | 0.162 | 2.8 |  | 1.70 | 0.089 | 0.172 | 0.162 | 2.8 |  | 1.70 | 0.089 |
|  | Matched | 0.173 | 0.170 | 0.7 | 76.8 | 0.36 | 0.722 | 0.173 | 0.170 | 0.9 | 69.8 | 0.46 | 0.648 |
| Maluku and Papua | Unmatched | 0.113 | 0.089 | 8.0 |  | 4.82 | 0.000 | 0.113 | 0.089 | 8.0 |  | 4.82 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.113 | 0.114 | -0.2 | 97.7 | -0.09 | 0.925 | 0.106 | 0.108 | -0.8 | 89.5 | -0.44 | 0.661 |

${ }^{1}$ Mass media exposure is defined as read newspaper, listen to radio, or watch TV at least once a week
${ }^{2}$ Not included in the estimation of the propensity score for the sub-sample
${ }^{3}$ Not included in the estimation of the propensity score for the full-sample
Appendix Table P. Mean biases of covariates before and after matching, Namibia

| Variable | Sample | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | pvalue | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | pvalue |
|  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Maternal age at birth | Unmatched | 29.683 | 26.209 | 53.2 |  | 10.53 | 0.000 | 29.683 | 26.209 | 53.2 |  | 10.53 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 29.425 | 29.117 | 4.7 | 91.1 | 0.71 | 0.477 | 29.387 | 29.051 | 5.1 | 90.3 | 0.76 | 0.446 |
| Maternal age at birth squared | Unmatched | 920.570 | 732.720 | 49.3 |  | 10.01 | 0.000 | 920.570 | 732.720 | 49.3 |  | 10.01 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 904.580 | 886.820 | 4.7 | 90.5 | 0.68 | 0.497 | 902.640 | 883.380 | 5.1 | 89.7 | 0.73 | 0.468 |
| Education |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No education | Unmatched | 0.021 | 0.111 | -36.8 |  | -6.15 | 0.000 | 0.021 | 0.111 | -36.8 |  | -6.15 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.024 | 0.027 | -1.1 | 97.1 | -0.24 | 0.810 | 0.025 | 0.023 | 0.6 | 98.4 | 0.14 | 0.890 |
| Primary education | Unmatched | 0.069 | 0.334 | -69.9 |  | -11.99 | 0.000 | 0.069 | 0.334 | -69.9 |  | -11.99 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.067 | 0.072 | -1.2 | 98.2 | -0.26 | 0.792 | 0.067 | 0.068 | -0.4 | 99.4 | -0.09 | 0.929 |
| Secondary or higher | Unmatched | 0.910 | 0.555 | 87.4 |  | 15.19 | 0.000 | 0.910 | 0.555 | 87.4 |  | 15.19 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.909 | 0.901 | 1.8 | 97.9 | 0.36 | 0.720 | 0.909 | 0.909 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.00 | 0.997 |
| Marital status ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Never married | Unmatched | 0.254 | 0.453 | -42.5 |  | -8.26 | 0.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.274 | 0.323 | -10.5 | 75.4 | -1.54 | 0.123 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Currently married | Unmatched | 0.695 | 0.485 | 43.8 |  | 8.65 | 0.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.673 | 0.620 | 11.0 | 74.9 | 1.60 | 0.111 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Formerly married | Unmatched | 0.050 | 0.062 | -4.9 |  | $-0.97$ | 0.334 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Matched | 0.053 | 0.057 | $-1.7$ | 65.4 | -0.25 | 0.805 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Birth order |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 | Unmatched | 0.294 | 0.312 | -4.0 |  | -0.81 | 0.420 | 0.294 | 0.312 | -4.0 |  | -0.81 | 0.420 |
|  | Matched | 0.317 | 0.339 | -4.8 | -19.9 | -0.67 | 0.500 | 0.320 | 0.343 | -5.0 | -26.2 | -0.70 | 0.485 |
| 2 | Unmatched | 0.284 | 0.253 | 7.0 |  | 1.44 | 0.149 | 0.284 | 0.253 | 7.0 |  | 1.44 | 0.149 |
|  | Matched | 0.276 | 0.282 | -1.3 | 82.1 | -0.18 | 0.859 | 0.276 | 0.289 | -2.9 | 58.4 | -0.41 | 0.683 |
| 3 | Unmatched | 0.212 | 0.157 | 14.3 |  | 3.04 | 0.002 | 0.212 | 0.157 | 14.3 |  | 3.04 | 0.002 |
|  | Matched | 0.214 | 0.203 | 2.9 | 79.4 | 0.40 | 0.686 | 0.214 | 0.196 | 4.8 | 66.1 | 0.66 | 0.509 |
| 4 or higher | Unmatched | 0.210 | 0.278 | -15.9 |  | -3.12 | 0.002 | 0.210 | 0.278 | -15.9 |  | -3.12 | 0.002 |
|  | Matched | 0.192 | 0.176 | 3.8 | 76.3 | 0.60 | 0.549 | 0.190 | 0.172 | 4.0 | 74.6 | 0.64 | 0.523 |
| Employment status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Not currently employed | Unmatched | 0.214 | 0.599 | -85.0 |  | -16.27 | 0.000 | 0.214 | 0.599 | -85.0 |  | -16.27 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.212 | 0.222 | -2.4 | 97.2 | -0.38 | 0.707 | 0.207 | 0.221 | -3.2 | 96.3 | -0.50 | 0.617 |
| Currently employed | Unmatched | 0.786 | 0.401 | 85.0 |  | 16.27 | 0.000 | 0.786 | 0.401 | 85.0 |  | 16.27 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.788 | 0.778 | 2.4 | 97.2 | 0.38 | 0.707 | 0.793 | 0.779 | 3.2 | 96.3 | 0.50 | 0.617 |

Appendix Table P. - Continued

| Variable | Sample | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic |  | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | pvalue |
|  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Education of head of the household |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No education | Unmatched | 0.061 | 0.244 | -52.6 |  | -9.08 | 0.000 | 0.061 | 0.244 | -52.6 |  | -9.08 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.067 | 0.079 | -3.3 | 93.6 | -0.64 | 0.520 | 0.069 | 0.078 | -2.6 | 95.2 | -0.48 | 0.629 |
| Primary education | Unmatched | 0.116 | 0.390 | -66.5 |  | -11.89 | 0.000 | 0.116 | 0.390 | -66.5 |  | -11.89 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.120 | 0.127 | -1.6 | 97.6 | -0.29 | 0.770 | 0.121 | 0.132 | -2.8 | 95.8 | -0.50 | 0.618 |
| Secondary or higher | Unmatched | 0.824 | 0.366 | 105.2 |  | 19.79 | 0.000 | 0.824 | 0.366 | 105.2 |  | 19.79 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.813 | 0.794 | 4.2 | 96.0 | 0.66 | 0.507 | 0.810 | 0.790 | 4.7 | 95.5 | 0.73 | 0.466 |
| Mass media exposure |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Not exposed | Unmatched | 0.029 | 0.177 | -49.9 |  | -8.3 | 0.000 | 0.029 | 0.177 | -49.9 |  | -8.30 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.024 | 0.029 | -1.7 | 96.5 | -0.46 | 0.648 | 0.022 | 0.023 | -0.3 | 99.3 | -0.10 | 0.922 |
| Exposed to media at least once a week | Unmatched | 0.971 | 0.823 | 49.9 |  | 8.30 | 0.000 | 0.971 | 0.823 | 49.9 |  | 8.30 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.976 | 0.971 | 1.7 | 96.5 | 0.46 | 0.648 | 0.978 | 0.977 | 0.3 | 99.3 | 0.10 | 0.922 |
| Wealth quintile |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| First | Unmatched | 0.032 | 0.229 | -61.3 |  | -10.11 | 0.000 | 0.032 | 0.229 | -61.3 |  | -10.11 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.031 | 0.038 | -2.2 | 96.4 | -0.56 | 0.578 | 0.032 | 0.034 | -0.5 | 99.2 | -0.13 | 0.894 |
| Second | Unmatched | 0.050 | 0.206 | -47.8 |  | -8.21 | 0.000 | 0.050 | 0.206 | -47.8 |  | -8.21 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.053 | 0.057 | -1.3 | 97.3 | -0.26 | 0.794 | 0.052 | 0.053 | -0.3 | 99.4 | -0.06 | 0.956 |
| Middle | Unmatched | 0.118 | 0.260 | -37.1 |  | -6.83 | 0.000 | 0.118 | 0.260 | -37.1 |  | -6.83 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.118 | 0.109 | 2.3 | 93.8 | 0.40 | 0.688 | 0.118 | 0.104 | 3.7 | 90.0 | 0.65 | 0.518 |
| Fourth | Unmatched | 0.277 | 0.223 | 12.5 |  | 2.61 | 0.009 | 0.277 | 0.223 | 12.5 |  | 2.61 | 0.009 |
|  | Matched | 0.281 | 0.263 | 4.1 | 66.8 | 0.58 | 0.562 | 0.283 | 0.265 | 4.2 | 66.6 | 0.58 | 0.565 |
| Highest | Unmatched | 0.523 | 0.082 | 109.5 |  | 28.74 | 0.000 | 0.523 | 0.082 | 109.5 |  | 28.74 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.517 | 0.532 | -3.9 | 96.5 | -0.45 | 0.654 | 0.515 | 0.545 | -7.4 | 93.2 | -0.85 | 0.396 |
| Residence |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rural | Unmatched | 0.330 | 0.631 | -63.2 |  | -12.73 | 0.000 | 0.330 | 0.631 | -63.2 |  | -12.73 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.332 | 0.350 | -3.9 | 93.8 | -0.57 | 0.571 | 0.337 | 0.319 | 3.9 | 93.8 | 0.57 | 0.570 |
| Urban | Unmatched | 0.670 | 0.369 | 63.2 |  | 12.73 | 0.000 | 0.670 | 0.369 | 63.2 |  | 12.73 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.668 | 0.650 | 3.9 | 93.8 | 0.57 | 0.571 | 0.663 | 0.681 | -3.9 | 93.8 | -0.57 | 0.570 |

Appendix Table P. - Continued

| Variable | Sample | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | pvalue | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | pvalue |
|  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Region |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Caprivi | Unmatched | 0.032 | 0.083 | -22.2 |  | -3.94 | 0.000 | 0.032 | 0.083 | -22.2 |  | -3.94 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.036 | 0.026 | 4.4 | 80.1 | 0.85 | 0.396 | 0.037 | 0.028 | 3.8 | 83.1 | 0.70 | 0.487 |
| Erongo | Unmatched | 0.084 | 0.060 | 9.5 |  | 2.06 | 0.040 | 0.084 | 0.060 | 9.5 |  | 2.06 | 0.040 |
|  | Matched | 0.096 | 0.100 | -1.7 | 82.5 | -0.21 | 0.836 | 0.096 | 0.111 | -5.8 | 39.3 | -0.69 | 0.487 |
| Hardap | Unmatched | 0.057 | 0.056 | 0.3 |  | 0.06 | 0.954 | 0.057 | 0.056 | 0.3 |  | 0.06 | 0.954 |
|  | Matched | 0.050 | 0.042 | 3.7 | -1209.8 | 0.59 | 0.553 | 0.047 | 0.035 | 5.3 | -1750.1 | 0.88 | 0.379 |
| Karas | Unmatched | 0.095 | 0.042 | 20.8 |  | 4.95 | 0.000 | 0.095 | 0.042 | 20.8 |  | 4.95 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.094 | 0.079 | 5.9 | 71.5 | 0.77 | 0.444 | 0.094 | 0.078 | 6.0 | 71.1 | 0.77 | 0.443 |
| Kavango | Unmatched | 0.061 | 0.146 | -28.1 |  | -5.06 | 0.000 | 0.061 | 0.146 | -28.1 |  | -5.06 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.060 | 0.053 | 2.3 | 91.6 | 0.44 | 0.659 | 0.062 | 0.046 | 5.1 | 81.7 | 0.98 | 0.329 |
| Khomas | Unmatched | 0.197 | 0.087 | 31.9 |  | 7.48 | 0.000 | 0.197 | 0.087 | 31.9 |  | 7.48 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.192 | 0.188 | 1.2 | 96.1 | 0.16 | 0.875 | 0.187 | 0.183 | 1.2 | 96.2 | 0.15 | 0.877 |
| Kunene | Unmatched | 0.034 | 0.060 | -12.3 |  | -2.29 | 0.022 | 0.034 | 0.060 | -12.3 |  | -2.29 | 0.022 |
|  | Matched | 0.036 | 0.042 | -2.8 | 76.9 | -0.44 | 0.656 | 0.037 | 0.048 | -5.3 | 57.0 | -0.79 | 0.432 |
| Ohangwena | Unmatched | 0.082 | 0.100 | -6.4 |  | -1.27 | 0.205 | 0.082 | 0.100 | -6.4 |  | -1.27 | 0.205 |
|  | Matched | 0.084 | 0.077 | 2.4 | 62.7 | 0.37 | 0.715 | 0.084 | 0.083 | 0.2 | 97.1 | 0.03 | 0.978 |
| Omusati | Unmatched | 0.099 | 0.092 | 2.4 |  | 0.50 | 0.619 | 0.099 | 0.092 | 2.4 |  | 0.50 | 0.619 |
|  | Matched | 0.101 | 0.114 | -4.6 | -90.1 | -0.63 | 0.532 | 0.103 | 0.109 | -1.8 | 26.1 | -0.24 | 0.809 |
| Oshana | Unmatched | 0.080 | 0.091 | -4.0 |  | -0.80 | 0.425 | 0.080 | 0.091 | -4.0 |  | -0.80 | 0.425 |
|  | Matched | 0.070 | 0.072 | -1.0 | 76.0 | -0.15 | 0.880 | 0.069 | 0.064 | 1.7 | 57.9 | 0.27 | 0.788 |
| Oshikoto | Unmatched | 0.086 | 0.095 | -3.2 |  | -0.65 | 0.517 | 0.086 | 0.095 | -3.2 |  | -0.65 | 0.517 |
|  | Matched | 0.079 | 0.096 | -5.9 | -81.0 | -0.86 | 0.391 | 0.081 | 0.077 | 1.4 | 56.3 | 0.21 | 0.831 |
| Otjozondjupa | Unmatched | 0.095 | 0.089 | 2.1 |  | 0.43 | 0.667 | 0.095 | 0.089 | 2.1 |  | 0.43 | 0.667 |
|  | Matched | 0.101 | 0.110 | -3.1 | -46.2 | -0.41 | 0.679 | 0.103 | 0.137 | -11.7 | -459.3 | -1.48 | 0.140 |

${ }^{1}$ Not included in the estimation of the propensity score for the sub-sample
Appendix Table Q. Mean biases of covariates before and after matching, Rwanda

| Variable | Sample | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | pvalue | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | pvalue |
|  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Maternal age at birth | Unmatched | 28.415 | 28.541 | -1.9 |  | -0.67 | 0.503 | 28.415 | 28.541 | -1.9 | -0.7 | 0.50 |  |
|  | Matched | 28.410 | 28.367 | 0.6 | 66.2 | 0.31 | 0.760 | 28.413 | 28.354 | 0.9 | 53.6 | 0.42 | 0.676 |
| Maternal age at birth squared | Unmatched | 849.290 | 860.610 | -2.8 |  | -0.99 | 0.322 | 849.290 | 860.610 | -2.8 |  | -0.99 | 0.322 |
|  | Matched | 849.220 | 848.910 | 0.1 | 97.2 | 0.04 | 0.970 | 849.270 | 848.410 | 0.2 | 92.4 | 0.10 | 0.920 |
| Education |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No education | Unmatched | 0.162 | 0.231 | -17.4 |  | -6.26 | 0.000 | 0.162 | 0.231 | -17.4 |  | -6.26 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.163 | 0.154 | 2.1 | 88.2 | 1.05 | 0.294 | 0.162 | 0.154 | 2.0 | 88.7 | 1.00 | 0.316 |
| Primary education | Unmatched | 0.718 | 0.703 | 3.4 |  | 1.18 | 0.239 | 0.718 | 0.703 | 3.4 |  | 1.18 | 0.239 |
|  | Matched | 0.723 | 0.732 | -1.9 | 43.3 | -0.92 | 0.358 | 0.722 | 0.729 | -1.5 | 55.7 | -0.71 | 0.476 |
| Secondary or higher | Unmatched | 0.120 | 0.066 | 18.5 |  | 6.11 | 0.000 | 0.120 | 0.066 | 18.5 |  | 6.11 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.115 | 0.114 | 0.2 | 99.0 | 0.08 | 0.936 | 0.116 | 0.117 | -0.4 | 98.1 | -0.15 | 0.882 |
| Marital status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Never married | Unmatched | 0.072 | 0.094 | -7.9 |  | -2.85 | 0.004 | 0.072 | 0.094 | -7.9 |  | -2.85 | 0.004 |
|  | Matched | 0.073 | 0.085 | -4.2 | 47.6 | -2.02 | 0.044 | 0.071 | 0.083 | -4.4 | 45.0 | -2.13 | 0.033 |
| Currently married | Unmatched | 0.852 | 0.751 | 25.6 |  | 9.36 | 0.000 | 0.852 | 0.751 | 25.6 |  | 9.36 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.852 | 0.836 | 3.9 | 84.8 | 2.00 | 0.045 | 0.855 | 0.840 | 4.0 | 84.6 | 2.04 | 0.041 |
| Formerly married | Unmatched | 0.075 | 0.155 | -25.1 |  | -9.44 | 0.000 | 0.075 | 0.155 | -25.1 |  | -9.44 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.075 | 0.079 | -1.2 | 95.1 | -0.69 | 0.491 | 0.074 | 0.078 | -1.1 | 95.5 | -0.63 | 0.529 |
| Birth order |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 | Unmatched | 0.245 | 0.191 | 13.0 |  | 4.45 | 0.000 | 0.245 | 0.191 | 13.0 |  | 4.45 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.242 | 0.257 | -3.5 | 73.0 | -1.58 | 0.114 | 0.242 | 0.257 | -3.6 | 72.5 | -1.60 | 0.110 |
| 2 | Unmatched | 0.195 | 0.195 | -0.1 |  | -0.05 | 0.962 | 0.195 | 0.195 | -0.1 |  | -0.05 | 0.962 |
|  | Matched | 0.195 | 0.196 | -0.1 | 57.0 | -0.03 | 0.978 | 0.196 | 0.196 | 0.1 | 61.9 | 0.02 | 0.981 |
| 3 | Unmatched | 0.155 | 0.150 | 1.4 |  | 0.48 | 0.629 | 0.155 | 0.150 | 1.4 |  | 0.48 | 0.629 |
|  | Matched | 0.155 | 0.147 | 2.4 | -75.1 | 1.16 | 0.248 | 0.155 | 0.146 | 2.7 | -91.1 | 1.26 | 0.209 |
| 4 or higher | Unmatched | 0.405 | 0.463 | -11.7 |  | -4.11 | 0.000 | 0.405 | 0.463 | -11.7 |  | -4.11 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.407 | 0.401 | 1.2 | 89.7 | 0.57 | 0.566 | 0.406 | 0.401 | 1.0 | 91.5 | 0.48 | 0.634 |
| Employment status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Not currently employed | Unmatched | 0.214 | 0.177 | 9.3 |  | 3.19 | 0.001 | 0.214 | 0.177 | 9.3 |  | 3.19 | 0.001 |
|  | Matched | 0.212 | 0.218 | -1.4 | 84.6 | -0.65 | 0.515 | 0.213 | 0.219 | -1.5 | 83.6 | -0.69 | 0.491 |
| Currently employed | Unmatched | 0.786 | 0.823 | -9.3 |  | -3.19 | 0.001 | 0.786 | 0.823 | -9.3 |  | -3.19 | 0.001 |
|  | Matched | 0.788 | 0.782 | 1.4 | 84.6 | 0.65 | 0.515 | 0.787 | 0.781 | 1.5 | 83.6 | 0.69 | 0.491 |

Appendix Table Q. - Continued

| Variable | Sample | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{p}- \\ \text { value } \end{gathered}$ | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{p}- \\ \text { value } \end{gathered}$ |
|  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Education of head of the household |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No education | Unmatched | 0.199 | 0.269 | -16.6 |  | -5.95 | 0.000 | 0.199 | 0.269 | -16.6 |  | -5.95 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.200 | 0.203 | -0.7 | 96.1 | -0.32 | 0.746 | 0.199 | 0.203 | -0.9 | 94.3 | -0.47 | 0.640 |
| Primary education | Unmatched | 0.670 | 0.648 | 4.5 |  | 1.59 | 0.112 | 0.670 | 0.648 | 4.5 |  | 1.59 | 0.112 |
|  | Matched | 0.674 | 0.670 | 0.6 | 85.7 | 0.31 | 0.757 | 0.672 | 0.668 | 1.0 | 78.7 | 0.46 | 0.647 |
| Secondary or higher | Unmatched | 0.131 | 0.082 | 15.8 |  | 5.28 | 0.000 | 0.131 | 0.082 | 15.8 |  | 5.28 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.127 | 0.127 | -0.1 | 99.3 | -0.05 | 0.963 | 0.128 | 0.129 | -0.2 | 98.8 | -0.08 | 0.935 |
| Mass media exposure |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Not exposed to media | Unmatched | 0.297 | 0.446 | -31.2 |  | -11.09 | 0.000 | 0.297 | 0.446 | -31.2 |  | -11.09 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.298 | 0.308 | -2.1 | 93.2 | -1.04 | 0.300 | 0.296 | 0.307 | -2.2 | 93.1 | -1.06 | 0.291 |
| Exposed to media at least once a week | Unmatched | 0.703 | 0.554 | 31.2 |  | 11.09 | 0.000 | 0.703 | 0.554 | 31.2 |  | 11.09 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.702 | 0.692 | 2.1 | 93.2 | 1.04 | 0.300 | 0.704 | 0.693 | 2.2 | 93.1 | 1.06 | 0.291 |
| Wealth quintile |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| First | Unmatched | 0.195 | 0.319 | -28.8 |  | -10.41 | 0.000 | 0.195 | 0.319 | -28.8 |  | -10.41 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.196 | 0.200 | -0.9 | 96.8 | -0.47 | 0.640 | 0.195 | 0.198 | -0.8 | 97.3 | -0.39 | 0.693 |
| Second | Unmatched | 0.203 | 0.227 | -5.7 |  | -2.00 | 0.045 | 0.203 | 0.227 | -5.7 |  | -2.00 | 0.045 |
|  | Matched | 0.205 | 0.205 | 0.1 | 98.9 | 0.03 | 0.977 | 0.204 | 0.202 | 0.4 | 93.5 | 0.18 | 0.859 |
| Middle | Unmatched | 0.198 | 0.171 | 7.1 |  | 2.45 | 0.014 | 0.198 | 0.171 | 7.1 |  | 2.45 | 0.014 |
|  | Matched | 0.200 | 0.198 | 0.4 | 94.3 | 0.19 | 0.851 | 0.200 | 0.197 | 0.7 | 89.9 | 0.33 | 0.742 |
| Fourth | Unmatched | 0.198 | 0.138 | 15.9 |  | 5.37 | 0.000 | 0.198 | 0.138 | 15.9 |  | 5.37 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.198 | 0.201 | -0.7 | 95.5 | -0.31 | 0.753 | 0.199 | 0.202 | -0.8 | 94.7 | -0.37 | 0.712 |
| Highest | Unmatched | 0.206 | 0.145 | 16.1 |  | 5.42 | 0.000 | 0.206 | 0.145 | 16.1 |  | 5.42 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.201 | 0.197 | 1.3 | 92.2 | 0.56 | 0.573 | 0.203 | 0.200 | 0.6 | 96.4 | 0.26 | 0.798 |
| Residence |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rural | Unmatched | 0.850 | 0.858 | -2.3 |  | -0.79 | 0.427 | 0.850 | 0.858 | -2.3 |  | -0.79 | 0.427 |
|  | Matched | 0.850 | 0.850 | 0.2 | 92.7 | 0.08 | 0.938 | 0.850 | 0.849 | 0.4 | 80.8 | 0.20 | 0.838 |
| Urban | Unmatched | 0.150 | 0.142 | 2.3 |  | 0.79 | 0.427 | 0.150 | 0.142 | 2.3 |  | 0.79 | 0.427 |
|  | Matched | 0.150 | 0.150 | -0.2 | 92.7 | -0.08 | 0.938 | 0.150 | 0.151 | -0.4 | 80.8 | -0.20 | 0.838 |

Appendix Table Q. - Continued

| Variable | Sample | Full sample |  |  |  |  |  | Sub-sample |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | pvalue | Mean |  | \% bias | \% bias reduction | t-statistic | pvalue |
|  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  | Insured | Uninsured |  |  |  |  |
| Region |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Kigali city | Unmatched | 0.111 | 0.134 | -7.2 |  | -2.54 | 0.011 | 0.111 | 0.134 | -7.2 |  | -2.54 | 0.011 |
|  | Matched | 0.111 | 0.109 | 0.7 | 90.6 | 0.33 | 0.739 | 0.112 | 0.111 | 0.4 | 94.5 | 0.19 | 0.847 |
| South | Unmatched | 0.247 | 0.266 | -4.4 |  | -1.53 | 0.126 | 0.247 | 0.266 | -4.4 |  | -1.53 | 0.126 |
|  | Matched | 0.247 | 0.253 | -1.3 | 69.8 | -0.63 | 0.530 | 0.247 | 0.251 | -1.1 | 75.7 | -0.50 | 0.614 |
| West | Unmatched | 0.241 | 0.203 | 9.2 |  | 3.15 | 0.002 | 0.241 | 0.203 | 9.2 |  | 3.15 | 0.002 |
|  | Matched | 0.241 | 0.239 | 0.6 | 93.2 | 0.28 | 0.776 | 0.242 | 0.241 | 0.2 | 97.5 | 0.11 | 0.916 |
| North | Unmatched | 0.172 | 0.108 | 18.5 |  | 6.18 | 0.000 | 0.172 | 0.108 | 18.5 |  | 6.18 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.170 | 0.177 | -2.0 | 89.1 | -0.87 | 0.384 | 0.169 | 0.175 | -1.9 | 89.7 | -0.82 | 0.412 |
| East | Unmatched | 0.229 | 0.289 | -13.6 |  | -4.83 | 0.000 | 0.229 | 0.289 | -13.6 |  | -4.83 | 0.000 |
|  | Matched | 0.230 | 0.223 | 1.8 | 86.6 | 0.90 | 0.370 | 0.231 | 0.222 | 2.1 | 84.9 | 1.01 | 0.314 |


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ In Albania, Cambodia, and Namibia, men age 15-49 were interviewed; in Indonesia, men age 15-54 were interviewed.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ Kernel matching is not available in STATA's teffects psmatch package.
    ${ }^{3}$ Several commands can be used to estimate the average treatment effect in STATA and these include att*, psmatch2 and teffects psmatch. Psmatch2 does not provide as much detail as att*, but provides more matching options, and it conveniently illustrates side-by-side comparisons of unmatched and matched cases. However, psmatch2 does not take into consideration that the propensity score is estimated when calculating standard errors. Teffects psmatch produces more robust standard errors because it accounts for additional variance due to the estimation of the propensity score.

[^2]:    Sources:
    Sources.

    1. http://www.rsijournal.eu/ARTICLES/December_2013/7.pdf 2. http://qshr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/4.17-Enkelejda.pdf 3. http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/women-of-the-world.pdf 4. http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/content/26/suppl_2/ii63.full 5. http://www.equitablehealthfinancing.org/countries/burundi
    2. http://www.who.int/healthsystems/topics/financing/healthreport/48_CHI.pdf
[^3]:    * $p<0.05$. ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$
    ${ }^{1}$ Not included in the estimation of the propensity score for the sub-sample
    ${ }^{2}$ Mass media exposure is defined as read newspaper, listen to radio, or watch TV at least once a week

[^4]:    * p<0.05. ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

[^5]:    * p<0.05. ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$
    ${ }^{1}$ Mass media exposure is defined as read newspaper, listen to radio, or watch TV at least once a week

[^6]:    ${ }^{1}$ Not included in the estimation of the propensity score for the sub-sample
    ${ }^{2}$ Mass media exposure is defined as read newspaper, listen to radio, or watch TV at least once a week

[^7]:    ${ }^{1}$ Not included in the estimation of the propensity score for the sub-sample
    ${ }^{2}$ Mass media exposure is defined as read newspaper, listen to radio, or watch TV at least once a week

